Political risk and Chinese investments in the African oil and gas industry : the case of China National Petroleum Corporation in South Sudan by Du Toit, Gerda Maria
  
Political Risk and Chinese Investments  
in the African Oil and Gas Industry:  
The Case of China National Petroleum Corporation in South Sudan 
 
by 
Gerda Maria du Toit 
 
 
 
 
 
Thesis presented in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree Master of Arts 
(International Studies) at Stellenbosch University 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Supervisor: Ms Derica Lambrechts 
Co-supervisor: Dr Sven Grimm 
Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences at Stellenbosch University 
 
 
March 2013 
	   ii	  
Declaration 
 
 
By submitting this thesis electronically, I declare that the entirety of the work contained therein is 
my own, original work, that I am the sole author thereof (save to the extent explicitly otherwise 
stated), that reproduction and publication thereof by Stellenbosch University will not infringe any 
third party rights and that I have not previously in its entirety or in part submitted it for obtaining 
any qualification. 
 
March 2013 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Copyright © 2013 Stellenbosch University 
All rights reserved  
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
	   iii	  
Abstract 
 
Chinese national oil corporations have increased their foreign direct investments over the 
last decade in Africa, where the political environment of oil producing countries often expose the 
firms to high political risk. The analysis of political risk is increasingly relevant for the 
investment decision-making process of Chinese corporations, as changes in political dynamics of 
host countries can affect the opportunities and profitability of investments. The study emphasises 
the need for firm-specific political risk analysis as a decision-making tool for international 
businesses operating in foreign countries.  
The main research question of the study is concerned with the main indicators of political 
risk that Chinese corporations may face in the African oil and gas industry. Chinese oil 
corporations may be affected by political instability, international and internal conflict, 
corruption, and poor economic and social development in African countries. The political risk 
they face may be influenced by indicators such as the location of the oil operations, the relative 
importance of the Chinese oil firm to the host country’s oil industry, the competitive advantage 
and technical abilities of Chinese oil firms, the support of the Chinese government to state-owned 
firms, and economic relations that the host government have with China and the oil firm. 
The study follows a qualitative research approach by way of an empirical case study of 
the political risk faced by one of China’s national oil corporations, China National Petroleum 
Corporation (CNPC), in South Sudan. A major part of CNPC’s business operations in Sudan was 
transferred to South Sudan after the country seceded from Sudan in July 2011. The political risk 
for CNPC in South Sudan is analysed and measured in accordance with an industry-specific 
political risk model for the oil and gas industry. The study finds that CNPC faces a high level of 
political risk in South Sudan since independence.  
An examination of the political risk analysis is done to serve as a basis for answering the 
main research question. The hostile relationship between South Sudan and Sudan in particular 
may expose CNPC to high political risk as it led to the shutdown of the oil industry and violent 
interstate conflict. However, CNPC’s political risk exposure may be mitigated by certain 
indicators, such as CNPC’s significance in the operation of the South Sudanese oil industry, 
CNPC’s attributes of being a Chinese state-owned enterprise, the availability of support from the 
Chinese government in the form of economic cooperation packages and CNPC’s technical 
abilities in exploration operations. Furthermore, while negative sentiments on the part of the 
South Sudanese government towards China and CNPC due to the latter’s close relations with 
Sudan might expose CNPC to high risk, the risk is mitigated by the high level of economic 
dependency of South Sudan on both China and CNPC.   
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Opsomming 
 
In die laaste dekade het Chinese nasionale oliekorporasies hulle buitelandse direkte beleggings in 
Afrika uitgebrei. Die politieke omgewing van hierdie lande veroorsaak egter dikwels dat hierdie 
firmas aan hoë politieke risiko blootgestel word. Omdat politieke dinamiek in gasheerlande die 
geleenthede en winsgewendheid van beleggings kan affekteer, is die analise van politieke risiko 
toenemend relevant in die beleggingsbesluitnemingsproses van Chinese oliekorporasies.  
Die hoof-navorsingsvraag in hierdie studie handel oor die hoofindikatore van politieke 
risiko waaraan hierdie korporasies in Afrika se olie- en gasindustrie blootgestel kan word. 
Politieke onstabiliteit, internasionale en nasionale konflik, korrupsie, asook swak ekonomiese en 
sosiale ontwikkeling in Afrikalande kan Chinese oliekorporasies affekteer. Die politieke risiko 
waaraan hulle blootgestel word, kan beïnvloed word deur faktore soos die ligging van 
oliebedrywighede, die relatiewe belangrikheid van die Chinese oliekorporasie vir die gasheerland 
se olie-industrie, die kompeterende voordeel en tegniese vermoëns van die Chinese 
oliekorporasies, die Chinese regering se ondersteuning van staatskorporasies en die ekonomiese 
verhoudings wat die gasheerland met China en die oliefirmas het. 
Die studie volg ‘n kwalitatiewe navorsingsbenadering by wyse van ‘n empiriese 
gevallestudie van die politieke risiko waaraan een van China se nasionale oliekorporasies, China 
National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), in Suid-Soedan blootgestel word. Sedert Suid-Soedan 
se onafhanklikheidswording in Julie 2011 is die grootste gedeelte van CNPC se bedrywighede in 
Soedan na Suid-Soedan oorgedra. Die politieke risiko vir CNPC is volgens ‘n industrie-spesifieke 
politieke risiko-model geanaliseer en bereken. Die studie toon dat CNPC inderdaad aan ‘n hoë 
vlak van politieke risiko blootgestel is sedert onafhanklikheid.  
 Die politieke risiko-analise word ondersoek ten einde as basis te dien vir die 
beantwoording van die hoof-navorsingsvraag. In die besonder kan die vyandiggesinde 
verhouding tussen Suid-Soedan en Soedan CNPC blootstel aan hoë politieke risiko, onder andere 
vanweë die sluiting van die olie-industrie en die gewelddadige interstaat-konflik wat dit 
meegebring het. CNPC se blootstelling aan politieke risiko kan egter verminder word deur sekere 
faktore soos CNPC se beduidende belangrikheid in die bedryf van die Suid-Soedanese olie-
industrie, CNPC se kenmerke as ‘n Chinese staatsonderneming, die beskikbaarheid van die 
ondersteuning van die Chinese regering in die vorm van ekonomiese samewerkingspakette asook 
CNPC se tegniese vermoëns in die veld van eksplorasiebedrywighede. Alhoewel die negatiewe 
sentiment in die Suid-Soedanese regering teenoor China en CNPC as gevolg van hulle noue 
verbintenis met Soedan vir CNPC aan hoë risiko kan blootstel, word hierdie risiko verminder 
deur Suid-Soedan se hoë vlak van ekonomiese afhanklikheid van CNPC en China.   
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Chapter One: Introduction to the study 
 
1.1 Introduction and statement of the topic 
Characterised by increased global economic integration, capital mobility and energy demand, the 
last few decades have seen the rise of new actors in the global business environment. As they are 
integrating into the world economy, developing countries such as China, India and Brazil are not 
only increasingly recipients of foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows, they have also become a 
major source of FDI outflows. Many of these FDI outflows from developing countries have gone 
to African countries, which have become an important source of oil to satisfy the growing world 
energy demand. This is particularly the case with China, which is now the second largest oil 
consumer in the world (Ma, Fu, Li & Liu, 2012:45). Africa is the source of 30 percent of China’s 
oil imports (Alessi & Hanson, 2012), with Angola as its main supplier (Croll, Lebzien & Paes, 
2008:2). The major part of Chinese FDI outflows to Africa has gone to oil-rich countries such as 
Nigeria, Algeria and Sudan (Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) of the People’s Republic of 
China, 2011:90). The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD, 
2012:xvi) reports that developing countries have increased their share of investments in Africa 
relative to developed countries over the last year. FDI by developed countries is constrained by 
the world economic downturn and the European debt crisis, and the political instability in African 
countries like Egypt and Libya made Africa less attractive as an investment destination. China on 
the other hand, has large foreign currency reserves (Deng, 2009:77) and seems willing to invest 
in African countries with unstable political environments. However, even if Chinese firms seem 
less risk-averse than their Western counterparts, the political environment may affect their 
business operations. For example, in 2011 more than 30 000 Chinese workers had to be 
evacuated from Libya during the political conflict (International Crisis Group (ICG), 2012a:9). 
Chinese firms can therefore not afford to ignore political risk. Jakobsen (2010:482) argues that 
the “risk landscape” of the 21st century is different from the previous century as more political 
actors are involved and the world is increasingly interconnected. Bremmer and Keat (2009:3) 
remark that this increased global economic integration, together with growing political instability, 
“have created a climate in which political risk is more relevant than ever for companies and 
governments”. While the key political risk that foreign investors faced during the 1960s and 
1970s was expropriation, Jakobsen (2010:482) argues that political risk today is a “highly 
complex and multidimensional phenomenon”.  
Apart from political instability such as the North Africa uprisings in 2011, foreign 
business firms operating in African countries may be exposed to political risk caused by wars, 
external threats, labour unrest and terrorism, or subtler political actions such as government 
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regulation or taxation policies. For oil corporations Alon, Gurumoorthy, Mitchell and Steen 
(2006:631) add the risks of energy vulnerability, oil embargoes or restrictions on oil exports. 
Frynas and Mellahi (2003:544) argue that these political risks can impact firms differently 
because of factors such as the firm’s historical advantage, technical abilities, high-level 
connections with the local government, nationality or the firm’s approach to community 
interaction (Frynas & Mellahi, 2003). This is in line with Alon and Herbert’s (2009:128) 
argument that “specific aspects of the firm either increase or decrease its political risk exposure”.  
The focus of this study will be on the political risk that Chinese business firms may face 
in the oil and gas industry in African countries. The risk landscape of the new millennium have 
changed as more actors are now involved in the African oil and gas industry, and although 
Chinese oil firms are relative latecomers in the field, they play an increasingly important role in 
Africa. With growing energy demands, oil and gas exports have become a major source of 
revenue for many African countries, and these countries are now much more integrated into the 
world economy. Africa has gained relative prominence in China’s foreign relations since the new 
millennium, especially in terms of economic relations, and political risk has become relevant for 
Chinese firms. 
This study will be an expansion of the research done by scholars such as Frynas and 
Mellahi (2003) and Alon and Herbert (2009) on firm-specific political risk. A case study 
approach will be followed by focussing on South Sudan, an African oil-producing country that 
seceded from Sudan1 in July 2011. A significant part of the investments of the largest investor in 
the Sudanese oil industry, the Chinese national oil corporation (NOC) China National Petroleum 
Corporation (CNPC), was transferred to South Sudan after independence because 75 percent of 
the oil fields of Sudan fell into the territory of the new state. These two countries remain 
economically interdependent because the landlocked South Sudan can only export its oil through 
Sudan’s infrastructure (Medani, 2011:136). However, unresolved issues of the Comprehensive 
Peace Agreement (CPA), that brought peace to Sudan in 2005 after 22 years of civil war, led to 
the renewal of the hostile relationship between Juba and Khartoum2. The direct consequences of 
these unresolved issues between Sudan and South Sudan was firstly the decision of the South 
Sudanese government to shut down its oil production at the beginning of 2012 (McNamee, 
2012:12) and secondly the outbreak of armed conflict between the two states during April 2012 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 In this study the term Sudan refers to the country with Khartoum as the capital and South Sudan refers to the new 
country with Juba as the capital. The term southern Sudan is used to describe the southern region of Sudan prior to 
secession. When describing events that took place prior to the secession of South Sudan, the term Sudan refers to the 
2 In this context Khartoum refers to the government agencies of Sudan while Juba refers to the government agencies 
of South Sudan since 9 July 2011 and to the government agencies of the semi-autonomous Southern Sudan for the 
period from 9 January 2005 to 8 July 2011. 
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because of disputes around the demarcation of the border. By way of a political risk analysis this 
study will measure the level of political risk that the political environment and events in South 
Sudan may pose to CNPC. 
In the remainder of this chapter the research problem and the research question will be 
formulated as well as an explanation of the objectives, rationale and significance of the study. 
Thereafter the research design and methodology will be described, followed by an overview of 
the important literature that will be consulted during the research, and a discussion of the 
limitations and delimitations of the study. Before concluding this section, an outline of the rest of 
the study will be provided. 
 
1.2 Research problem and research questions 
The relationship between business and politics is not only acknowledged in the field of Political 
Risk Analysis, but is also a subject of study in other disciplines such as International Relations 
(IR), Foreign Policy Analysis and Political Economy (PE). While Keohane and Nye (1971:330) 
emphasise the role of non-state actors such as multinational corporations (MNCs) in world 
politics, Beasly, Kaarbo, Lantis and Snarr (2002:8) make the specific comment that poor states on 
the periphery of the international economic system are often constrained in their foreign policy 
because of their extreme dependency on other states, MNCs and international financial 
institutions. In the field of PE, Stopford and Strange (1991:1) argue that firms and governments 
are mutually interdependent in a globalised world, as governments compete to attract FDI and 
firms become dependent on governments as they compete with other firms across national 
borders. Government diplomacy therefore increasingly extends beyond state to state relations to 
include relations with MNCs (Stopford & Strange, 1991:2; Hill, 2003:xix). In the field of 
Political Risk Analysis, Frynas and Mellahi (2003:541) have a similar line of argument to 
emphasise the importance of firm-specific political risk. They argue that international firms are 
not merely “passive bystanders” influenced by the political environment in which they operate, 
but they can be active actors in shaping that environment or in exploiting it for their own benefit 
(Frynas and Mellahi, 2003:541,562). For Brink (2004:181) this is especially the case with 
international firms operating in developing countries where the host government is dependent on 
the MNC for economic development. This relationship gives the MNC some bargaining power 
that can be used to benefit the firm or mitigate the effect of political risk (Brink, 2004:181). 
Recognising that the nature of political risk is highly complex, Frynas and Mellahi (2003) argue 
that firms or projects are differently affected by political risk exposure in a country because of 
variables that give the firm a bargaining advantage, such as the firm’s nationality and the firm’s 
relations with the host government. It is because of the particularity of international firms and the 
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industry in which they operate that scholars such as Frynas and Mellahi (2003:561) and Alon and 
Herbert (2009:127) suggest that more research is necessary in the area of micro political risk3.  
As Chinese corporations are expanding their investments in the African oil and gas industry, 
Cissé (2012:4) comments that the opportunities for Chinese investors are often in high-risk zones. 
These business operations of the Chinese oil corporations might be exposed to macro political 
risks4 such as wars or civil unrest that may affect all businesses in a country, but may also be 
exposed to micro political risks such as oil embargoes or environmental activism that are specific 
to the oil and gas industry. It is also possible that Chinese firms are affected by these risks in 
different ways to other corporations because of risk indicators such as the firm’s relations with 
the host government or its historical advantages in a certain country, as Frynas and Mellahi 
(2003) suggest. While Frynas and Mellahi (2003:541,562) argue that firms can mitigate their 
political risk exposure by playing a role in the shaping of the political environment or exploit the 
high-risk situation, this might be the case with Chinese NOCs. According to Alden, Large and 
Soares de Oliveira (2008:20), Chinese NOCs increasingly shape Chinese relations with Africa. 
This links up with Zhu’s (2010:22) observation that Chinese businesses play a role in political 
relations with Africa as bankers and businesspeople often accompany Chinese government 
officials on trips to Africa to promote commerce. Barber and Xiao (2012:6) remark that “Chinese 
interests become ever more entrenched and consequently caught up in Africa’s domestic and 
regional politics” despite Chinese official rhetoric of “non-interference”5 in the internal affairs of 
other countries. This study will examine the proposition that Chinese oil firms operating in Africa 
may not only be exposed to firm-specific political risk, but that these firms may also play a role 
in shaping or exploiting the political environment in which they operate. It is the aim of this study 
to identify the main indicators6 of political risk that Chinese corporations may face in the African 
oil and gas industry. From this discussion, the main research question that will be guiding the 
study is the following: 
 
• What are the main indicators of political risk that Chinese corporations may face in the oil 
and gas industry in African countries?  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 While macro political risk refers to risks that affect the majority of foreign operations and investments in a host 
country, micro political risk is discriminative in the sense that only a selected group is affected, such as a certain 
industry, firm or project (Alon & Herbert, 2009:129,130). The term macro and micro political risk will be 
conceptualised in section 2.3.6. 
4 Refer to footnote 3 for an explanation of macro political risk.  
5 The principle of non-interference in the affairs of other countries and respect for their sovereignty is a guiding 
principle in China’s international relations. Also refer to the discussion in section 3.3. 6	  The terms risk factors and indicators are used in this study in accordance with the use in Boshoff’s industry-specific 
political risk model for the oil and gas industry that is set out in section 2.4. 	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In order to answer the research question, a case study approach will be followed7. Through a 
case study, a detailed picture can be formed of the political risk that a Chinese oil corporation 
may face in an African country, which can provide a basis for identifying the main indicators of 
political risk. One of China’s large NOCs, CNPC, is the largest oil investor in South Sudan, a 
new country where the political environment has changed since the country seceded from Sudan 
on 9 July 2011. To both supplement and support the main research question the following two 
sub-questions were identified: 
 
• What are the features of the relationship between China and Sudan before South Sudan’s 
independence?  
• What is the level of political risk that CNPC faces in South Sudan since the country’s 
independence on 9 July 2011? 
 
1.3 Objectives, rationale and significance of the study 
Chinese oil corporations are expanding their investments in African countries, and often in 
countries where the political environment exposes the firms to high risk. For these firms the 
analysis of political risk, as part of investment risk, is of key relevance to the success of their 
business operations in Africa. Risk assessments assist the investor in weighing up the 
opportunities of high returns against potential losses (Brink, 2004:148). Political risk analysis is 
grounded in problem-solving and decision-making theory, “generally assumed to be a theory 
underlying rational decision-making under uncertainty” (Brink, 2004:30). For Venter (1999:1), 
the principle of reasoned and defensible decision-making is that a “decision-maker should 
anticipate future events, decide what measure of control is possible over those events and make a 
choice from those events that will produce a preferred outcome.” The analysis of political risk is 
a tool that investors can use to make reasoned and defensible decisions regarding investments 
(Venter, 1999:1). By conducting political risk analyses, investors can reduce uncertainties about 
the future and will be in a better position to make rational choices about their operations in the 
foreign country. A clear understanding of all factors and its indicators that can have an influence 
on political risk is necessary to conduct a reliable and purposeful political risk analysis. By 
gaining a better understanding of the relationship between international firms and politics and the 
implications of the relationship for political risk, investors can better prepare themselves to deal 
with these risks in the decision-making process. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 For detail on the methodology followed refer to section 1.4. 
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The political environment of the African countries is often negatively associated with 
high levels of political risk. However, if firms only focus on macro political risks in the African 
country and do not take the specific impact for the firm into account, it is possible that the firm 
may miss profitable business opportunities. Frynas and Mellahi (2003:563) found “political risk 
to be highly firm-specific and a potential source of competitive advantage”, because firms have 
specific resources and capabilities to allow them to play an active role in shaping their 
environment. Therefore it is important to provide firm-specific political risk analysis when an 
analyst has to forecast political risk as a justification for a firm’s business decisions. This 
forecasting can be done by “logically following an analysis of the identified variables in a risk 
model, determining their relationship and establishing their influence on a certain situation” 
(Hough, 2008:7). In this way, it is not only the negative implications of risks that are highlighted, 
but the opportunities can also be identified where “risk can result in gains, even if there is a 
probability of losses” (Van der Lugt & Hamblin, 2011:25). Van der Lugt and Hamblin (2011:25) 
argue that Chinese firms operating in Africa have this perspective of risk that can result in gains, 
and the idea of opportunities as the positive side of risk is “expressed in the Chinese character for 
‘crisis’, which contains both the word ‘chaos’ and opportunity’.” The objective of the study is to 
illustrate the importance of firm-specific political risk analysis for Chinese firms operating in the 
oil and gas industry in Africa by way of a case study of CNPC in South Sudan, an African 
country that is perceived to have an unstable political environment. The aim of the study is not to 
develop a new model for political risk analysis, but rather to identify the main indicators of 
political risk that Chinese firms operating in the African oil and gas industry may face and to 
measure the level of political risk that CNPC faces in South Sudan. The rationale behind the 
study is to gain a better understanding of the nature of political risk faced by Chinese 
corporations in the African oil and gas industry. This may provide valuable information for 
analysts to improve political risk assessments that can serve as a basis for decision-making by 
Chinese corporations. 
The significance of the study is that by empirical research on political risk more 
knowledge and understanding will be gained on political risk factors and its indicators. In 
particular, the study will contribute to a better explanation of the relationship between business 
and politics in the oil and gas industry. Contributions to the field of political risk and political risk 
analysis are important, as the nature of political risk is changing and becoming increasingly 
complex and multidimensional (Jakobsen (2011:482). As Brink (2004:410) comments, “the 
rationale behind political risk analysis remains the fact that political dynamics and ever-changing 
business climates constantly influence and change investment opportunities and profitability”. 
For Boshoff (2010:96) the field of political risk can be seen as a bridge between politics and 
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business and a better understanding of the character of political risk can help political risk 
analysts to provide better risk assessments on which business decisions can be based. In 
particular, if micro political risks are better understood, the analysis of political risk can provide a 
better forecast of future political events and the impact of the events on particular international 
firms. With better tools to use as a basis for reasoned decision-making, investors should be able 
to manage risks or mitigate the effects and take advantage of opportunities in order to maximise 
the firm’s profitability or other strategic goals. 
  
1.4 Research design and methodology 
The study will follow a qualitative approach and the research design is an empirical case study. 
The case study will be carried out in the form of a political risk analysis for CNPC’s investments 
in the South Sudanese oil industry. According to Yin (2009:18), a case study is defined as “an 
empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon in depth and within its real-life 
context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and contexts are not clearly 
evident”. One case is selected to perform an analytical study to demonstrate a causal argument or 
a theory (Neuman, 2006:40). Neuman (2006:159) explains that a wide variety of aspects of the 
same case are examined in the case study in order to find explanations or interpretations. A case 
study approach will be followed in this study because the phenomenon of political risk and the 
relationship between politics and business requires an in-depth understanding of the context of 
the real-life situation. Kobrin (1979:78) remarks that a case study can give in-depth knowledge 
about the relationships that influence political risk and the nature of the impact of political risk 
events. The theories of political risk, in particular micro political risk, will be demonstrated by 
way of empirical enquiry in the form of a political risk analysis. According to Yin (2009:9-11), 
case studies can be performed as a research method when contemporary events rather than 
historical events are investigated and when the research requires explanations. This study 
warrants a case study approach because the research focuses on current events, i.e. events since 
the recent secession of South Sudan from Sudan, although the historical context is necessary in 
order to understand the contemporary situation. Furthermore, the research questions, as set out in 
section 1.2, require explanations. The case study is a “distinctive form of empirical enquiry” and 
can therefore not be generalised to populations or universes, but is rather generalised to 
theoretical propositions with the goal of expanding or contributing to general theories (Yin, 
2009:14,15). This study will contribute to the general theories of political risk and political risk 
analysis by way of empirical research.  
The case study will focus on the political risk faced by CNPC in South Sudan. CNPC was 
selected as a firm for the case study because it is an oil corporation and unique in the sense that it 
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is a Chinese state-owned enterprise (SOE) which only started to integrate into the world economy 
since the 1990s. The reason that South Sudan was selected for the case study is firstly because of 
the change in the region’s political environment since the South Sudanese secession from Sudan 
on 9 July 2011. Secondly, the oil industry plays a major role in the country’s economy. Thirdly, 
the investment by CNPC in Sudan, of which a major part was transferred to South Sudan after its 
secession, was CNPC’s first major investment abroad. Fourthly, CNPC holds the majority of the 
shares in the two largest operating consortiums in the country.  
A main research question and two sub-questions that will guide the study were identified 
in section 1.2. The first sub-question that asks what the features of the relationship are between 
China and Sudan before South Sudan’s independence will be answered in Chapter Three through 
descriptive research. The answer to this sub-question will provide the context that is necessary as 
a background to answer the second sub-question, which asks what the level of political risk is that 
CNPC faces in South Sudan since the country’s independence. The second sub-question will be 
answered in Chapter Four by way of a political risk analysis. The answers to these two sub-
questions will support the main research question that asks what the main indicators of political 
risk are that Chinese corporations may face in the oil and gas industry in African countries. By 
examining the content and the risk ratings of the political risk factors and indicators of the 
political risk analysis, the main indicators of political risk that Chinese corporations may face will 
be identified and presented in Chapter Five. 
The purpose of the research is descriptive as well as explanatory. According to Neuman 
(2006:34-35), descriptive research presents a detailed picture of the situation or the social setting 
of the subject being studied. In this study, the contextualisation of the Chinese FDI in the South 
Sudanese oil industry will be descriptive research. The purpose of the political risk analysis is 
explanatory, as the analysis will explain why certain factors and indicators identified in the study 
will contribute to higher or lower political risk levels. As Neuman (2006:35) explains, 
explanatory research builds on descriptive research to identify the links between events or the 
reasons why events happened, usually in accordance with theory to determine the best 
explanations. Because micro political risk affects a specific firm or industry, Alon and Herbert 
(2009:127) note that the unit of analysis is not only the host country, but also the firm’s 
nationality, industry, particular characteristics of the project and the relationship between the host 
country and the firm. The unit of analysis of this study is therefore the oil and gas industry in 
South Sudan as well as CNPC and its relationship with the governments of China and South 
Sudan. The time dimension of the study is cross-sectional as the oil and gas industry of South 
Sudan will be analysed since the date of independence of 9 July 2011 until 31 August 2012. 
However, the history of the oil industry and its connection to the politics of Sudan and South 
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Sudan is essential in understanding the political risk that CNPC faces in South Sudan. Therefore, 
historical information applicable over a longer period of time will be gathered and interpreted in 
order to get a better understanding of the current level of political risk.  
As a theoretical background to the study, theories on political risk and political risk 
analysis will be examined. The theoretical framework of political risk and political risk analysis 
is grounded in rational decision-making theory, because political risk assessments can help 
investors to anticipate future events on which reasoned and defensible investment decisions can 
be based (Venter, 1999:1). As a framework for the political risk analysis, Alon et al. (2006:624) 
argue that it is important to use an industry-specific model because micro political risks differ 
from industry to industry. As the aim of the study is not to develop a new political risk model, an 
existing model, a model developed by Boshoff (2010), will be used as a basis for performing the 
analysis. There are various political risk models that are used in the industry of political risk 
assessment, but many are not readily available as they are considered intellectual property of 
those companies that developed them. By conducting research on elements of these models as 
reconstructed by various scholars, Boshoff (2010) developed a political risk analysis model for 
the oil and gas industry that follows a mixed methods approach, incorporating quantitative and 
qualitative methods. The model is compact and based on a simple mathematical calculation, but 
at the same time also comprehensive in the sense that macro and micro political risk indicators 
are incorporated into one model. This makes the model valuable for the purposes of this study, as 
another model developed by Alon and Herbert (2009) that was also considered, only assesses 
micro political risk. It is important for the purpose of this study to include the measurement of 
both macro and micro political risk to establish what the main indicators of political risk for 
Chinese oil corporations are. Boshoff’s (2010) model incorporates six political risk factors, i.e. 
political, economic, societal, petroleum, company and international factors that are analysed and 
rated in accordance with different indicators.  
The study will make use of textual secondary data such as academic articles, books and 
credible internet sources as the basis for the analysis. As Neuman (2006:41) states, most case 
studies are qualitative in nature that follow a nonlinear path and the context of the case is 
researched and interpreted. This research is oriented at interpretation by way of an analysis of the 
qualitative data where motives, themes and ideas rather than variables will be studied. Because of 
the qualitative nature of the data, Neuman (2006:151-152) emphasises that the credibility and 
validity of the evidence is very important. This study will therefore use a variety of sources, and 
their credibility will be checked.  
1.5 Literature overview 
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Three broad fields of literature will be consulted in the research. Firstly, literature on political risk 
and political risk analysis will be examined to provide a theoretical background to the study. To 
conceptualise political risk and political risk analysis, the main texts that will be used are Brink’s 
(2004) Measuring political risk: risks to foreign investment and articles by Robock (1971), 
Kobrin (1978 and 1979), Simon (1982 and 1984), Fitzpatrick (1983), Bremmer and Keat (2009), 
Howell and Chaddick (1994) and Frei and Ruloff (1988). Studies by Alon et al. (2006), Alon and 
Herbert (2009), Boshoff (2010) and Frynas and Mellahi (2003) will be of particular importance 
as they provide a better understanding of micro political risk, i.e. industry-specific and firm-
specific political risk, that will be the focus of this study.  
A second group of literature will provide the information on Chinese foreign policy and 
Chinese business operations in Africa, which is needed to contextualise the Chinese NOCs and 
their relations with the Chinese government. While Liou’s (2009) article Bureaucratic politics 
and overseas investment by Chinese state-owned oil companies: illusory champions and Van der 
Lugt and Hamblin’s (2011) Assessing China’s role in foreign direct investments in Southern 
Africa give insight into the strategies and institutions involved in Chinese FDI, Jiang’s (2009) 
Fuelling the dragon: China’s rise and its energy and resources extraction in Africa and Corkin’s 
(2011) Redefining foreign policy impulses toward Africa: the roles of the MFA8, the MOFCOM 
and China Exim Bank are important as a background to Chinese investments in Africa and the 
relationship between Beijing, the NOCs and the African countries. Other literature that will be 
consulted includes articles by Kolstad and Wigg (2009), Rui (2010), Cissé (2012) and Holslag 
(2011).  
The third field of literature will cover the history of Chinese involvement in the Sudanese 
oil industry, a background to the Sudanese civil war and the political situation in South Sudan 
after its secession from Sudan, with specific reference to CNPC and China’s current relations 
with South Sudan. In this regard, a valuable document is ICG’s (2012a) China’s new courtship in 
South Sudan. Other recent publications that are all based on interviews done in South Sudan 
during 2012, are Kuo’s (2012) Not looking to lead: Beijing’s view of the crisis between the two 
Sudan’s, Wheeler’s (2012) Development through peace: could China’s economic cooperation 
with South Sudan be more conflict-sensitive? and Barber and Xiao’s (2012) Win-win? China’s 
economic engagement with South Sudan. Lacher’s (2012) South Sudan: international state-
building and its limits provides valuable information on current developments in South Sudan. 
Various recent publications by Business Monitor International (BMI) will be consulted with 
specific reference to the economic situation in South Sudan. 
1.6 Limitations and delimitations of the study 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 MFA is the acronym for Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
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One of the limitations to the study is the definition of the term political risk, as there is no 
consensus among scholars in the field (Alon et al., 2006:624). To overcome this limitation, 
theoretical research will be performed in order to conceptualise political risk and political risk 
analysis for the purposes of this study. As Brink (2004:2) points out, the possible subjectivity of a 
political risk analysis is a further limitation, as with other qualitative research studies. In an 
attempt to reduce subjectivity, the analysis will be performed in accordance with a political risk 
model that includes quantitative methods. With regards to the case study, a limitation might be 
the availability and access to sources for an accurate description and analysis of the Chinese 
NOCs and the current South Sudanese situation. As inside knowledge of the Chinese NOCs is 
only available in secondary journals, it is possible that not all relevant information will be 
available. Language might also be a barrier and only English texts will be considered. Although 
many of the works of Chinese scholars are written in English, it is possible that important texts 
from different perspectives may not be available in English, that in turn may influence 
objectivity. Although a firm-specific risk analysis will be performed, the lack of knowledge of 
the specific criteria that Chinese corporations would consider in a political risk analysis may be a 
further limitation. However, the objective of the study is not to advise a certain client on an 
investment, but rather to gain more knowledge about the political risk factors and its indicators 
that Chinese firms may be exposed to in the African oil and gas industry.  
As the political situation in South Sudan is volatile and political risk can change over 
time, the political risk analysis for CNPC will be based on data collected up to 31 August 2012. 
While one of the aims of political risk analyses is to suggest ways for investors to mitigate and 
manage the risks, risk mitigation and risk management advice falls outside the scope of this 
study. 
 
1.7 Outline of the study 
Chapter Two will present a theoretical framework for the study and conceptualise key 
terminology that will be used during the course of the study. The terms that are conceptualised 
are FDI, risk, political risk, country risk, political instability, macro and micro political risk and 
political risk analysis. Boshoff’s (2010) political risk model, which will be used as an analytical 
framework for the political risk analysis will be presented in this chapter. 
The purpose of Chapter Three is to contextualise the situation in which CNPC currently 
operates in South Sudan to serve as a background for the analysis of political risk. The first sub-
question that concerns the features of the relationship between China and Sudan before South 
Sudan’s independence will be answered in this chapter. The relations between Chinese NOCs and 
Beijing will firstly be put into context by describing the influence of Chinese foreign policy on 
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Chinese FDI in general, and then in Africa, followed by the FDI of Chinese NOCs in the African 
oil and gas industry. The next section will focus on China’s role in the development of the 
Sudanese oil industry, followed by a brief analysis of the effect of the oil development on the 
Sudanese civil war. The last section of the chapter will describe the main issues concerning the 
independence of South Sudan on 9 July 2011.  
In Chapter Four, the political risk faced by CNPC’s current investments in South Sudan 
since independence will be analysed in accordance with Boshoff’s (2010) political risk model in 
order to answer the second sub-question. Each risk factor and risk indicator identified in the 
model will be analysed, assessed and rated. A final calculation and explanation of the overall 
political risk will be presented.  
Chapter Five will conclude on the research by an outline of the progress and an evaluation 
of the study. The answer to the main research question, recommendations for future research and 
a final conclusion will be presented.  
 
1.8 Conclusion 
This chapter provided an introduction to the study by stating the research problem and research 
questions, the objective of the study and the research methodology. The aim of the study is to 
identify the main indicators of political risk that Chinese corporations may face in the oil and gas 
industry in African countries and to measure the level of political risk faced by CNPC in South 
Sudan. The objective of the study is to gain an understanding of the nature of political risk in the 
contemporary political environment of the African oil and gas industry and in particular the 
influence of the risk on Chinese firms. The objective is further to support the theories of political 
risk by way of empirical research, in particular to demonstrate the importance of firm-specific 
political risk analysis as a decision-making tool for investors. By gaining a better understanding 
of the relationship between international firms and politics and the implications for political risk, 
investors can better prepare themselves to deal with these risks in the decision-making process. 
The research will take the form of an empirical case study on the political risk faced by CNPC in 
the South Sudanese oil industry. Before starting with the case study, the next chapter will provide 
a theoretical grounding for the study, a conceptualisation of the key terminology used and a 
presentation of the political risk model that will be applied in the political risk analysis in Chapter 
Four.   
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Chapter Two: Theoretical perspective and conceptualisation of key 
terminology 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Politics has always been inseparable from international business markets, making the assessment 
of the political context of international business risk essential in the investment decision-making 
process. However, with the influence of new political actors other than governments and subtler 
and less extreme political actions than the expropriations of the previous century, political risk 
today is a “highly complex and multidimensional phenomenon” (Jakobsen, 2010:482,488). 
Bremmer (2005:52) argues that political risk has been influenced by the increased 
interconnectedness of the international markets as emerging markets today form a great part of 
the global economic activities. With increased worldwide energy demand, political instability in 
oil-producing countries can quickly produce oil price shocks and short supply all over the world 
(Bremmer, 2005:52). Furthermore, business operations have moved to countries where labour is 
relatively cheap but living conditions are harsh, posing new threats of civil and labour uprisings 
to business operations (Bremmer, 2005:52). Bremmer (2005:52) points out that the attack on the 
World Trade Centre in New York in 2001 has changed the global security landscape and foreign 
policy agenda, emphasising the risk posed by non-state actors such as terrorist networks 
(Bremmer, 2005:52). The global financial crisis of 2007-2008 and the subsequent downgrading 
of sovereign risk ratings, followed by the sovereign debt crises of developed countries, have 
further emphasised the effect that political decisions had on the economy and business operations 
(Gupta, 2011). 
Because international business firms today operate in this increasingly risky environment 
caused by economic integration, globalisation and the influence of non-state political actors, the 
analysis of political risks became a necessity for the international business firm as a decision–
making tool. It is therefore important to understand the multidimensional and changing nature of 
political risk in order to provide theoretically grounded political risk analyses. This chapter will 
firstly outline the theoretical basis of decision-making and problem-solving theory in which 
political risk analysis is grounded. Secondly, the chapter will conceptualise the key terminology 
associated with political risk and political risk analysis to provide an in-depth understanding of 
the meaning of the terms used in the context of this study. The last section of this chapter will 
present the political risk analysis model that will be applied in the case study in Chapter Four. 
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2.2 Theoretical grounding: decision-making and problem-solving theory  
Political risk analysis is grounded in decision-making and problem-solving theory. These two 
theories have a complementary relationship in the application of management science, as 
management problems that have to be solved relate to the decision-making environment (Brink, 
2004:31). Managers are concerned with problem-solving activities that involve “agenda setting, 
setting goals and designing actions” as well as decision-making activities such as evaluating and 
choosing among alternative actions (Simon, Dantzig, Hogardt, Plott, Raiffa, Schelling, Shepsle, 
Thaler, Tversky & Winter, 1987:11). 
Rational decision-making theory is based on the principle that a decision-maker who is 
faced with a certain problem will make choices on the basis of the best or preferred outcome of 
the action taken (Simon, 1965:178). The decision-maker has to consider alternative actions or 
choices and for each action or choice determine the possible outcome, consequence or future 
affairs in order to justify the decision (Simon, 1955:102). Because the decision-maker is faced 
with uncertainties, information is needed to seek out the alternatives and calculate the 
consequences as well as the probability of the outcome if the specific decision is taken (Simon, 
1979:511; Simon, 1955:102). For Venter (1999:1), reasoned decision-making is a cognitive or 
knowledge problem implying that before a decision can be made, it must be justified, not only by 
knowledge, but also by reason.  Knowledge and reason are used to anticipate future events and 
the decision-maker can then respond to the possible outcome or adapt to the environment by 
choosing between alternatives (Venter, 1999:1). Simon (1979:502) points out that rationality is 
limited when all the relevant information is not available for managers to make reasoned 
decisions and a manager should search for alternatives. Consequently, it became necessary in 
management sciences to develop decision-making procedures that could be applied in practical 
situations (Simon, 1979:503). Decision-making theory can therefore be applied for the purpose of 
offering direct advice to business decision-makers and decision tools should be able to provide 
recommendations based on information from the real-life situation (Simon, 1979:498). Rather 
than being concerned with the outcome of the decision, decision-making theory is concerned with 
the way in which decisions are made (Simon, 1979:498). 
Political risk analysis is based on the same principles as problem-solving and decision-
making theory. March and Shapira (1987:1404) argue that the “idea of risk is embedded in the 
larger idea of choice as affected by the expected return of an alternative”. In the business 
environment, one of the problems that managers have to deal with is investment risk, including 
political risk. Apart from problem-solving, managers also have to make rational choices about 
what actions to take that would minimise the political risk and that would have the preferred 
outcome for the business, which is the survival as a profitable business (Venter, 1999:2). 
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Decision-making theory assumes that decision-makers would make choices based on the largest 
expected return (March & Shapira, 1987:1404).  
As part of the management process of an international firm, political risk can be managed, 
and Venter (1999:1) suggests that it should be done in such a way that the choices that are made 
are justified on the basis of knowledge and reason. By conducting a political risk analysis, 
information and knowledge are gained and reason is used in the analysis thereof. Political risk 
analysis can be an analytical tool, but also a practical guide to decision-making for managers 
(Sethi & Luther, 1986:58). Political risk analysis allows political risk problems or factors to be 
identified, to anticipate future events and to determine the effect that the events will have on the 
business in terms of profitability or other goals (Venter, 1999:9). Potential actions can then be 
identified and management can make decisions and select the best course of action to minimise 
the negative effects on the business, weighing up the costs and the benefits (Brink, 2004:31; 
Howell & Chaddick, 1994:70). Actions can be drastic such as avoiding or withdrawing 
investments in certain countries or industries, but actions can also be to negotiate with the 
different actors to guard against risk. High risk might also produce new opportunities where other 
investors might have left, as high risk may mean high returns (Howell & Chaddick, 1994:70). 
 
2.3 Conceptualisation of key terminology 
2.3.1 Foreign direct investment  
With globalisation and the integration of markets, FDI became an important way of 
internationalising a business (Graham & Spaulding, 2004). The term FDI as defined by the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) will be used in this study. FDI is defined as: 
 
“a category of international investment made by a resident entity in one economy (direct investor) with 
the objective of establishing a lasting interest in an enterprise resident in an economy other than that of 
the investor (direct investment enterprise). ‘Lasting interest’ implies the existence of a long-term 
relationship between the direct investor and the enterprise and a significant degree of influence by the 
direct investor on the management of the direct investment enterprise. Direct investment involves both 
the initial transaction between the two entities and all subsequent capital transactions between them 
and among affiliated enterprises, both incorporated and unincorporated” (OECD, 2012).   
  
A further requirement is that the investor must hold at least ten percent of the ordinary shares or 
voting stock of the enterprise for a FDI relationship to exist (OECD, 2012). FDI should be 
distinguished from portfolio investment, which is considered an indirect investment (Graham & 
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Spaulding, 2004). While FDI outflow refers to the amount of FDI leaving a continent, region or 
country to invest in another country, FDI inflow refers to the amount of FDI entering a continent, 
region or country (Van der Lugt & Hamblin, 2011:18). A distinction should be made between 
greenfield and brownfield FDI. While greenfield FDI refers to “a form of FDI where a parent 
company starts a new venture in a foreign country, constructing new operational facilities from 
the ground up”, brownfield FDI refers to a direct investment where the international firm buys a 
share in an already existing facility in another country (Van der Lugt & Hamblin, 2011:19).  
 
2.3.2 Risk 
According to March and Shapira (1987:1404), the term risk in classical decision theory reflects 
“variation in the distribution of possible outcomes, their likelihoods and their subjective values”. 
For Hough (2008:1), risk is associated with uncertainty about an event or action and the impact of 
that event or action. Shubik (1983, cited in Frynas & Mellahi, 2003:546), comments that one 
cannot refer to risk independently from purpose, and risk should therefore be defined in terms of 
a specific goal. Friedman and Kim (1988:64) further add that risk cannot exist independently 
from an entity. Although there are variations in the definition of risk in the literature, one can 
conclude that the major components of risk are: 
• that risk should always be seen in relation to an entity and to a goal 
• that risk is about the likelihood or probability that an event or action might occur  
• and that risk is about the impact or outcome of that event on the goal of the entity. 
The term risk in this study is used in the context of business risk, where a business refers to 
activities such as investments, business operations, donor activities, loans, joint ventures or 
agents. Because investors or lenders expect a return on their investments, and managers or 
employees expect business operations to continue, the main goal of a business is profitability as a 
measure of a business’s performance (Van Wyk, 2010:112). However, businesses also have other 
goals such as strategic value, job and physical security of personnel, infrastructure security and 
the long-term survival of the business (Bremmer & Keat, 2009:11). For the purpose of this study, 
risk will refer to:  
 
the probability that an event or action might have an impact on the business firm’s expected 
performance in terms of the realisation of its main goals such as profitability. 
 
Although risk is associated with uncertainty, a distinction should be made between uncertainty 
and risk. Uncertainty refers to a lack of information about the event and its impact (Brink, 
2004:20). Because of the lack of information, it is difficult to establish the probability and the 
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outcome of events in uncertain conditions, and a business will find it hard to control these events 
(Van Wyk, 2010:110). Risk on the other hand, according to Friedman and Kim (1988:64), is not 
about the lack of information, but rather about the probability that an event might happen and 
cause a loss to the firm. An uncertainty will become a risk when the probability and the outcome 
of the event can be established by information on the circumstances (Fitzpatrick, 1983:25). Allan 
Willet (1951, cited in Bauzon, 2000:27) makes the distinction by referring to risk as “objective 
doubt” and uncertainty as “subjective doubt” about the outcome. For Willet (1951, cited in 
Bauzon, 2000:27), risk should be defined with reference to the “degree of uncertainty about the 
occurrence of a loss”. With information about the business environment, these uncertainties can 
be converted into measurable and manageable risk (Kobrin, 1979:68). It is possible to determine 
the levels of risk by estimating or forecasting the probability of an event or action and the 
possible material outcome (Hough, 2008:3). However, even when risk is measured, Bremmer and 
Keat (2009:24) remark that there will always be a certain level of uncertainty because of the 
difficulties in risk measurement.  
Bremmer and Keat (2009:4) emphasise the importance of the other component of risk, i.e. 
the impact on the business if the event does occur. For them the biggest risks are those events that 
are perceived as unlikely to happen and are difficult to predict with scientific methods, but if they 
do happen, their impact is “catastrophically damaging” (Bremmer & Keat, 2009:4). Taleb (cited 
in Bremmer & Keat, 2009:18) calls these events “black swans”9 and argues that major events in 
the world such as World War I and the September 11 attacks on the World Trade Centre in 2001 
have been outliers and came as a surprise, and the impact was disproportionately high to the 
probability of it. Bremmer and Keat (2009:4) refer to these “black swans” as “fat tails”, meaning 
by that the unexpectedly thick bulges or “tails” at the end of distribution curves that measure 
risks and their impact (Bremmer & Keat, 2009:4). Bremmer and Keat (2009:4) argue that 
although these events are perceived as unlikely to happen, history shows that these events 
actually happen more often than people think. It is for this reason that they emphasise the need 
not to ignore the collective impact of smaller events (Bremmer & Keat, 2009:20). For example, 
the impact of corruption over several years can have a major influence on a country’s political 
stability, that in turn can have a huge impact on businesses operating in that country (Bremmer & 
Keat, 2009:20). However, it should be remembered that although risk normally has a negative 
connotation, high risk also implies that there are opportunities for high profits (Van der Lugt & 
Hamblin, 2011:25). For example, oil shocks have a negative implication for oil importing 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 The “black swan” refers to the unpredictability of events such as the discovery that swans could also be black when 
European explorers, who considered swans always to be white, first found black swans in Australia (Bremmer & 
Keat, 2009:19). 
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countries, but for oil corporations, high oil prices mean opportunities for high profits. Risks, 
unlike uncertainty, can be managed and mitigated or be exploited to increase the return on the 
investment (Brink, 2004:21). The impact of risk can therefore relate to both losses and gains 
(Bauzon, 2000:27). 
 
2.3.3 Political risk 
Political risk as a type of business risk is generally associated with the influence of politics on the 
international business firm. A variety of definitions for political risk exist in the literature and an 
overview of the concept is necessary to conceptualise the term for the purpose of this study.  
For Robock (1971:7), “political risk in international business exists (1) when 
discontinuities occur in the business environment, (2) when they are difficult to anticipate and (3) 
when they result from political change”. Further, the political change must have the potential to 
affect the profit or other goals of a firm. Like Robock (1971), Kobrin (1979:77) emphasises 
political change and the impact of the political change on the returns of a project, by his 
operational definition of political risk as the “probability that changes in the political environment 
will reduce returns to the point where the project would be no longer acceptable on the basis of 
ex ante criteria”. Howell and Chaddick (1994:1) include the social dimension of the political 
environment and more directly refer to the negative impact on profits with their conceptualisation 
of political risk as “the possibility that political decision, events or conditions in a country, 
including those that might be referred to as social, will affect the business environment such that 
investors will lose money or have a reduced profit margin”. Ekpenyong and Umoren (2010:28) 
recognise the multidimensionality of political risk by a broad definition, conceptualising political 
risk as “any politically induced event that has destabilising effects on the polity and distorts the 
functionality of an enterprise”. Simon (1982: 68) also recognises the multidimensionality, but 
gives a much more detailed definition of the different dimensions. Simon (1982:68) linked 
political risk to different sources and specifically to the foreign business by his definition of 
political risk as “governmental and societal actions and policies, originating either within or 
outside the host country, and negatively affecting either a select group of, or the majority of 
foreign business operations and investments”. With this definition, the distinction is made 
between macro and micro political risk, where macro political risk refers to risks that affect the 
majority of foreign operations and investments in a host country or region and micro political risk 
is discriminative in the sense that only a select group is affected.  
It is therefore clear that there are many definitions in the literature on political risk. To 
conceptualise political risk for the purposes of this study, certain essential attributes of political 
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risk have been identified during the review of the literature that should be included in a definition 
of the concept as it will be used in the study. 
Firstly, this study will be concerned with international business firms that operate or 
intend to operate in foreign countries and the political risk that these firms are exposed to. 
Boddewyn and Brewer (1994:125) point out that the influence of politics is different for domestic 
and international firms mainly because of the multiple sovereign states and government controls 
that have to be dealt with by international businesses. International businesses further have more 
strategic options when they operate in foreign countries, and foreign firms can influence the 
actions of governments by “arbitrage and leverage options” that domestic firms do not have 
(Boddewyn & Brewer, 1994:126).  
The second attribute that should be taken into account is the point that Fitzpatrick 
(1983:251) makes that political risk is a process rather than a sudden event. This view is shared 
by Robock (1971:11), who argues that risk is not static and can change over time, as well as Sethi 
and Luther (1986:62), who refer to political risk as a “gradual event such as ideological changes”. 
Van Wyk (2010:115) also refers to “risk development”, and thereby implying a process.  
The third attribute of political risk is its multidimensionality. Brink (2004:25) emphasises 
the interrelationship of factors that can affect the business and investment climates, while 
Bremmer and Keat (2009:7) mention that one form of risk can create other forms of risk. For 
example, macro-economic trends is a factor that can influence political risk on the one hand, and 
on the other hand political decisions can have economic consequences that may impact business 
operations (Bremmer & Keat, 2009:9). Furthermore, Alon and Martin (1998:11) argue that the 
sources of political risk are not limited to the host country, but also imply factors that originate 
from the home country environment, the international environment and the global environment. 
Jakobsen (2010:482) also adds the dimension of political actors other than governments, such as 
terrorists, activists, rebel groups or stakeholders as a source of political risk.  
The last attribute of political risk refers to the impact of the political process or event. The 
impact is normally associated with profitability, but Robock’s (1971:7) reference to 
“discontinuities in the business environment” implies that firms can also have other goals that 
might be affected. Although most literature refers to political risk in the negative sense, Alon and 
Herbert (2009:130) argue that political risk is a neutral phenomenon. They point out that political 
risk can have positive and/or negative outcomes for different entities and therefore international 
firms should safeguard against negative risk factors, but should also identify and exploit 
politically based opportunities (Alon & Herbert, 2009:130). Kobrin (1979:67) makes the point 
that not all political events or conditions that have negative connotations for one firm will 
necessarily have negative consequences for all international businesses in all situations. Frynas 
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and Mellahi (2003:548) illustrate this by the example of the Nigerian civil war from 1967-1970 
that disrupted the onshore oil production activities of foreign oil companies in Nigeria, but had a 
positive effect on oil companies that exploited the civil war by expanding their offshore oil 
production during the time of political instability10.  
Because these four attributes, i.e. business firms, events from political processes, the 
multidimensionality of risk sources and the neutrality of the impact of risk, are incorporated in 
the definition of micro political risk that Alon and Herbert (2009:130)11 present, their definition 
will be used as a basis for a final conceptualisation of political risk for the purposes of this study. 
This definition will be adapted in two ways. Firstly, the term “uncertainty” in Alon and Herbert’s 
(2009) definition will be substituted with the term “risk”12. Secondly the reference to “specific 
consequences for the firm” will be adapted to “general and specific consequences” to incorporate 
all political risk, i.e. macro and micro political risk. Therefore, the term political risk in this study 
refers to: 
 
The risk13 associated with outcomes or events from political processes, which have potential 
consequences, in general and specifically14, “for firms that are either contemplating entry into, or 
have already entered, another country. These political processes can result in outcomes or events 
which can emanate from environmental factors both within and outside the foreign host country, 
and either positively or negatively affect the firm’s operations, assets, or financial condition” (Alon 
& Herbert, 2009:130). 
 
2.3.4 Country risk 
Political risk should be distinguished from country risk, although some elements of the terms 
overlap. Brink (2004:19) defines country risk as the risk that an enterprise might incur “financial 
losses due to problems arising from macro-economic events in a country”, which is the definition 
that will be used in this study. For Frei and Ruloff (1988:3), country risk means the total risk that 
foreign investors have for investing in a country. It therefore seems as if country risk is a broader 
concept than political risk. For political risk the focus is on the political event or process as the 
cause of the losses to the investors, while for country risk the source of the risk can be more 
general in terms of the investment climate of that specific country. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 The term political instability should be distinguished from political risk. For a conceptualisation of political 
instability see section 2.3.5. 
11 For the definition of micro political risk by Alon and Herbert (2009:130) refer to section 2.3.6. 
12 For an explanation of the difference between the terms risk and uncertainty as used in this research study, refer to 
section 2.3.2. 
13 Alon and Herbert (2009:130) use the term “uncertainty” in their definition. 
14 Alon and Herbert’s (2009:130) definition only refers to ”specific consequences” because their definition only 
refers to micro political risk. 
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  Country risk is often used in terms of a country’s ability to pay its debt (Brink, 2004:22), 
but it seems as if the issue of creditworthiness is only part of the country risk. Frei and Ruloff 
(1988:3) describe sovereign risk as the risk that is associated with “granting loans to foreign 
governments”. Sovereign risk is a part of country risk, with the focus on the risk that a 
government will not be able to pay or service its loans (Boshoff, 2010:17). In this sense, Brink 
(2004:23) makes the distinction between country risk and political risk where country risk 
implies the risk that a country will not be able to pay back its loans, and political risk implies that 
a country is able to pay back its loans, but is unwilling to do so. For example, a country might 
have balance of payments problems that would pose a country risk to its creditors, as the country 
would not be able to repay its debts. However, country risk can be a source of political risk when 
a government is forced to cut back on social spending to improve its balance of payments as part 
of a structural adjustment program (Brink, 2004:23). Budget restrictions such as a cut back in 
social spending or tax increases can cause civil unrest or social upheaval and in that sense 
country risk can become political risk. On the other hand, a government’s decision not to accept 
the conditionalities imposed by structural adjustment programmes can also result in political risk 
to investors if the government defaults on its debt that would lead to economic instability, a 
source of risk to investors in a country in terms of elements such as currency volatility, poor 
market demand or bad debts (Brink, 2004:23). 
 
2.3.5 Political instability 
Apart from country risk, political risk should also be distinguished from political instability, 
although the terms are sometimes used interchangeably. Political risk is broadly the risk 
associated with outcomes or events from political processes that have an impact on foreign 
business firms15. Political risk is therefore a property of the business and cannot exist on its own 
(Kobrin, 1978:114). Political instability on the other hand is observable and a property of the 
environment, or the status of the political situation in a country (Kobrin, 1978:114; Frynas & 
Mellahi, 2003:545). Political instability refers to changes in the political leadership or 
government policy that was not foreseen or expected (Brink, 2004:19). Although the term 
political instability has a negative connotation and is normally associated with high political risk, 
Kobrin (1978:120) argues that the negative view of political risk is a result of cultural 
subjectivity. Robock (1971:16) agrees that many enterprises perceive political instability as high 
risk because they analyse the political conditions of another country from an ethnocentric point of 
view. He uses the example of the frequent changes of government in France before the time of 
De Gaulle, that might be perceived as political instability, while the stabilising role of a strong 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 For a detailed definition of political risk see section 2.3.3. 
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bureaucracy are ignored. Kobrin (1978:114) gives the example of a coup that might not be 
violent or lead to a change in government policy. Political instability therefore does not 
necessarily lead to high political risk. On the other hand, the argument can also be made that a 
stable political regime will not necessarily pose low political risk to enterprises. Bremmer and 
Keat (2009:29) argue that the stable regime in Venezuela under Hugo Chavez instituted 
government policy that had direct negative impacts for the investors in the oil industry. Chavez’s 
stable regime contributed to high political risk. It is thus clear that there might be a relation 
between the two concepts of political instability and political risk, but it is not a necessary one.   
Political instability is a political factor or event that might have an impact on the political 
risk exposure of a firm, but it is not the only factor or source, or necessarily the most relevant 
source of political risk to be considered (Brewer, 1981:6). Furthermore, political instability does 
not necessarily lead to political risk, because it might not affect the specific firm (Robock, 
1971:16). In situations of political instability, it is important to assess the impact that the political 
instability might have on the firm operating in the specific country in order to identify it as a 
source of political risk. 
 
2.3.6 Macro and micro political risk 
As mentioned in the conceptualisation of political risk in section 2.3.3, political risk has a macro 
and a micro risk dimension. For Robock (1971:9), “risk is of a macro nature when unanticipated 
and politically motivated environmental changes are broadly directed at all foreign enterprise”, 
while Alon and Martin (1998:10) define macro political risk as the risk that “represent the 
systematic portion of the political risk analysis that can be generalised across industries.” Macro 
political risk therefore refers to the dimension of political risk that will affect all foreign firms 
and all industries operating in the host country or in a certain geographic region (Alon & Herbert, 
2009:127). The effect of these risks can be dramatic, for example when a government is 
overthrown or when the country’s economic system is revolutionised (Alon & Herbert, 
2009:129). Robock (1971:9) uses the example of the confiscation of private enterprise during 
1959-1960 in Cuba as part of the move to a socialist system brought about by the Cuban 
revolution. 
While macro political risk affects all or most of the foreign firms operating in a country or 
region, micro political risk is firm-specific, meaning that it affects only a single firm or a select 
group of firms or business activities (Alon & Herbert, 2009:129). Robock’s (1971:9) definition 
states that “risk is of a micro nature when the environmental changes are intended to affect only 
selected fields of business activity or foreign enterprises with specific characteristics”. What is 
important in terms of micro political risk, is that the influence on the firm is discriminative 
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towards certain firms. Alon and Herbert’s (2009:130) definition of micro political risk is used in 
this study, with the only adaptation that the term “risk” will be used in the place of their term 
“uncertainty”.  Micro political risk is defined as:  
 
The risk16 associated with “outcomes or events from political processes, which have potential and 
specific consequences for the firm that is either contemplating entry into, or has already entered, 
another country. These political processes can result in outcomes or event which can emanate from 
environmental factors both within and outside the foreign host country, and either positively or 
negatively affect the firm’s operations, assets, or financial condition” (Alon & Herbert, 2009:130). 
 
Micro political risk refers to the specific risks for firms, either because of the industry in which 
the firm operates or because of other characteristics attached to specific firms. Risks can vary for 
different industries. While industries of strategic importance such as natural resources and 
banking are more likely to be regulated, the political environment in the host country can 
influence industries in different ways (Alon & Herbert, 2009:129). Alon et al. (2006:625) give 
the example of potential war that would have a major influence on an oil-producing company, 
while the balance of payments situation in a country would have a major impact on risk for the 
banking industry. Frynas and Mellahi (2003:541) argue that within the same industry different 
firms that are exposed to the same political event or environment can be affected differently 
because of the specific firm’s characteristics, such as its strategic capabilities and resources. Alon 
and Herbert (2009:129) make the point that micro political risk is not independent from macro 
political risk as micro risk also originates from internal and external as well as economic, societal 
and governmental forces, but that some firms are more likely to be affected by certain macro 
political risks. Therefore, political risk assessment should incorporate both macro and micro 
political risk factors (Alon & Herbert, 2009:128). 
Alon and Herbert (2009:130) identify specific aspects of international firms that can 
contribute to a differentiated impact on political risk, such as a firm’s contribution to the 
economy, its bargaining power, its behaviour and its governance structure. For Frynas and 
Mellahi (2003:541), the impact of political risk events varies for different firms because firms are 
not just “passive bystanders” of the political environment, but are “actors capable of acquiring 
and upgrading firm-specific resources and capabilities for coping with or even benefiting from 
political risk”. Frynas and Mellahi (2003) draw on Boddewyn and Brewer’s (1994:123,127) 
argument that there is a reciprocal relationship between the political behaviour of international 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 The definition by Alon and Herbert (2009:130) of micro political risk use the term “uncertainty” where this study 
will refer to “risk”, because the term uncertainty is differentiated from the term risk. For a detailed discussion of the 
differences between uncertainty and risk see section 2.3.2. 
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firms and firm, industry and nonmarket environment factors. While the political behaviour 
influences these factors on the one hand, the factors may influence the political behaviour on the 
other hand. For Boddewyn and Brewer (1994:128) a firm’s political behaviour can include, 
amongst others, dealings with government officials to obtain permission to trade, compliance to 
the rules of the government, the avoidance of the rules by leaving the country, and partnership 
formation with government (Boddewyn & Brewer, 1994:128,130). Keillor, Wilkinson and 
Owens (2005:629) also include lobbying, industry alliances and contributions to the government 
as political behaviour of international firms. An international firm’s bargaining power with the 
government of the host country is therefore important to secure a competitive advantage for the 
firm against rivals and to secure against other political risks (Boddewyn & Brewer, 
1994:128,130). For Frynas and Mellahi (2003:562) the competitive advantage of international 
firms can include political influence in the host country, experience in dealing with corrupt 
officials, specific technical expertise or the ability to appease the local population of the host 
country. By exploiting the competitive advantage and by using its resources, firms can play an 
active role in confronting or shaping the political environment or political events in order to 
reduce the political risk for the specific firm. Frynas and Mellahi (2003:543) give the example of 
an extreme case where ITT, an America company, used its capabilities to put pressure on the 
United States (US) government to help stop the 1970 election of the Chilean president, Salvador 
Allende. However, Jakobsen (2010:483) warns that the political behaviour of the firm may 
increase political risk due to the “obsolescing bargain mechanism”. By that is meant that a 
government may increase its leverage over the international firm once the firm has made large 
capital investments in the host country, making it difficult for the firm to withdraw without 
severe losses (Jakobsen, 2010:483). Because of a gradual shift in the relative bargaining power of 
the firm, there can be a gradual shift of government intervention in the affairs of the international 
firm (Jakobsen, 2010:483).  
Another relevant factor that may differentiate firms is the relationship of the firm and the 
host country with the firm’s home country, because the international firm is often associated with 
a particular nationality (Alon & Herbert, 2009:130). Because of the interdependence of 
international, home-country and host-country policies, political risk can also originate in the 
home country or a third country, for example by home country policies such as sanctions on 
countries that are regarded as “unfriendly” (Sethi & Luther, 1986:62). Furthermore, Gao 
(2009:107) argues that it is not only governments of the various countries that cause the political 
risk, but also other stakeholders such as labour unions, suppliers, competitors and non-
governmental organisations (NGOs). For example, other stakeholders can lobby or press the 
government to take action against the international firm (Gao, 2009:107). The withdrawal of the 
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Canadian oil company, Talisman Energy, from Sudan in 2003 is a clear illustration of the 
interdependence of the policies and pressures of the different stakeholders that contributed to the 
specific political risk for Talisman. Kobrin (2004:428) argues that the political risks that forced 
Talisman to withdraw from Sudan originated in North America, reflecting the “complexity of the 
political environment” in which international firms operate. Activists linked Talisman to massive 
human rights violations during Sudan’s civil war and the Canadian government has been 
pressurised by the US government to investigate these allegations (Kobrin, 2004:453). The 
Canadian government responded to the US pressure because of the high degree of economic 
integration between the US and Canada. Also contributing to the complexity of the relationships 
is the fact that Talisman entered Sudan with a relative advantage because of the lack of US 
competition, as a result of the US sanctions against Sudan (Kobrin, 2004:455). It is therefore 
clear that there are multiple stakeholders from the host country, the home country and the 
international community that can contribute to increased micro political risks. On the other hand, 
the influence of the governments of the home countries can also reduce the political risk that 
firms are exposed to by international treaties, concessions and pacts that can safeguard against 
some aspects of risk, for example by pressure from the home government to withhold aid (Sethi 
& Luther, 1986:63). The relationship between the home country, the international business and 
the host country government can be used as a way of bargaining power, in conjunction with the 
bargaining and negotiating skills from the international business firm (Sethi & Luther, 1986:66). 
Frynas and Mellahi (2003:554) use the example of French oil firms that invested in oil blocks 
situated in disputed border areas between Nigeria and Cameroon as well as Nigeria and 
Equatorial Guinea during the 1990s, despite the political risk attached to the investments. They 
argued that the French oil companies could count on the economic and military support of the 
French government because of their close relationship (Frynas & Mellahi, 2003:554). 
Furthermore, because of the economic dependence of the African countries on the French 
government, France still had political connections to the elite in its former colonies, resulting in 
political influence. This gave the French oil firms a competitive advantage that could be exploited 
to their benefit (Frynas & Mellahi, 2003:554).  
 
2.3.7 Political risk analysis 
The purpose of political risk analysis is to provide information on political risk for investors on 
which they can base decisions about their investments and business operations, and to manage the 
political risk in such as way that the negative effect on the business is mitigated. Although there 
are different methods of political risk analysis, Kobrin (1978:114) emphasises that such an 
analysis requires a systematic evaluation of political risk where possible political risk events are 
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identified and the probability as well as the consequences for the investor assessed. Furthermore, 
political risk analysis should be done on a regular basis as new information might lead to new 
forecasts (Hough, 2008:2). A distinction should be made between predicting and forecasting 
future political events that may affect the investor. While it is not possible to accurately predict 
political risk, political risk can be forecasted based on evidence such as scientific theories and 
empirical evidence that support the forecast (Brink, 2004:27). A forecast is the probability that a 
political event might cause losses for the investor in the future (Brink, 2004:27). Bremmer and 
Keat (2009:23) are of the opinion that through political risk analysis it is even possible to identify 
the risk of events that have a low probability of happening, but that would have a high impact on 
investors, like the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the US. However, Brink (2004:28) points out that even 
the most sophisticated forecasting models and sources of information have limitations and 
therefore it is not possible to have absolutely accurate forecasts.  Although political risk events 
cannot be predicted, they can be forecasted on the basis of political risk analysis. The validity and 
the reliability of the forecast will depend on the quality of the political risk analysis that in turn is 
influenced by aspects such as the methodology and the quality of the data used. For political risk 
analysis to be valid and to gain scientific recognition, Simon (1984:124) argues that the 
procedures followed should be done in a systematic way using models that are reliable. There are 
many models available for political risk analysis, but methodological problems can be 
encountered as some models are quantitative and others are qualitative in nature. It is therefore 
important to consider the attributes of qualitative and quantitative methods of political risk 
analysis.  
 
2.3.7.1  Qualitative and quantitative political risk analysis  
The main advantage of a qualitative approach is that such an approach looks at the political 
situation and risk factors in context. A specific situation can be analysed in context and a 
problem-solving assessment can be applied. For example scenario analysis will help the business 
firm to work towards a specific solution to the specific problem that the firm faces (Bremmer & 
Keat, 2009:24). A wider range of information would be gathered on the specific situation that 
might not be included in a quantitative model (Frei & Ruloff, 1988:6). However, promoters of 
quantitative approaches argue that qualitative analysis could be too subjective (Brewer, 1981:9). 
On the other hand, Frei and Ruloff (1988:7,9) argue that subjectivity is also a limitation in 
quantitative methods, as quantitative methods are still based on assumptions and judgments made 
by analysts. For Brink (2004:21), the quantitative model has the advantage of providing a 
calculated result in numerical terms for political risk, and therefore it can be used effectively in 
the management of the political risk. Furthermore, a quantitative approach can enhance the ability 
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to compare political risk assessments (Brink, 2004:21). An investor can evaluate two investments 
on the basis of the same models and come to a conclusion as to which investment is the best.  
However, Brewer (1981:8) warns that caution should be taken not to totally disregard context and 
extrapolate historical situations to the future. Brewer (1981:8) uses the example of the Iranian 
war where the past stability of an authoritarian regime did not mean that the future would be 
stable. Brewer (1981:9) further points out that the fact that the analysis is quantitative does not 
mean that the political risk analysis can be successfully incorporated with financial risk in the 
overall investment risk. Bremmer and Keat (2009:5,9) also emphasise that political risk is hard to 
quantify because of the complexity and interrelationship of the sources of political risk events. 
They use the example of the difficulty in calculating the cumulative losses incurred as a result of 
the 9/11 terrorists attack in the US (Bremmer & Keat, 2009:23). Hough (2008:11) makes the 
point that numerical risk analysis is of no value without being complemented by qualitative 
assessments and proper explanations of the conclusion of the analyst.   
Brink (2004:40) emphasises other problems with regards to the methodology used in 
political risk models, such as the fact that political risk factors from different levels of analysis 
are included in the same model. Brink (2004:40) warns against ecological and individualistic 
fallacies. Ecological fallacies refer to the mistake made to apply broad data on the ecological 
level to individual cases that can lead to false assumptions about a specific case. The 
individualistic fallacy on the other hand refers to the mistake to apply an observation that was 
done on an individual level incorrectly to the generalised level. A political risk indicator that 
implies a high risk for a certain business project will not necessarily be a high risk for other 
projects (Brink, 2004:40). To contribute to the objectiveness of the political risk analysis, an 
objective analytical framework should be used that is developed in accordance with a theoretical 
grounding (Robock, 1971:6; Kobrin, 1979:68). Kobrin (1978:120) argues that the use of 
mathematical models does not necessarily contribute to objectivity. Objectivity is rather reached 
by a better understanding of the political process and the operations of the firm. For example, 
Bremmer and Keat (2009:2) argue that the power dynamics of Chinese politics cannot be 
understood or studied in the same way as Saudi Arabia where politics is predominantly a family 
matter. Frei and Ruloff (1988:6) suggest that the qualitative methods should not be abandoned, 
but that they could be used in conjunction with quantitative methods because of the importance of 
context. Even in Brink’s (2004) model that seems quantitative, the mixed method approach is 
used.  
To conclude, what is important in political risk analysis is that a systematic approach is 
followed, that the context should be considered and that the model used should have a theoretical 
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grounding. These requirements have been taken into account in the decision to apply the Boshoff 
(2010) political risk model in the study, which is presented in the following section.  
 
2.4 Political risk model for the oil and gas industry 
The purpose of this study is not to develop a new political risk model, but rather to use an 
existing model that would satisfy abovementioned requirements. Because of the importance of 
micro political risk, a further requirement is that the political risk model must be specific for the 
oil and gas industry and must make provision for macro as well as micro political risk factors and 
indicators thereof. While political risk models that are used in practice are not readily available as 
they are considered intellectual property of those companies that developed them, Boshoff (2010) 
developed a political risk analysis model for the oil and gas industry by conducting research on 
elements of these political risk models as reconstructed by various scholars. The model follows a 
mixed methods approach and incorporates quantitative and qualitative methods. This model will 
be used as a framework of analysis in the case study for a few reasons. The model is compact and 
based on a simple mathematical calculation, and incorporates macro and micro political risk 
factors and indicators into one model. While the political risk model developed by Alon and 
Herbert (2009) was also considered, their model only assesses micro political risk and should be 
used in combination with a different macro political risk model. That would make the study too 
complex. 
Boshoff’s (2010) model incorporates six political risk factors, i.e. political, economic, 
societal, petroleum, company and international factors that are analysed and rated in accordance 
with different indicators. Each indicator is analysed and rated individually on a scale of 0-5 and is 
used to determine the overall political risk rating. The requirements for a political risk model, i.e. 
a systematic approach, a consideration of the context and the basis of a theoretical grounding are 
therefore met by Boshoff’s (2010) political risk model. Boshoff (2010) presents the model in two 
phases, where the first phase can be carried out without the knowledge of the investor and the 
second phase with the knowledge of the investor. For the purpose of this study, no distinction 
will be made between the two phases as an analysis will be carried out with the knowledge of a 
specific firm, i.e. CNPC. The following section as set out on pages 29 to 31 will explain the 
political risk model.  
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Political risk model for the oil and gas industry 
Political risk type Factors Indicators Rating Weight Score 
Host country 
political risk 
Political Regime/political stability 0-5 0-100% 
 
 
War and security issues 0-5 
Repatriation restrictions 0-5 
Corruption/ poor governance 0-5 
Unclear legislation/security of tenure 0-5 
Investment constraints 0-5 
Economic Economic performance 0-5 0-100%  
Balance of payments 0-5 
Creditworthiness 0-5 
Currency convertibility 0-5 
Energy vulnerability 0-5 
Public/private sector mix 0-5 
Current account deficit 0-5 
Societal Internal violence 0-5 0-100%  
Civil and labour unrest 0-5 
Homogeneity  0-5 
Ethnic conflict 0-5 
Community opposition 0-5 
Standard of living 0-5 
Environmental activism 0-5 
Petroleum Ownership 0-5 0-100%  
Domestic reserves/production 0-5 
Host’s relative market position 0-5 
Level and destination of exports 0-5 
Strengths of national oil company 0-5 
Role of the foreign company in industry 0-5 
Oil and gas prices 0-5 
Domestic ability to operate the industry 0-5 
Ownership/contractual relationship between the 
firm and the host country 
0-5 
Company political 
risk 
Company  Nationality of the company 0-5 0-100% 
 
 
World industry positioning 0-5 
Special bargaining advantage 0-5 
Host government relations 0-5 
International 
political risk 
International  Host government international integration 0-5 0-100% 
 
 
Host/home government relations 0-5 
World petroleum market 0-5 
World economic condition 0-5 
The demonstration effect 0-5 
Total  
 
Table One: Political risk model for the oil and gas industry. Source: Boshoff (2010).   
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In applying this political risk model, each of the factors carries a percentage weight of a total 100 
percent across all the factors. The weights are established by the analyst according to the impact 
that the factor has relative to the other factors. Each factor indicator is rated on a scale of 0-5, 
based on the following index:  
 
• 0 - no risk      
• 1 – nominal risk 
• 2 – low risk 
• 3 – medium risk 
• 4 – high risk 
• 5 – extreme risk 
 
To get a weighted score for each factor, the sum of the ratings of each factor’s indicators is 
multiplied by the percentage weight assigned to that factor and divided by the sum of the highest 
possible rating score for all indicators of that factor. 	  𝑊𝑆! = Σ𝑛𝑖 = 1  𝑅𝑖𝑀𝑇𝑅 (𝑊) 
 𝑊𝑆! =Weighted factor score 𝑅! = Total rating of factor 1 (adding all indicators for the factor 1) 
i  = Indicator 
W   = Percentage weight of factor 1 𝑀𝑇𝑅  = Maximum total rating of factor 1 
 
An overall political risk rating (OPRR) for the firm operating in the country or region under 
investigation is calculated by adding the weighted factors’ scores according to the following 
equation:  
 
OPPR = (WS1) + (WS2)… (WSn) 
 
The OPRR determines the investment and political risk indication for the firm that operates in the 
country or region.  The higher the overall risk rating, the greater the political risk that the investor 
and the investment faces. The indication is determined according to the following scale: 
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Rating Investment indication Rating Political risk indication 
0-10 Highly advisable 0-20 Nominal 
11-20 Advisable   
21-3 Very low risk 21-40 Low 
31-40 Relatively low risk   
41-50 Low to moderate risk 41-60 Medium 
51-60 Relatively moderate risk   
61-70 Moderate to high risk 61-80 High 
71-80 Relatively high risk   
81-90 Inadvisable 81-100 Extreme 
91-100 Highly inadvisable   
 
 
Table Two: Scale for the investment and political risk indication. Source: Boshoff, (2010). 
 
2.5 Conclusion 
The objective of this chapter was to outline the theoretical framework in which political risk 
analysis is grounded, i.e. decision-making and problem-solving theory. Political risk analysis is 
an analytical tool that international businesses can use as a basis for making rational decisions 
about their investments and operations in a foreign country. The second objective of the chapter 
was to conceptualise key terms that will be used in this study and included FDI, risk, political 
risk, country risk, political instability, macro and micro political risk and political risk analysis. 
Thirdly, Boshoff’s (2010) political risk model for the oil and gas industry was presented, which 
will be used as a framework for the political risk analysis for the case study in Chapter Four. To 
provide a background to the analysis of political risk in Chapter Four, and to answer the first sub-
question of the study that asks what the features of the relationship between China and Sudan 
before South Sudan’s independence are, the next chapter will contextualise Chinese FDI in 
Africa, in particular its role in the development of the Sudanese oil industry, and the historical 
factors that led to the independence of South Sudan in 2011. 
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Chapter Three: Contextualising Chinese foreign direct investment in the 
South Sudanese oil industry 
 
3.1  Introduction 
The purpose of Chapter Three is to contextualise Chinese FDI in the African oil and gas industry, 
in particular its investments in South Sudan. The first sub-question of the study will be answered 
in this chapter, which asks to identify the features of the relationship between China and Sudan 
before South Sudan’s independence. The answer to this question will provide the context for the 
analysis of political risk faced by CNPC in South Sudan, which is necessary in order to answer 
the second sub-question of the study in Chapter Four. This chapter will firstly give a historical 
overview of China’s FDI and its connection with the Chinese foreign policy. The second section 
will focus on Chinese investments in Africa, followed by a particular focus on the features of 
Chinese investments in the African oil and gas industry. In the fourth section the specific role of 
CNPC in the development of the Sudanese oil industry is contextualised, followed by an outline 
of the Sudanese civil war and the peace agreement that granted South Sudan the right to vote for 
self-determination. The last section puts the South Sudanese independence in context. 
 
3.2 China’s foreign policy and foreign direct investment 
In global terms, Chinese cumulative investments abroad are comparatively small and only 
represents 1,6 percent of the total world FDI stock17 (MOFCOM, 2011). This picture might 
change with China’s possession and use of large foreign currency reserves (Deng, 2009:77), as 
evidenced by China’s rapid increase in yearly FDI. According to MOFCOM (2011), China has 
been the world’s fifth largest source of FDI in 2010. Deng (2009:74) also notes that Chinese FDI 
has been the largest amongst emerging markets since the 1990s, coinciding with Chinese 
domestic economic liberalisation in 1992 18  (Buckley, Clegg, Cross, Liu, Voss & Zheng, 
2007:504). 
Chinese outward FDI was encouraged by the government’s ‘going out’19 policy and 
China’s accession to the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in 2001 (Buckley et al., 2007:504). In 
order to facilitate Chinese integration into the world economy and position itself into the 
economic world order, the Chinese government aimed to create a supportive environment for 
strong Chinese firms to invest abroad and become globally competitive MNCs (Deng, 2009:76). 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 FDI stock refers to the total value of the investments, not only the flows in a given year (Investor Dictionary, 
2012). 
18 Enterprise internationalisation has been incorporated into the national economic development policy by Deng 
Xiaoping (Buckley et al., 2007:504). 
19 The “going out” policy is also referred to as the “going global” policy. 
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Promoted by preferential policies, SOEs20 were encouraged to invest abroad in projects that 
supported the Chinese economic development model, which is built on heavy industrialisation, 
labour and capital intensive manufacturing industries and export-led growth (Liou, 2009:674; 
Jiang, 2009:587). To support the export of Chinese manufactured goods, FDI was firstly directed 
towards seeking new markets, mainly in developed countries (Buckley et al., 2007:504). 
Secondly, to gain entry into advanced markets, the Chinese government supported FDI that 
acquired advanced technological capabilities and managerial and professional skills, also mainly 
in the developed world (Deng, 2007:72). The third category of FDI that was of strategic national 
importance was investments that would secure access to domestically scarce products to support 
the domestic industrialisation, mainly in the energy and mineral sectors (Jiang, 2009:587). 
Kolstadt and Wigg (2009:9) note that being a latecomer in the global economy, Chinese 
investments in natural resources have been directed towards developing countries where there 
were still investment opportunities.  
As part of this process of transforming the Chinese SOEs into modern market-oriented 
MNCs that are integrated into the world economy, the corporations or their subsidiaries were 
listed on the world’s stock exchanges in order to improve their efficiency and profitability (Liou, 
2009:675). Although the companies were listed, the majority of their shares were still held by the 
state (Deng, 2007:73).  Jiang (2009:603) and Liou (2009:673) argue that the relationship between 
the Chinese state and the SOEs has changed with economic reforms and SOE managers have 
become more profit-oriented in their investment decision-making abroad. Although SOE 
executives can make decisions independently from the state, they are still appointed by the state, 
i.e. selected by the Communist Party of China (CPC), and according to Morck, Yeung and Zhao 
(2008:347), these executive positions are seen as a step in the political careers of the individuals. 
It is for this reason that Kolstad and Wigg (2009:6) suggest that the investment decisions of 
Chinese SOEs also reflect, apart from commercial objectives of profit-maximising, political 
objectives such as the promotion of domestic development, regime survival, social stability, the 
support of Chinese foreign policy or host country development. It therefore seems that despite 
being market-oriented MNCs, decisions made by Chinese SOEs still somewhat reflect dual 
objectives, i.e. profit-maximising and political goals. 
It should however be taken into account that China is no longer a monolithic block that 
dictates the investment decisions of SOEs, because various institutions under the State Council 
are involved in the management and regulation of Chinese FDI (Jiang, 2009:603). Liou 
(2009:683) argues that this bureaucratic fragmentation has weakened the central state’s control 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  20An enterprise is referred to as a SOE when the state holds more than 50 percent of its equity (Kaplinsky & Morris, 
2009:552).	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over the corporations’ decisions because of the conflicting goals of the bureaucratic institutions. 
MOFCOM is the central institution that directs non-financial foreign investments and operations 
and its functions include economic cooperation and the managing of foreign aid projects 
(Holslag, 2011:4; Corkin, 2011:67). The State Asset Supervision and Administrative 
Commission (SASAC) has authority over the management of overseas assets of the top 50 
Chinese SOEs and also regulates the NOCs together with the National Development and Reform 
Commission (NDRC). The Ministry of Finance determines fiscal and taxation policies and is also 
the sole shareholder of China Exim Bank,21 which is responsible for the financing of many of the 
overseas projects of Chinese firms, while the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) is in charge of 
overall foreign policy and strategy (Van der Lugt & Hamblin, 2011:38). 
 
3.3 China’s foreign policy and foreign direct investment in Africa 
As part of its “going out” policy, China’s foreign policy towards Africa since the 1990s has 
mainly been directed by economic interest. The same upward trend of China’s worldwide 
outward FDI has been reflected in China’s FDI in Africa, which has grown from yearly 
investments of US$317,43 million in 2004 to US$2,1 billion in 201022 according to MOFCOM 
(2011) figures. While total cumulative Chinese investments in Africa have only been US$899.55 
million in 2004, it has grown to US$13,04 billion in 2010 (MOFCOM, 2011). Although there has 
been a shift in recent years towards the retail and service sectors, Chinese investments in Africa 
are still dominated by the extraction of natural resources (UNCTAD, 2012:xvi). Kaplinsky and 
Morris (2009:56) mention that even investments in the construction of infrastructure focus on 
providing routes to enable the export of resources, such as oil pipelines or port facilities. As 
mentioned in section 3.2, the securing of scarce resources has been one of the objectives of 
China’s “going out” foreign policy. Van der Lugt and Hamblin (2011:25) note that the structure 
of most African economies is based on trading in raw materials rather than manufactured goods, 
and therefore Africa is able and willing to provide China with these scarce resources. 
Consequently China had investment opportunities in African resources that were not always 
available in the developed world (Kolstadt & Wiig, 2009:560). However, Africa lacked 
opportunities for acquiring technical capabilities and the expansion of its export market due to a 
relative small domestic market, poor infrastructure and a large unskilled labour force (Van der 
Lugt & Hamblin, 2011:25). 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 China Exim Bank is wholly owned by the Chinese Ministry of Finance that reports directly to the State Council 
(Corkin, 2011:68). The bank facilitates the import and export of Chinese products and technology and promotes 
Chinese relations and trade with foreign countries (ICG, 2012a:9). 22	  This is the latest available data from MOFCOM (2011).	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To demonstrate the importance of its economic interest in Africa, China created a 
platform for African and Chinese policymakers to enhance their relations and develop economic 
cooperation and trade, the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), whose first ministerial 
meeting took place in Beijing during 200023 (Cissé, 2012:1). During this first meeting Beijing 
offered African countries a unique economic, political and security package that included debt 
relief, peacekeeping, cheap loans, support in multilateral forums, military deals and South-South 
cooperation (Jacobs, 2011:29). Sino-African relations were strengthened further in 2006 with the 
publishing of the China Africa Policy paper, apart from having a full FOCAC III China-Africa 
summit in Beijing (Grimm, 2012:2). Cissé (2012:2) comments that FOCAC has played a major 
role in facilitating Chinese investments in Africa by enhancing business relations between 
Chinese companies and African countries. 
In the formal China-Africa and FOCAC policies, the principle of non-interference in the 
internal affairs of other countries24 is one of the principles that is declared to guide the Sino-
African relations (FOCAC, 2000; MFA, 2006). This principle manifested in Beijing’s claim that 
its assistance to and economic dealings with African countries are free of political conditions 
such as human rights, good governance or democracy (Jacobs, 2011:30). Alden and Hughes 
(2009:572) argue that the policy of non-interference and non-conditionality has initially benefited 
Chinese investors over their Western counterparts to obtain access to African resources. Although 
this is still the official policy of China, Kuo (2012:3) remarks that it is not always possible for the 
Chinese government to uphold this policy in practice due to the extent of Chinese business 
interests in Africa, Western pressure and expectations by African countries. Alden and Hughes 
(2009:572) further explain that the Chinese government cannot remain indifferent to the politics 
of a host country because of the complex situation created by the diversity of Chinese actors 
involved in African investments. For example, the Chinese government was pressurised 
domestically to evacuate more than 30 000 Chinese workers from Libya during the political 
conflict in 2011 (ICG, 2012a:9). 
The principle of non-conditionality is important in China’s foreign aid policy of granting 
concessional loans25 through China Exim Bank. There is no clear distinction between foreign aid 
and FDI support, as MOFCOM oversees Chinese FDI and also has authority over the Department 
of Foreign Aid. The Department of Foreign Aid in turn subsidises the loan interest of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 The ministerial meetings of FOCAC take place every three years (Grimm, 2012:1). 
24 This principle of non-interference is in line with Chinese principles that guide the government’s other international 
relations.	  
25 Concessional loans is conceptualised as the “medium- and long-term, low interest rate credit extended by China 
Exim Bank under the designation of the Chinese government with the nature of official assistance” (Corkin, 
2011:68). These loans are granted without the conditions such as human rights or revenue transparency attached to 
them, as required by the IMF and World Bank (WB) (Mitchell, 2010:19). 
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concessional loans granted by Exim Bank (Corkin, 2011:68). Aid is granted in the form of 
development packages that are beneficial to African countries, but at the same time promotes 
Chinese foreign policy objectives (ICG, 2012a:9). Yeung and Liu (2008, cited in Corkin, 
2011:75) call this system “economic diplomacy”, where interstate economic relations are 
conducted through the activities of national firms. Apart from profit and economic motives, 
political and diplomatic goals are met through these activities (Yeung & Liu, 2008, cited in 
Corkin, 2011:75). As a way of granting aid, China Exim Bank grants African countries 
concessional loans for development projects, with low interest rates and no conditions such as 
human rights or revenue transparency attached to it (ICG, 2012a:8). Because the contracts for the 
development projects financed by these loans have to be awarded to Chinese contractors, China’s 
foreign policy objective of new markets for its goods and services is also met in this way (Corkin, 
2011:71). Often the repayment of the loans is secured by raw materials from the African country, 
thereby meeting another foreign policy objective of securing access to scarce natural resources 
(Corkin 2011:71). In this way, Beijing may assist SOEs to increase their investment prospects in 
Africa and at the same time obliges the firms to maintain close relations with the State Council 
and China Exim Bank (Holslag, 2011:4; Cissé, 2012:1). 
 
3.4 China’s national oil corporations and foreign direct investment in Africa 
Historically there has always been a connection between trade, FDI and financial flows such as 
aid (Kaplinsky & Morris, 2009:561). This is also evident in China’s economic relations with 
African countries. According to Jacobs (2011:34), 90 percent of African exports to China in 2010 
consisted of natural resources, mainly oil. The same trend is reflected in China’s FDI in Africa 
over the last decade. MOFCOM’s (2011:90) statistics for 2010 show that the majority of Chinese 
FDI in Africa has been in resource-rich countries, of which a large part is in oil-producing 
countries such as Nigeria, Algeria, Sudan26, Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and 
Angola.  However, it should be noted that despite the influx of FDI from Chinese oil companies, 
Chinese NOCs are still small oil producers in Africa (Jiang, 2009:595). 
With China’s domestic development model of heavy industrialisation, the country has 
experienced rapid urbanisation and motorisation simultaneously since 2000 (Ma et al., 2012:43). 
Oil demand has risen in such a way that China is now the second largest oil consumer in the 
world and dependent on oil imports for more than 50 percent of its oil supply (Ma et al., 
2012:45,47). While the Middle East has traditionally been the main supplier of Chinese oil 
imports, the political volatility of the region forced China to diversify its supply, and in 2008 
Angola overtook Saudi Arabia as the main oil supplier (Croll et al., 2008:2). As mentioned in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 Because South Sudan only became independent in 2011, the term Sudan refers to both countries in 2010. 
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section 3.3, Africa provided the Chinese NOCs with opportunities not always available in the oil 
industries of developed countries. For example, because of political opposition, one of China’s 
NOCs, China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC), did not succeed in acquiring an 
American oil company, Unocal, in 2005 (Zhang & Ebbers, 2010:102). Alden and Hughes 
(2009:573) also point out that the lack of certain technical capabilities has been a hurdle for 
CNPC to invest in deep water oil exploration or oil extraction in polar regions. Taylor (2006:942) 
argues that the African oilfields provided Chinese NOCs not only with access to potential oil 
discoveries and unallocated oil reserves, but also with the opportunity to transform their NOCs 
into globally competitive MNCs as a way of integrating China into the world economy.  
Transformation in the Chinese oil and gas industry started in 1988 with the establishment 
of the three NOCs that specialised in different activities (Liou, 2009:676). While CNPC were 
mainly responsible for onshore upstream27 activities, CNOOC specialised in offshore upstream 
activities and Sinopec took control of the downstream business (Rui, 2010:59). Further 
restructuring by vertical integration in 1998 allowed CNPC and Sinopec to expand their 
operations into both upstream and downstream businesses and resulted in competition between 
the NOCs (Mitchell & Lahn, 2007:4). However, the corporations maintained their original 
advantage and today CNPC still dominates upstream activities and Sinopec downstream activities 
(Rui, 2010:59).   
As argued in section 3.2, Chinese NOCs as state-owned enterprises act as profit-making 
corporations, but executives still have to find a balance between commercial and political 
interests when making business decisions. The Chinese NOCs are regulated by NDRC and 
SASAC, both entities that fall under the authority of the State Council (Liou, 2009:683). Liou 
(2009:683) argues that the goals of these two agencies are often in conflict with one another, 
because SASAC is concerned with commercial performance while NDRC is concerned with 
political goals such as the security of Chinese energy supplies. Therefore, despite being 
autonomous commercially driven entities, NOC executives are still obliged by the regulatory 
authorities to take national interest into account when making business decisions. 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27The oil industry is divided into upstream, midstream and downstream sectors. However, the midstream sector is 
usually included in the downstream category. The term “downstream” as used in this study will therefore include 
midstream activities. Upstream activities refer to the exploration and production sector, including the operation to 
bring the crude oil to the surface. Midstream activities include the processing, storage, marketing and transport of 
commodities such as crude oil (Petroleum Services Association of Canada, 2012). The downstream sector includes 
oil refineries, petrochemical plants, petroleum product distribution, retail outlets and distribution and therefore refers 
to the selling and distribution of products derived from crude oil (Fatal Attractions & European Coalitions on Oil in 
Sudan (ECOS), 2008:19). 
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3.5 China’s role in the development of the Sudanese oil industry28 
Encouraged by Beijing’s foreign policy to invest abroad, CNPC, which originally specialised in 
upstream activities, started its foreign operations in the African oil and gas industry with the 
acquisition of large oil stakes in Sudan in 1997 (Rui, 2010:59). Close government relations 
between the two countries facilitated CNPC’s entry into the Sudanese oil industry (Large, 
2009:615). Large (2009:615) makes the point that the Chinese government has seen this 
investment as an opportunity for its NOCs to develop its foreign operations in accordance with 
the foreign policy goals of becoming integrated into the world economy. In another article, Large 
(2008:3) comments that the success that CNPC had with its operations in Sudan contributed to 
the fact that the China’s State Council endorsed CNPC’s strategy of purchasing foreign assets. It 
also led to stronger Sino-Sudanese ties, increased bilateral trade, and facilitated the entry of a 
wider variety of Chinese business enterprises in Sudan (ICG, 2012a:2). Until 2005 Sudan was the 
largest recipient of official Chinese FDI in Africa (MOFCOM, 2011:90). Although China’s 
investments in other African oil producing countries such as Nigeria have overtaken its Sudanese 
investment (MOFCOM, 2011:90), ICG (2012a:27) notes that the importance of this initial 
implementation of China’s “going out” strategy has given Sudan “symbolic importance”. 
China has been of significant importance for Sudan, not only as the largest economic 
investor and a central role-player in the development of its oil industry, but also as the largest 
buyer of its oil29 (Kuo, 2012:3). Oil development in Sudan started in 1981 by Chevron after 
significant discoveries in Bentiu, later called Unity, and Heglig in the Muglad Basin 30 
(Goldsmith, Abura & Switzer, 2002:223; ECOS, 2010:30). With the onset of the second 
Sudanese civil war in 1984, oil development stopped after a rebel attack on the Chevron base and 
the subsequent withdrawal of Chevron from Sudan (Harneit-Sievers, 2010:98). After more than a 
decade of civil war, the Sudanese government turned to China to restart the development of its 
oilfields to improve the state’s poor financial situation31 (Large, 2008:2). Sudan faced political 
isolation after US sanctions32 prohibited American companies from investing in Sudan since 
1997. China, who was keen to invest abroad, was seen as a potential ally because it also faced 
difficulties in its foreign relations because of the Tiananmen Square incident33 in 1989 (Large, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 Refer to Table Four in Appendix A for a chronology of the conflict and oil development  in Sudan. 
29 In 2011 China imported 66 percent of Sudanese (Sudan and South Sudan combined) oil (Kuo, 2012:3). 
30 Refer to Maps One, Two and Three in Appendix B. 
31After the West pulled out of Africa with the demise of the communist bloc in 1989, foreign aid to Sudan fell 
dramatically and together with the costs of the civil war has led to a situation of high external debt, hyperinflation 
and declining GDP (Smith, 2011:174).   
32 The fact that the governing party of Sudan, the National Islamic Front (NIF), later called the National Congress 
Party (NCP), has been associated with terrorism, led to the US sanctions against Sudan in 1997. The United Nations 
(UN) has also announced sanctions against Sudan in 1996 (Large, 2008:2, Smith, 2011:175).  
33 The Chinese government was criticised for a military operation that killed hundreds of civilians during a 
democratic protest in Beijing’s Tiananmen Square in 1989 (BBC News, 1989). 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
	   39	  
2008:2). From China’s point of view, the lack of competition from American firms offered the 
Chinese NOCs the opportunity to develop its overseas investments on favourable terms (ICG, 
2012a:2). 
In 1997, CNPC became the operating company as well as the largest shareholder (40 
percent) in the Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company (GNPOC), a consortium with 
Petronas (30 percent) from Malaysia, Talisman Energy (25 percent) from Canada and Sudapet 
(five percent), the Sudanese NOC, as the other shareholders34 (Rui, 2010:60). With concessions 
in blocks one, two and four in the Muglad Basin, GNPOC started with oil production of Nile 
blend crude35 in the Heglig and Unity oilfields36 (Energy Information Administration (EIA), 
2012). After the completion by CNPC of the 1600 km Greater Nile Oil Pipeline (GNOP) from the 
Muglad Basin to Port Sudan on the Red Sea, Sudan exported its first oil in 1999 (Harneit-Sievers, 
2010:98). Apart from operating the pipeline, CNPC further expanded its downstream activities 
with a 50 percent investment in the Khartoum Refinery in 2000 (Rui, 2010:64).  
CNPC, with a 41 percent share in the Petrodar37 consortium, expanded its Sudanese 
investment in 2000 with the development of block three and seven in the Melut Basin38, which 
gained significance with the discovery of a world class oil field in Palogue in 2002 (CNPC, 2012; 
EIA, 2012). The 1370 km pipeline, operated and owned by Petrodar, has linked these oil fields 
with Port Sudan since 2006 (ICG, 2012a:26; ECOS, 2010:14). The crude that is found in the 
Melut Basin, Dar blend, is a sour blend, which means that it has a high sulphur content and 
refineries have to be adapted to be able to refine this crude into useable products39 (ECOS, 
2010:9). CNPC also has production facilities in blocks six and fifteen, but GNPOC and Petrodar 
account for the largest portion of Sudanese (and after independence, also South Sudanese) oil 
production, making CNPC the largest oil investor in Sudan (Jiang, 2009:598; CNPC, 2012). 
With the independence of South Sudan on 9 July 2011, oil fields have been divided 
between the two countries according to territorial position, shifting around 75 percent of oil 
production to South Sudan (BMI, 2012f:22). While the Petrodar operating areas, i.e. blocks three 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 Talisman sold its share in 2003 to the Indian NOC, Oil and Natural Gas Corporation (ONGC) Videsh due to 
political pressure from the Canadian government (Kobrin, 2004). With the independence of South Sudan, Sudapet’s 
share was transferred to Nilepet, the South Sudanese NOC (ICG, 2012a). 
35 Nile blend crude is a sweet crude. This means that it has a low sulphur content and is easier and less costly to 
refine into useable products than blends with a higher sulphur content (WB, 2007). 
36 Refer to Maps One, Two and Three in Appendix B. 
37 Petrodar is also referred to as Petrodar Operating Company (PDOC). Apart from CNPC, China holds a further six 
percent in this consortium through the other large NOC, Sinopec (Sautman & Yan, 2009:754). The other 
shareholders of Petrodar are Petronas (40 percent) from Malaysia, Al Thani (five percent) from United Arab 
Emirates (UAE) and Sudapet  (eight percent). After South Sudanese independence Sudapet’s share has been 
transferred to Nilepet, the South Sudanese NOC. 
38 Refer to Maps One, Two and Three in Appendix B. 
39 According to ECOS (2010:9), most refineries in Asia have started to upgrade their equipment in order to process 
Dar blend crude. 
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and seven in the Melut Basin, are completely situated in South Sudan and blocks six and fifteen, 
as well as all the pipelines and refineries, are completely situated in Sudanese territory, the oil 
fields in blocks one, two and four, operated by GNPOC, are situated in the common border area 
across both countries40, thereby splitting the operations of the consortium (ICG, 2011b:28). The 
situation has been complicated because of certain oilfields such as Heglig that are situated in the 
disputed border area between the two countries, despite the fact that it is treated by the 
international community as part of Sudan (EIA, 2012). CNPC has therefore been central to the 
development of the Sudanese oil industry and remains the largest investor in both countries after 
the independence of South Sudan in July 2011. According to Wang (2012), the investments in the 
two countries are CNPC’s largest, most complete production chain outside China, with interests 
in exploration, pumping and refining. In order to understand the complex situation in which 
CNPC finds itself after the South Sudanese secession, the Sudanese civil war and the subsequent 
peace accord that led to the secession of South Sudan should be contextualised. 
 
3.6 Civil war and peace in Sudan41 
While the Sudanese civil war of 22 years was caused and fuelled by a complex interrelationship 
of factors, for the purpose of this study it is only relevant to focus on two interrelated aspects, i.e. 
the north-south division and the impact of the discovery and subsequent exploitation of oil in 
Sudan. 
Gonzalez (2010:71) argues that Sudan’s north-south division has its roots in the colonial 
history of Anglo-Egyptian rule42 when the north has been developed in terms of education, 
infrastructure and state administrative structures, while the southern provinces remained 
undeveloped. The “southern policy” of the 1920s reinforced separate development along ethnic, 
cultural and religious lines by the promotion of English and Christianity in the south rather than 
Arabic and Islamism that dominated the north (Woodward, 2011:6). Just before Sudanese 
independence in 1956, the first civil war broke out because of rebellion against southern 
subordination, which only ended in 1972 with the Addis Ababa peace accord that granted 
regional autonomy to southern Sudan (Fatal Attractions & ECOS, 2008:5; Christopher, 
2011:128). Gonzalez (2010:74) argues that the discovery of oil in Sudan triggered renewed north-
south conflict and contributed to the outbreak of the second civil war in 1983. President Nimeiri 
of Sudan tried to redraw the borders between the provinces, created Unity State to include the oil 
fields of the Muglad Basin and claimed control by the central government in Khartoum over the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 Refer to Map One in Appendix B.  41	  Refer to Table Four in Appendix A for a chronology of the conflict and oil development in Sudan.	  
42Sudan has been under the Anglo-Egyptian rule since 1898 (Gonzalez, 2010:71). 
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southern provinces and their oilfields (Kobrin, 2004:432; Maitre, 2009:57; Switzer, 2002:7). It is 
estimated that the second civil war, with the NCP as the governing party of Sudan and the Sudan 
People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) under the leadership of John Garang as main 
actors, resulted in the deaths of over two million people, the internal displacement of more than 
four million people and the flight of 500 000 refugees across national borders (Large, 2009:613; 
Gonzalez, 2010:72). 
Apart from the triggering of renewed conflict, the development of the Sudanese oil 
industry impacted the civil war in different ways. For the purposes of this study, it is important to 
look at three issues in order to understand the link between the civil war, the oil industry and 
CNPC. Firstly, the development of the oilfields has been associated with large-scale forced 
displacements and depopulation of the region (Gonzalez, 2010:7). Under the smokescreen of 
defending the oilfields and its investors, these displacements were carried out by government-
sponsored militia that followed a strategy of division along ethnic lines43 (Schumann, 2010:104). 
According to Thomas (2011:58), there have been suggestions of complicity by oil companies in 
the evacuation of the population and of the use of oil company facilities to launch air attacks. 
This intensified perceptions by the southerners and the SPLM/A that the oil companies took the 
side of the Sudanese government in the civil war (Thomas, 2011:58). Secondly, the revenue that 
the oil boom brought to Khartoum since exports started in 1999 enabled the government of Sudan 
to gain military strength to intensify its war efforts (Patey, 2007:999). This caused grievances not 
only against the government, but also against the international oil corporations that were 
associated with the government and the oil revenue (Thomas, 2011:58). China in particular has 
been associated with Khartoum’s oil wealth because of CNPC’s role in the development of the oil 
industry and because China has been one of the major export destinations for Sudan’s oil. The 
huge military expenses also triggered grievances against China that have been associated with the 
supply of weapons to Sudan44. Thirdly, the increase in the oil revenue intensified the war because 
of resentment by the south of the unequal development in Sudan. The oil revenue allowed for 
increased public spending on development projects (Schumann, 2010:105), but most of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 While the SPLA strongly represented the Dinka ethnic group, the government backed the Nuer forces to challenge 
the SPLA in the oil producing areas (Fatal Attractions & ECOS, 2008:6; Goldsmith, et al., 2002:219).  
44Although literature such as Large (2008:8), Wezeman (2010:62), Sautman and Yan (2009:756) and McFarland 
(2010:471) suggest that China has been a supplier of military weapons to Khartoum, there are differences on the 
extent of the military relationship between China and Sudan. However, for the purposes of this research the real 
extent of the relationship is not important, but rather the perceptions held by the SPLM/A. It is a general perception 
that the domestic Sudanese military industry was developed with the assistance of the Chinese government (Large, 
2007:61). 
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development took place around Khartoum whereas the south has been marginalised45 (De Waal, 
2010:17).  
While the development of the oil industry contributed to the escalation of the Sudanese 
civil war, the escalation of the conflict in turn hampered Sudan’s ability to export the oil 
(Gonzalez, 2010:75). This situation was a major factor that led to the signing of the CPA in 2005 
by the government’s leading NCP and the SPLM/A after negotiations facilitated by the 
international community (Ahmed, 2009:138). The CPA established two governing entities, i.e. 
the Government of National Unity (GNU), a power-sharing government in Khartoum, and the 
semi-autonomous regional government, the Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS) situated in 
Juba (Thomas, 2010:2). The CPA gave Southern Sudan the right to vote on 9 January 2011 for 
unity with or secession from Sudan (Large, 2009:621). In accordance with a wealth sharing 
agreement, the CPA also stipulated that for this interim period Southern Sudan would get a 50 
percent share of the oil revenue from oil produced within its territory (Ahmed, 2009:141; 
Gonzalez, 2010:75). This peace agreement contributed to a better political and security 
environment that enabled the development of blocks three and seven in the Melut Basin and the 
construction of the Petrodar oil pipeline that connects the oil fields with Port Sudan (ECOS, 
2010:30). Without this pipeline, Sudan would not be able to export oil from the Melut Basin oil 
fields where large discoveries have been made.  
 
3.7 Independence of the Republic of South Sudan 
On 9 January 2011, the Southern Sudanese people voted with a 98,3 percent majority in favour of 
secession from Sudan and the Republic of South Sudan became an independent country on 9 July 
2011, with an estimated population of 8,2 million and a government led by the SPLM/A and its 
leader, President Salva Kiir (Aras, 2011; Dagne, 2011:15). However, the secession brought new 
insecurities to the region because of issues that had not been resolved before independence, 
despite the facilitation by the African Union High Level Implementation Panel (AUHIP) led by 
former South African president, Thabo Mbeki (African Union Peace and Security Council 
(AUPSC), 2012:1). Without an agreement on how to share the oil revenue after independence, 
both countries faced financial insecurities. While Sudan has lost a major part46 of its oil revenue 
because 75 percent of the oilfields fell within South Sudanese territory, South Sudan faced the 
dilemma of being fully dependent on the Sudanese infrastructure, i.e. the pipelines and the port 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 According to De Waal (2010:170) 90 percent of infrastructure development in the early 2000s took place around 
Khartoum.	  
46 According to Global Witness (2011:24) oil revenue represented 50 percent of Sudan’s domestic revenue and 
accounted for 93 percent of exports, making oil exports one of the only sources of hard currency. 
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facilities, to export its oil (Global Witness, 2011:3; BMI, 2012h:44). The demarcation of the 
border between the two countries has been another unresolved issue, in particular the question on 
how the oil fields in blocks one, two and four in the Muglad Basin, which straddled the border, 
were owned and operated (Schankleman, 2011:5). Other unresolved issues are the question of 
whether Sudan’s external debt of US$38 million should be shared by South Sudan, whether the 
Abyei region on the border should be part of Sudan or South Sudan and questions regarding the 
citizenship of South Sudanese who live in Sudan and vice versa (EIA, 2012; De Waal, 2010:22). 
 
3.8 Conclusion 
The purpose of this chapter was to contextualise Chinese FDI in the African oil and gas industry, 
in particular its investments in South Sudan, in order to answer the first sub-question of this 
study. This sub-question asks to identify the features of the relationship between China and 
Sudan before South Sudan’s secession. The following features that are significant to this study 
have been identified: 
Firstly, CNPC’s initial engagement with Sudan was encouraged by Beijing’s “going out” 
policy. Investments abroad were financially and diplomatically supported by the Chinese 
government to transform its SOEs into globally competitive MNCs as a way of integrating into 
the world economy. Because of the success of CNPC’s investments in Sudan as the first major 
overseas investment by a Chinese NOC, Sudan’s investments did not only have commercial 
value, but also symbolic value. It should however be noted that Beijing’s control over the 
Chinese NOCs has weakened over the last decade because of bureaucratic fragmentation and 
NOC executives have to meet both commercial and political objectives.  
A second feature of the relations between China and Sudan is Beijing’s orthodox 
understanding of a policy of “non-interference” and “non-conditionality”. CNPC did not have the 
same pressures from the Chinese government as Western firms had on political issues such as the 
war on terror or conditions such as human rights. These issues limited the investments in Sudan 
by other firms, but Chinese firms could expand their investments and use the advantage of 
concessional loans without conditions attached to them.  
Thirdly, Sudan was of economic interest to China because of its oil reserves, which were 
important to secure Chinese access to scarce natural resources, in particular oil. Until 2005, 
investments in Sudan were China’s largest FDI in African countries. Sudan was therefore of 
relevance for China in terms of the return of its investments for CNPC, but also in terms of 
securing oil imports from Sudan.  
Fourthly, China was of extreme economic interest to Sudan as the largest oil investor, 
mainly investments held by CNPC. Chinese oil firms had an advantage in the Sudanese oil 
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industry because of the lack of competition after US investments and trade with Sudan were 
forbidden by sanctions. Because China could secure the import of Sudanese oil by these 
investments, China also adapted its refineries in order to process the crude blends from Sudan. In 
this way, China had a competitive advantage in terms of trade as a significant export destination 
for Sudanese oil. CNPC’s investments in the downstream oil industry in terms of the construction 
and operation of the pipelines and the oil refineries further made Sudan dependent on investments 
by Chinese firms. Also of significance is the dependency of the Sudanese economy on oil 
revenue. 
A fifth relevant feature is the close relations that the Chinese government and oil firms 
had with Sudan during the Sudanese civil war. The involvement of the Chinese oil firms in the 
development of the Sudanese oil industry, specifically its connotation with forced evacuations, 
and the impact of the oil revenue on the civil war, have created and sustained perceptions by the 
SPLM/A supporters that the Chinese government and CNPC have supported Khartoum in the 
civil war against the southern regions. China was associated with the increased military strength 
of Khartoum and marginalisation of the south while the northern region of Sudan developed.  
 It is important to take these features of the relations between China and Sudan into 
account when the political risk faced by CNPC in South Sudan is analysed in the next chapter, as 
75 percent of Sudan’s oil fields, a significant part of Chinese investments, were transferred to 
South Sudan after independence.  
The first sub-question was answered in this chapter, while the second sub-question of the 
study, which asks what the level of political risk is that CNPC faces in South Sudan since the 
country’s independence, will be answered in Chapter Four.  
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Chapter Four: Political risk analysis for CNPC in South Sudan 
 
4.1 Introduction 
The purpose of Chapter Four is to analyse and measure the level of the political risk faced by 
CNPC in South Sudan since the country’s independence in order to answer the second sub-
question of the study. The results of the analysis will be examined in Chapter Five in order to 
answer the main research question, which asks what the main indicators of political risk are that 
Chinese corporations may face in the oil and gas industry in African countries. The industry-
specific political risk model for the oil and gas industry of Boshoff (2010), as outlined in section 
2.4, is used as a framework for the analysis. The political risk will be determined by analysing the 
risk factors, i.e. political, economic, societal, petroleum, company and societal factors. The data 
that will be used as a basis for the analysis will be limited to those data available as at 31 August 
2012. Each factor is influenced by different risk indicators that are assessed separately on a scale 
of 0-5. In the last section, a final risk rating is calculated by applying the ratings to the political 
risk model.  
 
4.2 Political risk analysis for CNPC in South Sudan 
For each risk factor, the risk indicators are rated. For each risk indicator, a risk rating is presented 
and followed by a justification for the rating. 
 
4.2.1  Political risk factor: Political factor 
4.2.1.1 Political indicator: Regime and political stability 
Risk rating: Extreme: 5. South Sudan became an independent state on 9 July 2011 after it was 
governed by a semi-autonomous GoSS under the CPA since 2005. Political stability in the 
country may firstly be threatened by the weak government and state institutions of the new 
country. Secondly, it may be threatened by the renewed mistrust and hostile relationship between 
the governments of Sudan and South Sudan following the lack of a resolution to the outstanding 
CPA issues, specifically with regards to the division of oil revenue between the two countries 
after South Sudan’s secession.  
 
4.2.1.1.1 Weak government and state institutions 
Despite governing Southern Sudan during the CPA period, Lacher (2012:5) argues that the 
SPLM is a weak government party because of internal divisions and factionalism with its roots in 
the civil war. Since the death in 2005 of the SPLM leader, John Garang, whose strong leadership 
unified the groups, the SPLM has suffered from splits and internal divisions (Ahmed, 2009:143). 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
	   46	  
Dagne (2011:12) and Lacher (2012:5) warn that the South Sudanese government may face 
political rivalries that might challenge its leadership. Since the April 2010 general elections there 
have been various rebellions against the SPLM government by former SPLA commanders 
(Dagne, 2011:13; UNSC, 2012a:15). However, despite the internal divisions, the SPLM is still 
seen as the liberation movement that brought peace to the region (El-Battahani, 2010:4). The 
UNSC (2012b) also reports that the hostile relations with Sudan since independence had a 
unifying effect throughout South Sudan. It is for this reason that Dagne (2011:12) makes the 
comment that the SPLM is “likely to dominate the political scene in South Sudan for years to 
come”. Although a change in government is unlikely, the government policies may still be 
influenced by shifts in the prominence of different factions and sentiments within the SPLM. 
Foreign oil companies are extremely vulnerable to possible changes in government policies such 
as its energy policy, tax policy or foreign policy. 
Weak state institutions and the lack of state legitimacy also threaten political stability in 
South Sudan. Nyuot Yoh (2010:52) argues that the SPLM did not have a strong institutional 
framework because of the dominant role that the SPLA played during the civil war. Due to the 
marginalisation of the south in terms of education and socio-economic development by the 
Khartoum government, there is a shortage of trained civil servants to form competent state 
institutions (Lacher, 2012:27). This has led to the expansion of a patronage network in the current 
state structure to compromise for the lack of public service delivery such as education, water, 
electricity and transport infrastructure (Dagne, 2011:2; Lacher, 2012:27). This is evident from the 
2011 state budget, where security and military expenses comprised 38 percent of the budget and 
only 21 percent were allocated to infrastructure, education and health combined (Lacher, 
2012:29). Lacher (2012:27) also points out that the lack of a proper tax administration makes the 
state, and therefore also the financing of the patronage system, almost totally dependent on oil 
revenue. Because of the weak state institutions and poor public services, oil companies may face 
the risk of being targeted by the government either to fulfil some of the state’s functions or to pay 
more taxes. 
A further possible threat to political stability is the military force in South Sudan. The 
government of South Sudan aims to gain support from the military through its patronage system, 
as evident from the large military state spending. However, the new government faces the 
problem of transforming the SPLA, a former guerrilla force with soldiers from different militant 
groups, into a regular army (Wezeman, 2010:62; BMI, 2012h:55). Lacher (2012:10) remarks that 
the army and security forces often present a threat to the civilian population, rather than protect 
them. The UNSC’s explicit mandate to the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) to 
protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence is evident of this lack of security 
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provision by the state (Lacher, 2012:10). With a widespread proliferation of arms amongst 
civilians and non-state armed groups, and dissatisfied demobilised ex-combatants who face a lack 
of employment opportunities, the violent political culture as a legacy of the civil war may pose a 
threat to political stability (Wezeman, 2010:63; Nichols, 2011:13). Apart from threatening the 
power of the SPLM in the government, conflicts caused by divisions in the military and the 
availability of arms amongst civilians may threaten the security of the personnel and assets of oil 
companies, as well as their ability to continue their operations.  
 
4.2.1.1.2  Dispute with Sudan over oil revenue  
As discussed in section 3.7, Sudan lost a major part of its revenue with the transfer of 75 percent 
of the oil production to South Sudan at independence. South Sudan, on the other hand, faces the 
dilemma of being completely dependent on Sudan for its refineries and export infrastructure in 
the form of pipelines and port facilities (Large & Patey, 2010:14). Despite negotiations between 
the two countries under the facilitation of the AUHIP, no agreement had been reached before 
independence on the transit fees that South Sudan would have to pay for the use of the Sudanese 
oil infrastructure (AUPSC, 2012:1).  
Khartoum rejected a deal proposed by Juba in July 2011, where after Juba received all the 
oil revenue in the absence of an agreement (BMI, 2011; Lacher, 2012:11). Lacher (2012:11) 
argues that the main reason for the continuation of the South Sudanese oil operations and exports 
during this period, was the pressure from the Chinese government on Khartoum. However, this 
situation could not last because of the worsening of Khartoum’s fiscal position as a result of the 
loss of the oil revenue (Lacher, 2012:11). This led Khartoum to take action at the end of 
November 2011 to compensate for the loss of revenue. As Sudan had control over the export 
facilities at Port Sudan, Khartoum ordered the delay of two shipments of South Sudanese oil on 
30 November and 3 December 2011 respectively (ICG, 2012a:27) and started to divert some of 
the South Sudanese Nile blend crude to the Khartoum refinery (EIA, 2012). In the absence of a 
deal, further shipments of South Sudanese oil were blocked and loaded onto Khartoum-chartered 
ships during January 2012 (ICG, 2012a:28). Khartoum claimed that it seized the oil because of 
the unpaid transit fees owed by South Sudan for the use of Sudan’s oil pipelines (AUPSC, 
2012:1). South Sudan, on the other hand, reported that it would treat the confiscated oil as stolen 
goods, as it had been the rightful owners of the oil (Government of the Republic of South Sudan, 
2012). To resolve the dispute, the parties continued to negotiate in January 2012 under the 
mediation of the AUHIP, but after the AUHIP proposal was rejected by South Sudan, Juba made 
the decision to shut down its oil production until a fair deal was reached on transit fees (EIA, 
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2012). All South Sudan’s oil operations were shut down incrementally until production ended 
completely at the end of January 2012 (ICG, 2012a:28; EIA, 2012).   
BMI (2012h:46) argues that the rationale for the shutdown has been to put pressure on the 
international community to intervene and resolve the crisis, as the world crude supply would be 
affected, especially in China where the Dar and Nile blends of South Sudan are in particular 
demand47. Furthermore, with the negotiations on new oil contracts48 with the oil companies that 
took place at the same time as the negotiations on the oil deal, Juba calculated that the Chinese 
government would pressure Khartoum to lower its pipeline charges (BMI, 2012h:46). ICG 
(2012a:28) comments that Juba was of the opinion that Beijing could play a larger role in 
pressing Khartoum to reach a deal. It was only on 4 August 2012 that Pagan Amum (2012), 
South Sudan’s chief negotiator, announced in a press statement that the two parties had reached 
an agreement after pressure from the UNSC to close a deal under the mediation of the AUHIP. 
Amum (2012) stated that while Sudan previously demanded fees of up to US$36 per barrel for 
the use of its oil pipelines, an agreement had been reached for combined fees of US$11 per barrel 
for the GNPOC operated pipeline and US$9,1 per barrel for the Petrodar pipeline for the next 
three and a half years, after which the fees can be renegotiated (Amum, 2012). Amum (2012) also 
declared that as a separate agreement from the transit fee agreement, South Sudan agreed to assist 
Sudan with a Transitional Financial Arrangement (TFA) because of the impact that the loss of the 
oil revenue had on Sudan’s fiscal position. This financial assistance of US$3,02849 will be paid 
over a period of three and a half years as part of a “comprehensive package designed to ensure 
peace and security, respect for territorial integrity and cooperation” (Amum, 2012). The South 
Sudanese Minister of Petroleum and Mining, Stephen Dhieu Dau, said that as soon as the 
agreement was signed, South Sudan could resume preparation for its oil production (Dau, 2012). 
The two parties would resume their negotiations under the facilitation of former South African 
president, Thabo Mbeki, and the AUHIP on 4 September 2012 in Addis Ababa with the aim of 
reaching a final comprehensive agreement on the oil deal as well as other outstanding CPA issues 
such as security, border disputes, the status of Abyei and nationality issues50 (Amum, 2012; 
Reuters, 2012). The UNSC has set a deadline of 22 September 2012 for the finalisation of the 
negotiations (Reuters, 2012). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 It is reported that approximately five percent of China’s imported crude oil comes from South Sudan (BMI, 
2012f:19). 
48 New oil contracts have been negotiated during January 2012 with oil companies that operate oil fields in South 
Sudan. This issue is dealt with in detail in section 4.2.4.9. 
49 This amount reflects a third of the gap in Sudan’s revenue resulting from the loss of oil revenue after South 
Sudan’s independence (Amum, 2012). 
50 Refer to section 3.7 for more information on outstanding CPA issues and to section 4.2.1.2 on security issues with 
regards to the demarcation of the common border. 
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The dispute over the transit fees and the shutdown of the oil production had a severe 
effect on CNPC’s investment in South Sudan in several ways. Firstly, the confiscation of the oil 
and the delay in shipments during December 2011 and January 2012 brought technical problems 
for oil production facilities, as the delay caused a storage crisis in the port with limited holding 
facilities (ICG, 2012a:27). Because of the delayed loading dates, oil tankers had to dock at 
considerable cost at Port Sudan, despite pleas from CNPC leadership (ICG, 2012a:28). Irregular 
schedules led to inefficiencies in oil production and other problems such as insufficient staffing 
and the movement of staff and personnel across the border (ICG, 2012a:28). Despite technical 
reports on these issues to the negotiation team in Addis Ababa by the CNPC representative, Sun 
Xiansheng, during January 2012, Juba still decided to shut down the production (ICG, 2012a:28).  
Secondly, CNPC, which operates in both countries, had been dragged into the dispute that 
ultimately led to the expulsion of Petrodar’s president from South Sudan on 20 February 2012. 
Despite the 2005 CPA, the two parties mistrusted one another and due to the NCP domination of 
the Ministry of Energy and Mining (MEM) during the CPA period, Juba had suspicions that 
Southern Sudan did not get its fair share of oil profits during that time51 (Aras, 2011). Mistrust 
escalated with the oil dispute between Juba and Khartoum, which started at the same time that the 
oil companies renegotiated their contracts with Juba52. During the contract negotiations, Juba 
threatened that complicity with Khartoum’s oil confiscation by any company would not be 
tolerated and could lead to the invalidation of oil contracts (BMI, 2012d). After the shutdown, 
Juba started to investigate the Petrodar consortium that operates blocks three and seven, as well 
as the Petrodar pipeline situated in Sudan (BMI, 2012d). According to ICG (2012a:30), South 
Sudanese officials found oil wells during the investigation that has not been recorded previously. 
This fuelled further mistrust against Khartoum for under-reporting oil output and Juba accused 
Petrodar of complicity with Khartoum despite Petrodar’s explanations of the discrepancies (ICG, 
2012a:30). Apart from this accusation, Juba also complained about Petrodar’s delay in the 
relocation of its headquarters to Juba and a dispute over the future of Nilepet53, which holds a 
minority share in the consortium (ICG, 2012a:30). These accusations and, in Pagan Amum’s54 
words, the “lack of cooperation” led to the expulsion of Petrodar’s president, the Chinese national 
Liu Yingcai, from South Sudan on 20 February 2012 (Sudan Tribune, 2012). This expulsion may 
have a direct impact on CNPC’s staff efficiency, and this incident has also demonstrated that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 These discrepancies and its explanations have been published in a report by Global Witness in 2011. In terms of 
the CPA, Juba had to share in 50 percent of the oil revenue from production in Southern Sudan. 
52 For more detail on the contracts see section 4.2.4.9. 
53 Nilepet is the South Sudanese NOC. 
54 Pagan Amum is the secretary general of the SPLM and the top negotiator in talks with Sudan (Sudan Tribune, 
2012). 
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Juba has the power to make decisions that may impact on CNPC’s continuation of its operations, 
especially when the company is mistrusted for siding with Khartoum.  
Thirdly, the shutdown of the South Sudanese oil operations by Juba has caused severe 
losses for CNPC as the largest shareholder in both oil consortiums. Apart from the loss in 
revenue, the companies still have regular overhead costs above additional costs to regulate the 
technical process of the shutdown. It has further been reported that oil companies sent some of 
their foreign workforce home (EIA, 2012), while CNPC subsidiaries that have been responsible 
for exploration, engineering, construction and drilling have been idle since the shutdown (ICG, 
2012a:23). BMI (2012b) reports that according to industry sources it might take up to six months 
to resume production as water has to be removed from pipelines at huge costs. The shutdown of 
the oil operations has therefore had a huge negative effect on CNPC’s income, and even when the 
decision is taken to resume production once a final agreement is signed, it would be costly and 
the retraining and repatriation of personnel would hamper production efficiency. Hence, it will 
take a long time for production to reach the same levels as before the shutdown.  
While it seems as if a short-term agreement has been reached to secure the export of 
South Sudanese oil, on which CNPC’s operations in South Sudan are dependent, a last point 
should be made on the long-term effect of a hostile Juba-Khartoum relationship on CNPC. While 
the agreement has secured South Sudan’s use of Sudan’s infrastructure for the next three and a 
half years, there is no long-term guarantee that the agreement will be extended. It is possible that 
CNPC can once again find itself in the same position after the end of three and a half years if the 
hostile relationship between the two countries persists. As an attempt to become independent 
from the Sudanese infrastructure, Juba has started negotiations with Kenya for the development 
of an oil pipeline to the port of Lamu, a Kenyan port that is still under construction (Dau & 
Murungi, 2012; BMI, 2012f:28). However, no funding has been secured for the project and 
doubts have been expressed as to the economic viability of the project55 (Barber & Xiao, 2012:8; 
ICG, 2012a:25). It should also be taken into account that an alternative pipeline would make 
Sudan’s pipelines obsolete and may cause losses to Petrodar and GNPOC as operating companies 
of the pipelines, as Kuo (2012:5) remarks. This can also undermine relations between Sudan and 
South Sudan, as well as between Sudan and the Chinese government and oil firms if Chinese 
companies are involved in the construction of the pipeline (Kuo, 2012:5). As CNPC has 
investments in both Sudan and South Sudan, these hostile relations may have a negative effect on 
the long-term security of South Sudanese exports, and at the same time the continuation of 
CNPC’s operations cannot be guaranteed. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 According to ICG (2012a:25) CNPC raised concerns about the recovering of the costs of such a pipeline because 
of the time and difficult terrain, which could exceed a reasonable transfer fee to be charged. 
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4.2.1.2  Political indicator: War and security issues 
Risk rating: High: 4. Apart from the oil dispute, the hostile relationship between Juba and 
Khartoum also manifested in the dispute over the demarcation of the common border that peaked 
in April 2012 as the armies of the two countries launched violent attacks across the border. The 
demarcation of the border has not been resolved before independence and is of significant 
importance for both countries as most of the oilfields are situated around the north-south border, 
including the Heglig oilfields that lie within disputed territory56. According to BMI (2012c), 
Heglig has been responsible for about half of Sudan’s crude production since the independence of 
South Sudan. While Sudan and the international community, including the African Union (AU) 
and the UN, consider Heglig as part of the territory of Southern Kordofan in Sudan, Juba claims 
that Heglig belongs to South Sudan because it is situated south of the 195657 historical border that 
is supposed to be the official border between the two countries (Sudan Human Security Baseline 
Assessment (SHSBA), 2012; BBC News, 2012c). Although the Permanent Court of Arbitration 
(PCA) in The Hague ruled in 2009 that the Heglig oilfields fall outside the Abyei58 border area, 
South Sudan argues that the court did not make a decision on whether Heglig falls within the 
Sudanese state, Southern Kordofan, or Unity State that is now part of South Sudan (SHSBA, 
2012; Peter, 2010:68). Juba therefore argues that South Sudan still has a claim to Heglig 
(SHSBA, 2012). 
According to De Waal (2010:18), both parties increased their military spending before 
independence to prepare for a renewal of hostilities between the two countries. Despite an 
agreement by both parties to respect each other’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, since 
November 2011, UNMISS has reported air attacks by the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) on 
locations in the South Sudanese state of Upper Nile, and violence along the border in Unity State 
escalated in late March 2012 (UNSC, 2012a:7; UNSC, 2012b:4). The UNSC (2012b:6) reports 
that after air and ground attacks by the SAF on SPLA bases in Unity State on 26 and 31 March 
2012, the SAF were pushed north towards the area of Heglig by the SPLA. The conflict escalated 
in April 2012 and on 10 April the Heglig oilfields were captured and occupied by the SPLA 
forces, forcing the oil operations of GNPOC to shut down (UNSC, 2012b:4). This was followed 
by several air attacks by the SAF on South Sudanese territory in Unity State (UNSC, 2012b:6) 
and allegations of attacks on oil installations were made (BMI, 2012h:58). It was only after 
international pressure that the SPLA forces withdrew from Heglig on 24 April 2012, and the SAF 
aerial bombardments ended on 5 May 2012 (UNSC, 2012b:4). After what has been seen as “the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 Refer to Maps Two and Three in Appendix B. 
57 Sudan gained independence in 1956. 
58 It is still an unresolved CPA issue whether the Abyei region is part of Sudan or South Sudan. 
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biggest north-south crisis since the second Sudanese civil war”, both sides returned to 
negotiations overseen by the AUHIP in Addis Ababa (BMI, 2012g:9), and specific negotiations 
on security and border issues would continue on 4 September 2012 (Reuters, 2012).   
BMI (2012f:23) argues that the Heglig conflict reflects the “precarious nature” of the 
peace between the two countries and highlighted the importance of the undemarcated border 
region as a source of discontent between the two nations. Even before South Sudanese 
independence, De Waal (2010:13) summed up the relations between the two parties as 
“defensive, mutually sizing each other up, testing one another, and assuming the worst of one 
another”. BMI (2012h:5) makes the point that the Heglig incident is a demonstration of the 
capabilities of the South Sudanese forces that can match the SAF despite Sudan’s superior 
aircraft capabilities. Also, the fact that the UN Office of the Co-ordination of Humanitarian 
Affairs (UNOCHA) witnessed military build up on both sides demonstrates the ongoing mistrust 
between the two parties (BMI, 2012h:58). Despite the ceasing of violent cross-border attacks, the 
hostile relationship between the two countries and their military capabilities remains a threat to 
the security situation in the border areas.  
This cross-border violence directly affected the security of oil companies, as most of the 
oil fields are situated in the border area. The air attacks by the SAF threatened to damage 
GNPOC’s assets in Unity State and GNPOC incurred severe losses by the shutdown of and 
damage to the Heglig oilfields.  
 
4.2.1.3 Political indicator: Repatriation restriction 
Risk rating: Low: 2. Research done for this study could find no evidence of restrictions on the 
repatriation of funds or employees of foreign firms operating in South Sudan. This is confirmed 
by the fact that some foreign workers have been sent home after the shutdown of the oil 
production in January 2012, as EIA (2012) reports. Because China is the main buyer of South 
Sudanese oil59, it is unlikely that CNPC, as a Chinese SOE, will be affected by any repatriation 
restrictions of funds if it exists.  
 
4.2.1.4 Political indicator: Corruption and poor governance  
Risk rating: High: 4. South Sudan suffers from a high level of corruption as the patronage 
system is integrated into the weak state institutions.60. Extensive financial mismanagement and 
fraudulent conduct by some senior officials in the former government of Southern Sudan have 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 According to EIA (2012), 66 percent of Sudan and South Sudan’s combined oil exports in 2011 were destined for 
China. 
60 See discussion on weak institutions in section 4.2.1.1.1. 
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been reported (UNSC, 2012a) and since independence the Anti-Corruption Commission has 
retrieved US$60 million to the government coffers (UNSC, 2012b:2). Although ICG (2012a:12) 
comments that Chinese firms’ business practices are not as concerned with norms of governance, 
capacity and accountability as the Western firms are, corruption and the patronage system can 
affect the Chinese oil companies mainly because it sustains a weak state administrative system. 
As Lacher (2012:7, 20) argues, the system of clientelism impedes the development of efficient 
state structures. Without strong institutions, company representatives have to rely on individuals 
in the clientelist system for certain decisions to be taken. With the lack of revenue from oil after 
the oil shutdown, the patronage network might crumble because of financial constraints, that in 
turn can cause grievances and fuel violent protests, causing a security threat to oil operations.  
 
4.2.1.5 Political indicator: Unclear legislation/ security of tenure 
Risk rating: Medium: 3. ICG (2012a:11) reports that South Sudan’s government policy 
planning remains limited and new civil servants are inexperienced in the area of petroleum. 
According to Barber and Xiao (2012:8), the new Petroleum Bill has not been implemented, but it 
“displays the intention to enshrine international best practices into law,” that could mean that oil 
companies should pay more attention to social responsibility factors. Although extreme policy 
changes are not expected, the oil companies may still be at risk of the new legislation affecting 
them negatively.   
 
4.2.1.6 Political indicator: Investment constraints  
Risk rating: Medium: 3. ICG (2012a:1) reports that Juba has begun to promote investment 
incentives, particularly for strategic and transformative investments. Existing investors in the oil 
industry were allowed to keep their investments and new oil contracts were agreed upon in 
January 2012. However, Juba insisted that the operations of the oil consortiums should be 
separated from their Khartoum operations (ICG, 2012a:23). This requirement has been especially 
problematic for GNPOC, which operates in blocks that fall across the territories of both 
countries. GNPOC, Petrodar and CNPC have already established administrative offices in Juba 
with the purpose of eventually duplicating the whole head office that is currently in Khartoum 
(ICG, 2012a:23). This has implications for CNPC’s operations, especially in the GNPOC 
consortium, in terms of costs and efficiency as it can be hindered by the availability of qualified 
staff in South Sudan.  
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4.2.2 Political risk factor: Economic factor 
4.2.2.1 Economic indicator: Economic performance 
Risk rating: High: 4. According to the WB (2012), South Sudan is the most oil-dependent 
country in the world, as oil exports accounted for 70 percent of GDP and 99 percent of export 
revenue in 2011 (UNSC, 2012a:3). Therefore, the shutdown of the oil production since January 
2012 has had a severe effect on the country’s economic performance. The Republic of South 
Sudan National Bureau of Statistics (SSNBS) (2012) reported a GDP of US$13,2 billion for 
2010, but because of the large foreign component of the foreign oil industry, the Gross National 
Income (GNI) was much lower at US$8 billion. The GDP per capita of US$1 546 in 2010 was 
much higher than other East African countries, but the GNI per capita has only been US$984 
(SSNBS, 2012). Despite the oil income, the WB (2012) reports that South Sudan is the world’s 
least developed country. Resources are also very unequally distributed, and ECOS (2010:27) 
remarks that most of the development in Southern Sudan has been around Juba where the 
government offices are.  
While the formal economy of South Sudan is dominated by oil production, the informal 
sector mainly consists of subsistence agriculture (Schankleman, 2011:2). Despite rich water 
sources, the agriculture sector remain small and according to Lacher (2012:8), only one to two 
percent of the fertile land in the country is farmed. Poor infrastructure is a major obstacle to 
further development and it also limits the opportunities for economic integration with 
neighbouring countries (Verhoeven, 2011:13; BMI, 2012e:20). This makes South Sudan heavily 
dependent on food imports. Food imports are extremely expensive because of the depreciation of 
the South Sudanese pound caused by the limited availability of foreign currency after the oil 
shutdown. The Economist (2012b) reports that inflation reached 80 percent in May 2012.  
The fiscal position of the South Sudanese government has deteriorated with the loss of 98 
percent of its oil revenue since the shutdown of the oil production. Because of the weak state 
institutions, the government does not have the ability to raise taxes and relies on foreign reserves 
for budget expenses (BMI, 2012g:25; Lacher, 2012:8). The UNSC (2012b:3) reports that the 
government planned to borrow money and get income from selling oil and other resource 
concessions. Despite an austerity budget for 2012, government expenses remained high because 
of the military costs incurred to safeguard the border areas (UNSC, 2012b:3). The UNSC 
(2012a:19) comments that the weak fiscal position will severely impact on the government’s 
ability to implement military and security reforms and to address the humanitarian crisis in the 
country. A volatile security situation may be created if armed militia fuel protests and may 
escalate into violent internal conflicts. With little money to spend on development outside the oil 
sector, the food crisis is unlikely to be resolved and inflation is likely to stay at high levels. 
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Therefore, the poor economic performance may threaten the security of oil corporations’ 
operations if economic grievances of the community escalate to violent protests. Oil corporations 
may also face the risk of being targeted by the government to make up for the loss of the oil 
revenue in terms of taxes or regulations that require them to perform more development 
functions.  
 
4.2.2.2 Economic indicator: Balance of payments 
Risk rating: High : 4. No statistics were found during the research of South Sudan’s current 
balance of payments61 , but the trade deficit and the loss of foreign currency inflow suggest a 
negative balance of payments situation. The country has a trade deficit because exports ceased 
with the oil shutdown,62 and the country is almost totally reliant on food imports. It is also 
unlikely that there has been an inflow of foreign currency from inward FDI, as BMI (2012g:15) 
reports that the government could only survive for the first half of 2012 by drawing on foreign 
currency savings from oil revenues accrued during times of high oil prices in 2011. A shortage in 
foreign currency can impact economic performance negatively, and the inability to import food 
can escalate the already severe humanitarian crisis. Economic and humanitarian grievances of the 
community may cause violent protests that may threaten the security of oil corporations.  
 
4.2.2.3  Economic indicator: Creditworthiness 
Risk rating: High: 4. With secession, South Sudan did not share in Sudan’s external debt of 
US$38 million (EIA, 2012), but the situation is not entirely finalised and still depends on 
negotiations during September 2012 (AUPSC, 2012:3). However, even without the share of 
Sudan’s debt, the creditworthiness of the country has been impacted by the loss of its oil revenue 
(BMI, 2012a:19) and is heavily dependent on the resumption of oil production. This may affect 
oil corporations that plan to invest in oil infrastructure together with the South Sudanese state. 
For example, CNPC indicated that it considers investments in downstream projects such as 
refineries (ICG, 2012a:25) and the firm may face the risk that the state will not be able to finance 
its share. This may put pressure on the oil corporations to finance the full project, or being 
dependent on donors for finance.  
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61 Balance of payments refers to all the transactions made between a particular country and all other countries during 
a specified period of time. A negative balance of payments means that more money is flowing out of the country than 
coming in and vice versa (Investopedia, 2012). 
62 As 99 percent of exports are oil exports, this is the only source of hard currency. 
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4.2.2.4 Economic indicator: Currency convertibility 
Risk rating: Medium: 3. South Sudan’s currency, the South Sudanese pound, has been highly 
volatile and is traded on two parallel markets (African Economic Outlook, 2012). The currency 
has depreciated severely because of the limited availability of foreign currency after oil exports 
ceased in January 2012 (UNSC, 2012b:4). This had a huge impact on the South Sudanese 
economy in terms of its balance of payments, trade deficit and the inflation rate. As discussed in 
section 4.2.2.1, this impacts food prices that in turn may cause economic grievances, and can 
ultimately lead to violent protests, impacting on the security of oil corporations. Apart from the 
indirect effect, CNPC will not be directly affected by the currency volatility, as oil is traded in US 
dollars and a large part of South Sudan’s oil exports are destined for the Chinese market. The 
increased costs that currency devaluation might bring, will also not have a huge effect on CNPC, 
as all the oil production is for the export market63 and the firm should have enough foreign 
currency to be able to pay its expenses when production resumes.  
 
4.2.2.5 Economic indicator: Energy vulnerability 
Risk rating: Extreme: 5. Because of South Sudan’s extreme dependency on oil revenue in terms 
of GDP and government revenue,64 its economy is highly vulnerable to external pressures and oil 
price fluctuations. For example, in 2009 the government had to cut its budget by a third when oil 
prices fell after the global financial crisis (Lacher, 2012:8). Due to the dependency on foreign 
investors in the oil industry, this extreme oil dependency would normally be an indicator of lower 
risk for foreign investors. However, South Sudan is not only extremely dependent on the foreign 
investors, but also on other countries for exporting its oil. As a landlocked country, South Sudan 
is dependent on other countries’ infrastructure, at this stage Sudan, for the export of its oil, 
making the economy even more vulnerable (Lacher, 2012:11). This extreme vulnerability led to 
severe losses for CNPC after the shutdown of the oil production caused by the dispute with 
Sudan. CNPC is therefore dependent on good relations between Khartoum and Juba to enable the 
oil to be exported. As discussed in section 4.2.1.1.2, even if an alternative pipeline was built to 
Kenya, South Sudan’s exports would remain dependent and vulnerable.  
 
4.2.2.6 Economic indicator: Public/private sector mix 
Risk rating: Extreme: 5. As oil is considered a national asset and the South Sudanese 
government has Exploration and Production Sharing Agreements (EPSAs)65 with oil companies, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63 South Sudan does not currently have any refining facilities for the domestic refinery of crude oil for the processing 
of useable consumer products. 64	  For detail refer to section 4.2.2.1. 
65 For further detail on these contracts see section 4.2.4.9. 
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the oil sector can be classified as the public sector. With the oil sector that makes up 70 percent 
of GDP (UNSC, 2012a:3) and very little business activity outside Juba (African Economic 
Outlook, 2012:6), the public sector dominates the formal economy. Without a large private sector 
that can form a substantial tax base, the oil companies are highly vulnerable to government 
decisions, especially as they are easy targets for the government as a source of extra income.  
 
4.2.2.7 Economic indicator: Current account deficit 
Risk rating: High: 4. No statistics were found during the research of South Sudan’s current 
account66, but a deficit for 2012 is suggested by the ceasing of oil exports67 and the total 
dependence on imports of food and consumer products. Although this situation may change when 
oil production resumes, BMI (2012b) reports that it might take up to six months to resume 
production, and not necessarily at full production levels. The lack of foreign currency may impact 
on the country’s ability to import food, that in turn might lead to economic grievances and violent 
protests and negatively affect the security situation of oil corporations.  
 
4.2.3 Political risk factor: Societal factor 
4.2.3.1 Societal indicator: Internal violence 
Risk rating: High: 4. As a legacy of the Sudanese civil war, which has been far more complex 
than the north-south division68, internal divisions within the north and within the south still have 
an influence on internal violence in both Sudan and South Sudan. Internal violence within Sudan 
might also have a spill-over effect on the security situation in South Sudan.  
Two of Sudan’s states bordering South Sudan, Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile, have 
been affected by ongoing conflict between the SAF and SPLM-North69 (SPLM-N) rebel groups 
that peaked during 2011 (Dagne, 2011:1). These conflicts have fuelled mistrust between the 
Sudanese and South Sudanese government as the Sudanese government accused the SPLM of 
supporting the SPLM-N in trying to topple the Sudanese government, despite the fact that the 
SPLM insists that it broke ties with the SPLM-N after independence (BMI, 2012a). The internal 
conflicts in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile affected the security situation in South Sudan, 
especially in the bordering states of Unity and Upper Nile, because of the spill-over effect of 
violence and the influx of refugees (ICG, 2011a). Both states have large refugee camps close to 
the border (ICG, 2011b:24; The Economist, 2012a), that put severe strain on the already dire 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66 The current account refers to the difference between a nation’s total exports and total imports of goods, services 
and transfers, excluding financial assets and liabilities (Investopedia, 2012). 
67 Oil exports accounts for 99 percent of total exports.  
68 A detailed discussion of the civil war falls outside the scope of this study.  
69 After independence, the SPLM forces situated in Sudanese territory formed the SPLM-N. The SPLM-N has been 
declared an illegal party in Sudan after violence broke out in September 2011 in Blue Nile (Dagne, 2011:1).  
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humanitarian situation. Together with the proliferation of arms and the violent political culture as 
a legacy of the civil war, the situation may pose a security threat to the oil consortiums with 
operations in the region, such as Petrodar and GNPOC.  
Van der Zwan (2011:14) argues that many of the civil war grievances have resurfaced 
with the prospect of the independence of South Sudan. This can explain why rebel activity within 
South Sudan has been a continued source of instability since independence. While the UNSC 
(2012a:15) reports that in 2011 350 000 people were displaced within South Sudan because of 
internal violence, Wheeler (2012:9) points out that there are still tension in most South Sudanese 
states, including Jonglei, Unity and Upper Nile, where most of the oil production take place. 
According to McNamee (2012:10) internal conflicts in South Sudan have worsened in 2012, 
despite the involvement of UNMISS and the success of SPLM to crush several rebel factions. 
The UNSC’s (2012b:6) July 2012 report notes that the situation in Unity State and Jonglei has 
improved, but that militia groups were still mobilised in Upper Nile. The rebellions worsened 
relations between Sudan and South Sudan as Juba accused Khartoum of supporting the rebel 
groups to overrun oil installations and topple the government, just as Juba is accused of 
supporting rebel groups in Sudan, despite the denial of accusations by both parties (BMI, 
2012h:59; UNSC, 2012b:6). 
Internal violence in Unity and Upper Nile affects the security of the region, and may 
threaten the security of the operations of the oil facilities of GNPOC and Petrodar that are 
situated in these two states. The security of the pipelines on which the oil exports are dependent 
can also be directly affected by internal violence and rebel attacks in Southern Kordofan and Blue 
Nile in Sudan. Although rebel groups have not directly targeted the oil companies, on 28 January 
2012 there was an attack by the SPLM-N in Southern Kordofan on Chinese workers from Power 
Construction Corporation of China. Twenty nine Chinese nationals were abducted, of which 18 
escaped, one was killed and the rest were released on 7 February 2012 (Quarterly Chronicle and 
Documentation, 2012:571; BBC News, 2012a). BMI (2012g:27) argues that oil companies within 
the region may run the risk of being targeted by rebel groups as attacks on foreign companies can 
make a huge impact because of the publicity. Even if the oil companies are not directly targeted, 
rebel activities may pose a risk in terms of the general security environment in the region in 
which they operate, which can hamper its operations and ability to export. Barber and Xiao 
(2012:7) report that some Chinese companies they have interviewed are concerned about the 
deteriorating security situation along the border. However, according to Barber and Xiao 
(2012:7), the security situation around Juba, where the headoffices of the oil consortiums are 
situated, is relatively stable.  
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4.2.3.2 Societal indicator: Civil and labour unrest 
Risk rating: High: 4. Van der Zwan (2011:14) argues that the South Sudanese government has 
been unable to meet the high expectations that the South Sudanese had of what their life would be 
after independence. Grievances such as poor public services and the lack of development can 
easily result in civil unrest, as evidenced by protests in Khartoum during July 2012 (Reeves, 
2012). Although there have not been reports of civil unrest in South Sudan, the circumstances of 
poor public service delivery, a dire humanitarian situation and economic grievances may pose a 
risk of civil unrest that may hold a security threat for oil companies.  
Oil companies may also face the risk of labour unrest. Most employees of the oil 
companies have been of northern Sudanese origin,70 as regulations have disadvantaged people 
from the southern region for employment71 (EIA, 2012; ECOS, 2010:22). Because of the 
uncertainty around the citizenship and status of South Sudanese in Sudan and vice versa, there 
was an incident in Unity State during April 2011 where several hundred oil workers and 
engineers of northern Sudanese descent were expelled from Southern Sudan by the governor of 
the state (ICG, 2011b:29). It was only after Juba interfered that the employees returned (ICG, 
2011b:29). However, after independence many of the Sudanese left South Sudan because of the 
uncertainty regarding their citizenship (BMI, 2012f:39). When oil companies resume production, 
they may face labour unrest because of resentment by South Sudanese for not being employed in 
skilled jobs, or because of the lack of a skilled workforce. According to ICG (2012a:23), the oil 
consortia plans to address this issue with involvement in the establishment of a petroleum 
engineering department at the Juba University.  
  
4.2.3.3 Societal indicator: Homogeneity 
Risk rating: High: 4. Despite perceptions of a homogenous north-south division of the Sudanese 
population72 after South Sudan’s independence, the WB (2012) reports that the country has more 
than 200 ethnic groups. Christopher (2011:128) notes that there is considerable ethnic, religious 
and linguistic diversity among the society that was exploited by Khartoum during the civil war. 
Van der Zwan (2011:14) and Medani (2011:145) argue that the complex multi-ethnicity around 
the border area contributes to territorial disputes that make the demarcation of the border a 
complex issue. Dinka dominance in the SPLM is also a source of grievance (Ahmed, 2009:145) 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70 According to Rui (2010:61), 93 percent of GNPOC’s employees had been from Sudanese origin. 
71 According to ECOS (2010:22), oil consortiums had to recruit employees through a local company, Petroneeds, 
which only accepted applicants that could provide a certificate for the completion of military service in the Sudanese 
government army.  
72 Perceptions of homogeneity have its origins in the Arab/Africa and Islam/Christian division that was one of the 
sources of the Sudanese civil war.  
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and the marginalisation of minority groups can easily spark ethnic conflict, as witnessed by the 
long Sudanese civil war. This may pose a security risk to oil corporations.  
 
4.2.3.4 Societal indicator: Ethnic conflict 
Risk rating: High: 4. Ethnic conflict as part of the complex conflict system in Sudan and South 
Sudan is still ongoing in the states where oil is produced, i.e. Unity and Upper Nile, as discussed 
in section 4.2.3.1. For McNamee (2012:10), the ethnic conflict over resources often has deeper 
roots, such as the proliferation of arms, extreme poverty and the marginalisation of smaller ethnic 
groups73, all features of the situation in South Sudan. Van der Zwan (2011:14) argues that these 
conflicts in South Sudan will continue to threaten socio-economic development in the absence of 
state provision of security and justice, and in turn may threaten the security of oil corporations.  
 
4.2.3.5 Societal indicator: Community opposition 
Risk rating: High: 4. According to ECOS (2010) and Large (2009:624) there are widespread 
community grievances against oil companies in South Sudan’s oil-producing regions, mainly 
because the community has not benefited from the oil wealth. Oil companies have been accused 
of following a top-down approach and not involving the community when social projects such as 
the building of clinics and schools have been taken on (ECOS, 2010:21,28). ECOS (2010:27) 
also comments that oil companies face resentment by the community because of the violent 
displacements with the development of the oilfields during the time of the Sudanese civil war and 
the delays in compensation for victims. Barber and Xiao (2012:8) note that South Sudanese 
officials are still dissatisfied with the lack of attention that corporate social responsibility gets in 
the actions of the Chinese oil companies. For example, The Economist (2012a) reports that 
Petrodar has been criticised for its reluctance to help aid agencies in the refugee camps in Upper 
Nile State, which have been flooded during the rainy season, despite the consortium’s access to 
an all-weather landing strip in the area. South Sudanese resentments against oil corporations 
extend to grievances in the workforce because of the discrimination against Southern Sudanese, 
as preference was given to northern Sudanese for employment (ECOS, 2010:28). New contracts 
that the oil companies signed with the government in January 2012 strengthened previously 
neglected social and employment standards (ICG, 2012a:ii). Although there are no recent reports 
of community opposition that turned into attacks on oil operations, ECOS (2010:20) reports that 
GNPOC incurred damages of US$10,7 million during the first half of 2008 due to incidents of 
sabotage and vandalism. Apart from the threat of being targeted physically, oil corporations may 
also face the risk of having to incur major costs to secure community corroboration.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73 This point was also made in section 4.2.3.1.  
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
	   61	  
4.2.3.6 Societal indicator: Standard of living 
Risk rating: Extreme: 5. A very low living standard is reflected in the fact that 90 percent of the 
population of 8,2 million South Sudanese live on less than US$1 a day, as the UN reports (EIA, 
2012). Food insecurity remains the main threat to South Sudanese because of the loss of oil 
revenue, a small agriculture sector, a poor harvest and inaccessibility of areas that need 
humanitarian aid (UNSC, 2012a:14; UNSC, 2012b:17). The UNSC (2012b:17) reports that 70 
percent of the countryside is inaccessible for humanitarian aid workers during the rainy season 
because of the poor infrastructure. The situation has worsened with the influx of refugees from 
Sudan, especially to the states of Upper Nile and Unity, and the large number of internal 
displacements caused by internal violence (The Economist, 2012b). Severe strain is also placed 
on the social infrastructure by the returning of South Sudanese from Sudan, who return without 
any economic prospects. The UNSC (2012a:15) estimates that about 500 000 people returned to 
South Sudan between September 2011 and February 2012. Apart from poor economic 
development, South Sudan also has extremely low levels of human development (BMI, 
2012g:11) as evidenced by the very low literacy rate of 27 percent, low attendance of schools and 
poor health care (Dagne, 2011:14; African Economic Outlook, 2012:8). Although the national 
development plan of the new South Sudanese government prioritises social and human 
development, this plan has not yet been implemented due to budget constraints (African 
Economic Outlook, 2012:8). The poor human development levels may firstly have an impact on 
the efficiency of oil operations once production resumes, as according to Barber and Xiao 
(2012:8), new contracts with the oil companies have stricter requirements of local employment 
targets for companies. Oil corporations may firstly face the risk of inefficiency due to an 
unqualified or unskilled workforce. Secondly, poor living standards may create and sustain 
grievances against the government, and also against the oil companies that may be associated 
with government wealth. Oil companies may face the risk of being targeted in community unrest 
because of this association. Thirdly, poor living conditions may fuel and sustain violence in an 
already violent society, which may hold security threats for oil companies.   
 
4.2.3.7 Societal indicator: Environmental activism 
Risk rating: Medium: 3. ECOS (2010:33) argues that poor environmental law enforcement in 
Sudan during the development of the oil industry has led to severe environmental damage such as 
deforestation, water contamination and the diversion of the natural flow of the Nile waters. Since 
independence South Sudanese authorities are more interested in rectifying the environmental 
damage and have drafted an environmental policy to mitigate some of the environmental threats 
(ICG, 2011b:30; African Economic Outlook, 2012:7). This has also led to significant changes to 
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contracts with the oil companies in terms of environmental standards (ICG, 2012a:ii). Oil 
corporations might be obliged to pay more attention to environmental issues, although it is 
unlikely that policies will be adequately monitored due to the weak state institutions.  
 
4.2.4 Political risk factor: Petroleum factor 
4.2.4.1 Petroleum indicator: Ownership 
Risk rating: Extreme: 5. Under Sudanese law, all petroleum found within its territory is deemed 
to be the property of the state (BMI, 2012f:37) and ownership of the oil reserves on South 
Sudanese territory were transferred to the new state after independence (AUPSC, 2012:3). 
However, there are still ownership disputes of certain oilfields such as Heglig because of 
disagreements on the demarcation of the border. The government of South Sudan has already 
signed new contracts with the oil consortiums based on EPSAs (ICG, 2012a:22), which means 
that the profits from the oil operations are shared equally by the consortium and the government 
(BMI, 2012f:37). The oil companies have no right to the oil reserves, only to operate the oilfields. 
This situation may increase the risk that oil companies can lose their investments if the state 
decides to take over the operation of the oil fields and cease the contracts.  
 
4.2.4.2 Petroleum indicator: Domestic reserves and production 
Risk rating: High: 4. Most of South Sudan’s proven oil reserves lie in the Muglad and Melut 
Basins, which is currently operated by GNPOC and Petrodar respectively. Estimates of South 
Sudan’s oil reserves vary from 4,2 billion barrels by Wood MacKenzie (according to BMI, 
2012f:22) to 7 billion barrels reported by the South Sudanese energy minister, Dhieu Dau (BMI, 
2012b). BMI (2012b) has a conservative estimate of 4,85 billion barrels as there is no 
comprehensive data available on the potential for greenfield investment. According to ECOS 
(2010:24), results of other exploration blocks did not show much potential. South Sudan’s 
reserves are considerably smaller than the oil reserves of other large oil producers in Africa such 
as Nigeria and Angola (Harneit-Sievers, 2010:98). Also, according to Schankleman (2011:3), the 
WB expects that production levels will start to decline sharply in 2015. With limited reserves and 
declining production levels, South Sudan’s proven oil reserves are not as relevant to China’s 
global energy strategy as they once were when CNPC first invested in Sudan (ICG, 2012a:ii). 
The declining reserves may pose the risk of poor long-term prospects for growth in the oil 
industry, which may result in a low return on investment.  
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4.2.4.3 Petroleum indicator: Host country’s relative market position 
Risk rating: Medium: 3. According to Schankleman (2011:2), Sudan and South Sudan’s 
combined production accounts for 0,6 percent of the world’s oil output. On the global stage, 
South Sudan is only a minor producer, which may pose the risk that the lack of expansion 
opportunities can lead to lower returns on investment. However, it should be noted that South 
Sudanese oil is still important to China74, where oil consumption and demand is increasing.  
 
4.2.4.4 Petroleum indicator: Level and destination of exports 
Risk rating: High: 4. Because South Sudan does not have any oil refineries, all of its production 
is exported, mainly to Asia. EIA (2012) reports that in 2011, 66 percent of Sudan and South 
Sudan’s combined crude exports were destined for China while the rest were exported to 
Malaysia, Japan, UAE, India and Singapore. China has been a preferred destination because of 
US sanctions75 and because of the limited market for Dar blend crude that is produced in the 
Melut Basin by Petrodar (BMI, 2012f:39), as refineries need to be adapted to fulfil the special 
requirements needed to refine the Dar blend crude (Schankleman, 2011:3). While the high level 
of exports would normally be an indication of lower risk for foreign firms because they would be 
less dependent on the host country, in this case the high export level may pose an extreme risk to 
oil producers because of South Sudan’s landlocked geographical position. If South Sudan is 
unable to export its oil, oil corporations will not be able to continue their operations. However, 
the fact that such a high level of exports is for the Chinese market, justifies a somewhat lower 
risk rating than extreme as it is unlikely that South Sudan will lose China as an export market. 
Because of Beijing’s official policy of non-interference in political issues of foreign countries in, 
it is unlikely that Beijing will introduce trade restrictions on South Sudan.  
 
4.2.4.5 Petroleum indicator: Strength of national oil company 
Risk rating: Low: 2. After independence, the South Sudanese NOC, Nilepet, took over the five 
percent share in GNPOC and eight percent share in Petrodar that was held by Sudapet, the 
Sudanese NOC, although the details of the transfer are still a matter of dispute (ICG, 2012a:20). 
Despite the dispute, South Sudan has started to market and sell its oil independently from 
Khartoum (ICG, 2012a:20). However, Nilepet is still a weak institution mainly because of a lack 
of experienced and trained staff (IGC, 2012a:20), making nationalisation unlikely because of the 
extreme dependency on foreign oil firms to operate the South Sudanese oil industry.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74 According to BMI (2012f:19), approximately five percent of Chinese oil imports come from South Sudan.  
75 US sanctions have been lifted against South Sudan in December 2011. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
	   64	  
4.2.4.6 Petroleum indicator: Role of the foreign company in the national oil industry 
Risk rating: Low: 2. CNPC played a central role in the development of the oil industry in Sudan, 
and the company remains the largest investor in the South Sudanese oil industry since 
independence with its shareholding of 40 percent in GNPOC and 41 percent in Petrodar. CNPC’s 
large investment, its experience in Sudan and the wide range of activities that not only includes 
prospecting and well drilling, but also engineering and construction (BMI, 2012f:43), provided 
CNPC with a bargaining advantage when the South Sudanese government had to sign new 
agreements with the oil companies. Juba renewed CNPC’s contracts because of mutual interest 
(Large, 2012:18). The oil shutdown made Juba even more dependent on CNPC, as the negative 
message that the shutdown sent to potential Western investors may make them reluctant to invest 
(ICG, 2012a:24). Because of the dependence on CNPC, there may be a lower risk of being 
targeted by the government with measures such as expropriation.  
 
4.2.4.7 Petroleum indicator: Oil and gas prices 
Risk rating: Low: 2. The Brent crude price was US$113,93 per barrel on 31 August 2012 
(YCharts, 2012), after a high yearly average price of US$111 per barrel in 2011 that peaked in 
April 2012 at around US$120 per barrel (UN, 2012:4). The UN’s (2012:4) forecast for 2012 is an 
average of US$110 per barrel and for 2013, US$100 per barrel. However, South Sudanese Dar 
blend crude that is produced by Petrodar in block three and seven in Upper Nile State, is traded at 
a substantial discount because of its limited market76 (Schankleman, 2011:3). Current high oil 
prices reduce the risk of losses for oil companies because of higher profit margins.  
 
4.2.4.8 Petroleum indicator: Domestic ability to operate the industry 
Risk rating: Nominal: 1. Government officials of South Sudan have limited experience in the oil 
industry, as it was run by Khartoum’s MEM before South Sudan’s independence (ICG, 
2012a:20). South Sudan is totally dependent on foreign oil firms to operate the industry because 
of a shortage of experienced staff, a lack of technology, and a lack of domestic investment capital 
(Thomas, 2011:57). As discussed in section 4.2.4.5, Nilepet is a weak institution with no capacity 
to operate the industry. Because of this high dependency on foreign oil firms, the risk of 
measures such as nationalisation or expropriation is nominal.  
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76 Sales to the US were prevented because of US sanctions since 1997 and Sudanese oil was therefore mainly sold to 
the Asian markets, where the refineries have been equipped to process the oil (Schankleman, 2011:3). 
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4.2.4.9 Petroleum indicator: Contractual relationship between the firm and the host country 
Risk rating: Extreme: 5. On Juba’s insistence, GNPOC had to separate its Sudanese and South 
Sudanese operations after South Sudan’s independence and GNPOC, Petrodar and CNPC have 
established offices in Juba (ICG, 2012a:23). Negotiations on new contracts between Juba and the 
oil firms took place at the same time in January 2012 as negotiations on Juba’s dispute with 
Khartoum over transit fees. New five-year transitional contracts were signed on 13 January 2012, 
around a week before Juba decided to shut down the South Sudanese oil operations (Barber & 
Xiao, 2012:8; ICG, 2012a:22). The contracts secured the existing consortiums’ concessions and 
the distribution of the shares within the consortiums has remained the same, but some changes 
have been made to the terms of the EPSAs (ICG, 2012a:21,22). The financial terms of the 
contracts have been retained, but according to Barber and Xiao (2012:8), stronger environmental 
regulation, more social protection and more regulations on employment targets of South 
Sudanese nationals are now part of the contracts. A major change to the terms has given Juba 
more flexibility in guiding its oil sector policy, by protecting the government from compensating 
or being held liable to the oil companies in the event of a shutdown of oil production caused by 
its inability to export oil, such as the confiscation of its oil by Khartoum (ICG, 2012a:22). The 
impact of this provision on oil corporations has been that they will not be compensated for the 
losses that resulted from the shutdown of the oil industry since late January 2012 (ICG, 
2012a:22). The new contracts also allow the government absolute discretion to extend the 
contract with oil companies in certain cases (ICG, 2012a:22). For example, the degree of 
cooperation by the oil companies in helping to resolve the disagreement with Khartoum over its 
transit fees may allow the government discretion over the extension of the contract (ICG, 
2012a:22). ICG (2012a:22) argues that this provision may expose the oil companies to the risk of 
losses caused by the hostile relations and disputes between the governments of Sudan and South 
Sudan.  
 
4.2.5 Political risk factor: Company factor 
4.2.5.1 Company indicator: Nationality of the company  
Risk rating: Low: 2. CNPC is one of China’s largest NOCs and responsible for most of the oil 
and gas production in China (CNPC, 2012). As discussed in section 3.2, Chinese NOCs are 
commercial enterprises that have profit-making goals, but at the same time, have the same status 
as government ministries and therefore also have to uphold political goals (ICG, 2012a:21). This 
means that Chinese companies are often willing to take a longer view on investment, as Taylor 
(2006:942) remarks. For example, Large and Patey (2010:11) comment that oil is often 
considered a pillar industry for wider business expansion and economic growth, for example the 
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provision of services connected to the oil industry, that can be more profitable than the actual oil 
production. Because of this long-term view, Chinese NOCs might ignore short-term losses and be 
less risk-averse in the short term. A second important advantage of being a Chinese company is 
Beijing’s policy of non-interference, as discussed in section 3.3. For example, CNPC has not 
been pressurised by Beijing to withdraw from Sudan during the civil war because of human rights 
abuses as was the case with the Canadian firm, Talisman Energy77. Also, the withdrawal of 
Western enterprises as a result of sanctions due to Sudan’s links with terrorism, has opened other 
business opportunities to Chinese corporations.  
 
4.2.5.2 Company indicator: World industry positioning 
Risk rating: Low: 2. CNPC is an integrated international energy corporation and China’s largest 
oil and gas producer and supplier, with interests in 33 countries  (CNPC, 2012). CNPC’s business 
involves upstream and downstream business as well as oilfield services and engineering 
construction (CNPC, 2012). CNPC owns 86,29 percent of PetroChina, a company listed on the 
New York, Hong Kong and Shanghai stock exchanges and that ranked 13th on the list of the 
largest oil companies in the world in terms of 2010 oil equivalent reserves (PetroStrategies, 
2012). In terms of revenue, CNPC ranked sixth on the 2012 Fortune’s Global 500 list after Royal 
Dutch Shell, Exxon Mobil, BP and Sinopec (CNPC, 2012). Being a major oil producer in China 
and also worldwide, losses in one project can be offset by high profits in other projects, reducing 
its relative risk exposure. It should, however, be borne in mind that CNPC is still considerably 
behind the other large enterprises because of its latecomer status in the global industry.  
 
4.2.5.3 Company indicator: Special bargaining advantage 
Risk rating: Nominal: 1. CNPC firstly has a special bargaining advantage because of its status 
as a Chinese NOC. This gives the company the advantage of access to low-cost capital and low-
cost labour, and the SOEs have relative low return and dividend pay-out requirements (Buckley 
et al., 2007:513; Mitchell & Lahn, 2007:8). Jiang (2009:602) remarks that Chinese managers, 
engineers and workers are not expensive and they are also used to working in harsh conditions 
due to their experience in China’s domestic oilfields. This gives the Chinese firms a competitive 
advantage over Western corporations in the bidding process for projects, as they can, according 
to Rui (2007:74), offer prices up to a third lower than their Western counterparts.  
Secondly, Morck et al. (2008:346) argue that Chinese firms have an advantage over 
Western firms when operating in countries with a similar institutional environment as China, as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77 See section 3.5 for more detail. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
	   67	  
Chinese SOEs have developed measures to operate despite government interference78. In this 
regard Buckley et al. (2007:513) comment that ethical considerations are not as relevant for 
Chinese firms as they are for Western firms when they have to make investment decisions. Rui 
(2010:75) further remarks that CNPC is effective in mobilising its capabilities in a short period of 
time and are quick in decision-making. For example, in Sudan CNPC took over the construction 
of the GNOP project after an affiliate of Petronas could not meet the deadline (Rui, 2010:75). 
Thirdly, because CNPC focussed on upstream business before restructuring, CNPC 
possesses unique, advanced petroleum technologies that supported the Chinese petroleum 
industry (Rui, 2010:59). For example, Rui (2010:59) points out that CNPC’s discovery of the oil 
in blocks three and seven in the Melut Basin in South Sudan has been successful because of 
Chinese domestically developed technologies to discover oil in passive rift and under-explored 
basins. This technology may give CNPC the advantage of more successful exploration activities.  
Fourthly, as a SOE, CNPC has the advantage of diplomatic and economic support from 
the Chinese government. For example, in February 2011, China’s vice foreign minister, Zhang 
Zhijun, accompanied by a senior CNPC executive, visited Juba to seek assurance from Juba of 
the security of the CNPC’s oil investments, in addition to its diplomatic goals (ICG, 2012a:6). 
ICG (2012a:28) also reports that during December 2011, when South Sudanese oil was 
confiscated by Khartoum, the Chinese Special Envoy for African Affairs, Liu Guijin, was 
summoned to Juba for diplomatic intervention. Furthermore, during a visit from Li Yuanchao, a 
senior CPC figure, in January 2012, the possibility of a Chinese economic cooperation package 
was discussed and aid of US$31,5 million for 2012 was pledged (ICG, 2012a:10). Barber and 
Xiao (2012:6) report that the Chinese government and China Exim Bank have expressed their 
willingness to provide concessional loans for the development of infrastructure projects, which 
would be constructed by Chinese companies. This Chinese diplomatic involvement and 
willingness to engage with South Sudan in terms of loans, aid and economic cooperation, gives 
CNPC a special bargaining advantage.  
A fifth advantage for CNPC is China’s trade relations with South Sudan. Sixty six percent 
of combined Sudanese-South Sudanese exports in 2011 were destined for China, whose refineries 
are equipped to refine the Dar blend crude produced in the Melut Basin (EIA, 2012). This 
dependency on China for South Sudanese exports makes CNPC less vulnerable to being targeted 
by the government of South Sudan. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78 Jacobs (2011:54) has a similar argument that transnational corporations (TNCs) from developing countries have an 
advantage when they operate in countries with difficult governance conditions, because they have the same 
institutional conditions at home. 
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Lastly, it should be noted that CNPC has the advantage of being the first and also the 
largest investor in Sudan (Jiang, 2009:598) and after independence, also in South Sudan. Because 
of South Sudan’s extreme dependency on oil revenue, the government could not afford to cease 
the contracts with CNPC, as it would cripple the South Sudanese oil industry (ICG, 2012a:22). 
ICG (2012a:22) also argues that if Juba ignored the existing contracts with CNPC and considered 
new tenders, the government’s reputation as an investment destination for Western companies 
would be ruined. This gave CNPC an extreme bargaining advantage despite negative sentiments 
towards the corporations amongst many SPLM officials. Because of the mutual interest, South 
Sudan was obliged to secure CNPC’s investment by renewing the oil contracts.  
 
4.2.5.4 Company indicator: Host government relations 
Risk rating: Extreme: 5. Due to CNPC’s central role in the development of the Sudanese oil 
industry and the role of oil in the civil war 79, historically the SPLM did not have a good 
relationship with CNPC. The oil corporations have been associated with the brutalities of the civil 
war and complicity with the NCP and Khartoum (Barber & Xiao, 2012:8; ICG, 2012a:2). During 
the interim period of the CPA since 2005, when CNPC started production in the Melut Basin, 
Khartoum was still in charge of the oil industry. Southern Sudan’s relations with CNPC were still 
strained because CNPC was suspected of complicity with Khartoum in manipulating oil 
production figures to Southern Sudan’s disadvantage80 (Barber & Xiao, 2012:8). With the signing 
of new contracts after independence, ICG (2012a:22) remarks that some in the SPLM still had 
negative sentiments towards CNPC and would rather replace their contracts with Western firms. 
As mentioned in section 4.2.5.3, contracts were renewed in January 2012 with CNPC because of 
pragmatism and mutual interest and not because of good government relations with CNPC. 
According to Barber and Xiao (2012:8), Juba was of the opinion that the oil companies could do 
more to resolve the dispute over the transit fees by putting more pressure on Khartoum.  
The relations between CNPC and the government of South Sudan were strained further by 
the expulsion of the Chinese head of Petrodar from South Sudan in February 2012 after being 
accused of complicity with Khartoum (ICG, 2012a:30, Sudan Tribune, 2012). CNPC faces the 
dilemma of having significant investments in both Sudan and South Sudan that have to be 
protected (BMI, 2012d). Strained relations between Juba and Khartoum have put CNPC in a 
difficult position because of Juba’s historical association of CNPC with Khartoum, which may 
pose a threat to CNPC of being targeted by Juba’s decisions.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
79 For more details refer to section 3.6. 
80 During the CPA period, Southern Sudan shared in 50 percent of oil revenue from its territory.  
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4.2.6 Political risk factor: International factor 
4.2.6.1 International indicator: Host government international integration 
Risk rating: Medium: 3. Since independence, South Sudan has appointed 90 ambassadors and 
joined the WB, IMF and FOCAC (UNSC, 2012b:1; ICG, 2012a:4). Despite the fact that the US 
maintained good relations with the SPLM, Southern Sudan has still been isolated because of US 
sanctions against Sudan (Dagne, 2011:7). Since independence the US sanctions have been lifted 
and the US has increased the number of officials in South Sudan (Dagne, 2011:7; BMI, 
2012f:39). However, because of the dominance of the Asian countries in terms of investments 
and trade, South Sudan has not been integrated on a global level. This lack of competition from 
Western firms currently gives CNPC a competitive advantage in South Sudan. 
In terms of regional integration, Dagne (2011:7) comments that the SPLM has always 
maintained good relations with East African countries such as Ethiopia, Kenya, Tanzania and 
Uganda, and South Sudan has started to integrate into regional organisations such as the East 
African Community (EAC), Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and the 
Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA)81 (UNSC, 2012b:5; African 
Economic Outlook, 2012:4; BMI, 2012h:61). However, South Sudanese trade with neighbouring 
countries have been limited because of the lack of infrastructure and economic activity other than 
oil production and Lacher (2012:8) argues that the South Sudanese economy has only been 
superficially integrated into markets and monetised exchange. Therefore, South Sudan’s 
economy remains dependent on the oil industry and CNPC’s investment. 
 
4.2.6.2 International indicator: Host/home government relations 
Risk rating: High: 4. As a Chinese NOC, CNPC may be affected by the relationship between 
the Chinese and South Sudanese government. After exclusively dealing with Khartoum during 
the civil war, Beijing started to cultivate relations with Juba after the 2005 CPA, but at the same 
time strengthened its ties with Khartoum (Large & Patey, 2010:5). Since South Sudan’s 
independence, Beijing still has to find a balance in its relationship with both countries. As ICG 
(2012a:i) argues, it has proven difficult because of the unresolved political, economic and 
security issues that fuelled hostile relations between Juba and Khartoum since independence. 
Martina (2012) points out that China’s oil investments in both countries have given the Chinese 
government a stake in preserving stability between the two countries. Also, trade relations with 
South Sudan is still important for China as approximately five percent of China’s oil imports 
come from South Sudan (BMI, 2012f:19). The Chinese government aims to support peace by 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
81 The membership of these organisations is not necessarily a sign of regional integration, as these organisations with 
overlapping membership compete with one another. 
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focussing on economic development to overcome the “structural sources of the conflict” (Large 
(2012:5,12), and the government have indicated that they would support South Sudan in key 
areas such as energy, infrastructure, telecommunications and agriculture (ICG, 2012a:4).  
Because of Beijing’s close relations with Khartoum during the civil war, the Chinese 
government and Chinese business firms, in particular CNPC, have been associated with the 
economic exploitation and marginalisation of the south, while Khartoum has been favoured with 
regards to development (Wheeler, 2012:10). It seems as if this negative sentiments remains a 
hurdle in Sino-South Sudanese relations (Wheeler, 2012:10) and may affect the South Sudanese 
government’s sentiments towards CNPC. However, Barber and Xiao (2012:6) remark that Juba 
sees the potential benefits that China’s engagement might bring, particularly in addressing the 
country’s large infrastructure deficit. Sautman and Yan (2009:756) as well as Kuo (2012:4) argue 
that large construction projects around Juba by Chinese firms since the CPA in 2005 have 
influenced South Sudanese perceptions toward China positively. According to ICG (2012a:8), the 
South Sudanese perception has also changed because the Chinese government appears more 
willing to listen to the needs of the South Sudanese than their Western counterparts. Furthermore, 
while Beijing’s policy of “non-interference” was criticised during the civil war, Large (2012:19) 
and Barber and Xiao (2012:6) remark that this policy now appears to appeal to the government of 
South Sudan.  
Beijing has strengthened its ties with Juba though various high-level political visits to 
South Sudan, and President Salva Kiir has also visited Beijing since South Sudanese 
independence. Beijing has shown its willingness to support South Sudan by way of concessional 
loans, the construction of sports facilities and the renovation the Juba airport, as well as in areas 
such as humanitarian aid and the provision of anti-malaria drugs (Barber & Xiao, 2012:6). By 
way of its involvement in the peacekeeping mission by contributing troops to UNMISS, the 
Chinese government also supports security issues (ICG, 2012a:14). 
Despite this closer economic cooperation, ICG (2012a:29) points out that the dispute over 
transit fees with Khartoum has strained Juba’s relations with Beijing that may affect Juba’s 
sentiments towards CNPC. Beijing’s reluctance to get more involved in finding a solution to the 
oil dispute has been criticised by Juba and the international community. The Chinese 
government’s inaction against Khartoum after the confiscation of South Sudanese oil in 
December 2011 and January 2012 was seen by Juba as “passive complicity” with Khartoum 
(ICG, 2012a:ii). According to ICG (2012a:27), one of the main reasons for Beijing’s reluctance 
to press Khartoum is that it would be expected from China to write off Sudan’s debt of at least 
US$1,9 billion to make up for the gap in Sudanese lost oil revenue. Although high-level visits 
have been made to Juba to try to influence the parties, Kuo (2012:4) remarks that South Sudan is 
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not a top priority to China. This reluctance to get more involved in the oil dispute has had a 
negative effect on the relationship between Juba and Beijing, and consequently may affect Juba’s 
relationship with CNPC.  
 
4.2.6.3 International indicator: World petroleum market 
Risk rating: Medium: 3. The supply of oil on the world petroleum market has been limited by 
US and European Union (EU) bans to import oil from Iran and Syria, and oil prices remain high82 
(UN, 2012:4,12). Other key exporters such as Saudi Arabia have since increased their production 
to satisfy global demand and to ensure more stable prices (IMF, 2012:6). Apart from the 
Eurozone, BMI (2012a:5) expects global oil consumption to increase, because the economy of 
China, now the second largest oil consumer in the world, is still expected to grow at seven and a 
half percent in 2012 (BMI, 2012g:29). According to Ma et al. (2012:47), China has imported 
more than 50 percent of its oil supply since 2009 and this trade accounts for ten percent of the 
global oil trade. However, BMI (2012a:9) points out that the Chinese oil demand might decline if 
Beijing moves towards a market-based pricing system for fuel. But CNPC can still rely on the 
Chinese market because of the demand for the South Sudanese oil blends (BMI, 2012h:46).  
 
4.2.6.4 International indicator: World economic condition 
Risk rating: High: 4. The world economic condition remains weak and while world economic 
growth for 2011 was only 2,7 percent, the UN (2012:1) expects world growth of 2,5 percent in 
2012 and 3,1 percent in 2013. According to the UN (2012:1) the sovereign debt crisis in the 
Eurozone remains the biggest threat to the world economy, because an escalation of the crisis can 
trigger turmoil in the financial markets that in turn can lead to the contraction of economic 
activity in developed countries, that is already strained. The IMF (2012:4) argues that the 
declining demand in developed countries puts strain on developing countries’ growth, as 
evidenced by the slower growth of emerging market countries such as Brazil, China and India. 
The IMF (2012:4) also comments that low-income countries receive less aid because of declining 
economic growth in developed countries. The weak world economic situation can firstly affect 
CNPC because of lower oil demand that may lead to a lower return on investment. Secondly, it 
may be expected from CNPC to contribute more towards South Sudanese development as the 
weak financial situations of developed countries can limit their aid contributions to South Sudan. 
Especially since the shutdown of the oil production, South Sudan is dependent on donors for the 
building of infrastructure, that is in turn needed for South Sudanese economic growth.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
82 Refer to section 4.2.4.7. 
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4.2.6.5 International indicator: The demonstration effect83 
Risk rating: High: 4. ICG (2012b) reported in May 2012 that the Sudanese government has been 
extremely concerned about the effect that the Arab Spring84 uprisings in North Africa and the 
Middle East since December 2010 could have on Sudan. Reeves (2012) reports that there have 
been unprecedented protests due to grievances of hyperinflation and high fuel prices during June 
and July 2012 around Khartoum that also spread to other Sudanese regions. Because of the 
demonstration effect, these protests may also spill over to South Sudan, which has the same 
economic problems as Sudan. Such protests may threaten the security of CNPC’s personnel and 
assets. Furthermore, regime change in Sudan might affect the peace between Juba and Khartoum, 
a critical component of CNPC’s investment security in South Sudan because of their economic 
interdependency in terms of oil exports.  
 
4.3 Calculation of overall political risk  
In this section, the risk ratings for the indicators as scored in section 4.2 are applied to the 
Boshoff (2010) political risk model, as set out in section 2.4. A weight should be attached to each 
risk factor according to “the impact that the factor has relative to the analysis and the other 
factors” (Boshoff, 2010:60). The impact of the factors that contribute towards host country 
political risk is regarded as having a larger impact than the country and international risk factors. 
A combined weight of 70 percent for the four host country political risk factors and 30 percent 
for the combined company and international factors was regarded as the relative importance of 
the factors in the analysis. Because of the major impact of the oil industry in South Sudan’s 
political, economic and societal sphere, and the interconnectedness of these factors, even weights 
of 17,5 percent are attached to the political, economic, societal and petroleum factors. As the 
company and international risk factors are also interconnected in the sense that international 
indicators influence company indicators85, these two factors were regarded as having an equal 
impact on the analysis, and therefore a 15 percent weight is attached to each of these two factors.  
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
83 The demonstration effect refers the fact that developments in one place will often act as a catalyst for the same 
developments in another place. 
84 Oxford Dictionaries (2012) define “Arab Spring” as a series of anti-government uprising in various countries in 
North Africa and the Middle East, beginning in Tunisia in December 2010. The uprisings have spread to Egypt, 
Libya and Syria. 
85 For example, the international risk indictor of the relationship between the governments of China and South Sudan 
influences the relationship between CNPC and South Sudan, a company risk indicator. 
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Political risk 
type 
Factors Indicators Refe-
rence 
Rating 
0-5 
Weight Score 
Host country 
political risk 
Political 
 
Average rating: 3,586 
Regime/political stability  4.2.1.1 5 17,5% 
 
12,25 
War and security issues 4.2.1.2 4 
Repatriation restrictions 4.2.1.3 2 
Corruption/ poor governance 4.2.1.4 4 
Unclear legislation/security of tenure 4.2.1.5 3 
Investment constraints 4.2.1.6 3 
Economic 
 
Average rating: 4,14 
Economic performance  4.2.2.1 4 17,5% 14,5 
Balance of payments 4.2.2.2 4 
Creditworthiness 4.2.2.3 4 
Currency convertibility 4.2.2.4 3 
Energy vulnerability 4.2.2.5 5 
Public/private sector mix 4.2.2.6 5 
Current account deficit 4.2.2.7 4 
Societal 
 
Average rating: 4 
Internal violence 4.2.3.1 4 17,5% 14 
Civil and labour unrest 4.2.3.2 4 
Homogeneity  4.2.3.3 4 
Ethnic conflict 4.2.3.4 4 
Community opposition 4.2.3.5 4 
Standard of living 4.2.3.6 5 
Environmental activism 4.2.3.7 3 
Petroleum 
 
Average rating: 
3,11 
Ownership 4.2.4.1 5 17,5%  10,89 
Domestic reserves and production 4.2.4.2 4 
Host’s relative market position 4.2.4.3 3 
Level and destination of exports 4.2.4.4 4 
Strength of national oil company  4.2.4.5 2 
Role of foreign company in industry 4.2.4.6 2 
Oil and gas prices 4.2.4.7 2 
Domestic ability to operate the industry 4.2.4.8 1 
Firm and host contractual relationship  4.2.4.9 5 
Company 
political risk 
Company 
Average rating: 2,5 
Nationality of the company 4.2.5.1 2 15% 
 
7,5 
World industry positioning 4.2.5.2 2 
Special bargaining advantage 4.2.5.3 1 
Host government relations 4.2.5.4 5 
International 
political risk 
International  
Average rating: 3,6 
Host government international integration 4.2.6.1 3 15% 
 
10,8 
Host/home government relations 4.2.6.2 4 
World petroleum market 4.2.6.3 3 
World economic condition 4.2.6.4 4 
The demonstration effect 4.2.6.5 4 
Total 69,94 
 
Table Three: Calculation of overall political risk for CNPC in South Sudan.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
86 This rating of 3,5 reflects the average risk rating for the indicators of the political risk factor. This figure is 
calculated by adding all the risk ratings of the indicators for this factor and dividing the sum by the number of 
indicators. For example: (5+4+2+4+3+3)÷6=3,5. 
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The average risk rating for the political factor is 3,5. While the risk ratings for the indicators of 
political instability, war and security issues and corruption were high to extreme, the average 
rating for the political factor has been reduced by the fact that there is a low risk for restriction on 
repatriation of funds or personnel, and medium risk for the indicators of unclear legislation and 
investment constraints.  
The average risk rating for the economic factor is high at 4,14. While most of the 
indicators are high to extreme risk because of the effect of the oil shutdown on the economy, the 
average has been slightly reduced by the indicator of currency convertibility, because oil is traded 
in foreign currency.  
The average risk rating for the societal factor is high at 4. Internal violence may affect the 
oil producing regions of South Sudan, and poor living standards, ethnic divisions and unequal 
development may pose a risk of civil and labour unrest or environmental activism.  
The petroleum factor is rated at an average risk of 3,11. While the indicators such as the 
South Sudanese state ownership of the oil reserves, declining oil reserves and the dependency on 
neighbouring countries’ infrastructure for oil exports may pose a high risk, the risk is mitigated 
by the fact that South Sudan is extremely dependent on CNPC for the operation of its oilfields.  
The average risk rating for the company factor is relatively low at 2,5. Despite the fact 
that an extreme risk rating is assigned to the strained relations between Juba and CNPC, the risk 
is mitigated because of the special bargaining power of CNPC, such as the importance of China 
in terms of South Sudanese oil trade, CNPC’s status as a Chinese SOE, its technical and 
managerial capabilities and experience, and being the first and largest investor in the country.  
The average rating for the international factor is 3,6, because of strained relations between 
the governments of South Sudan and China, the weak world economic condition and the risk of 
the spill-over to Juba of civil unrest in Khartoum following the Arab Spring uprisings.  
From the analysis it can be seen that while the political, economic, societal and 
international factors have been rated high, the overall risk has been reduced because of the 
petroleum factor and the company factor. According to the scale for investment and political risk 
indication87, a score of 69,94 gives an investment indication of moderate to high risk and a 
political risk indication of high. This means that although CNPC may be exposed to high risk in 
the South Sudanese oil industry, it is still not at a level where the firm is advised to leave the 
country. While other oil firms may be reluctant to enter the country due to the high risk involved, 
CNPC’s competitive advantage may provide the firm with opportunities to gain from the high-
risk situation. The overall political risk rating will be explained in the next section. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
87 Refer to section 2.4, Table Two. 
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4.4 Overall political risk evaluation 
With the transfer of 75 percent of Sudan’s oil operations to South Sudan at independence, CNPC 
faced the risk that Juba would not renew its contracts to continue the oil production of the 
concessions that GNPOC and Petrodar had in Sudan. Negative sentiments towards the Chinese 
government and CNPC due to their association with Khartoum indicated an extreme risk 
rating. 88 . However, the risk has been reduced by the fact that the SPLM rather acted 
pragmatically in its decision to continue the contracts with CNPC. Because of South Sudan’s 
extreme reliance on oil revenue, the government could not afford to terminate the contracts with 
CNPC because it would send out a negative message as to the security of investments in South 
Sudan to other possible investors, making it difficult for Juba to replace CNPC as an investor. 
Also, the oil industry would be crippled if Juba terminated the contract with CNPC. Juba 
is extremely reliant on the oil revenue and does not have the ability to operate the oil industry 
without GNPOC and Petrodar. Because of the important role that CNPC played in the operation 
of the oil industry, such as the exploration technologies used in the Melut Basin and the 
development of the oil infrastructure, Juba is extremely reliant on CNPC to produce oil. 
Furthermore, CNPC has an advantage because of its status as a Chinese SOE. South Sudan’s 
economy is extremely dependent on China as an export destination as most of China’s refineries 
can process South Sudanese oil, while US refineries are not adequately equipped. These 
economic relations between South Sudan, China and CNPC impacted positively on the risk that 
CNPC’s operational contracts would be terminated with South Sudanese independence. CNPC 
signed a five-year transitional contract with Juba in January 2012, thereby securing its operations 
over the short term. However, despite the fact that CNPC can now be assured of the continuation 
of its operations, the terms of the contract may still pose a high risk to CNPC. Although the 
contract secured the existing concessions for CNPC, the contract allows for flexibility in Juba’s 
actions in cases where South Sudan is unable to export its oil. This allowed for the decision by 
Juba to shut down its oil production in late January 2012 without having the liability to 
compensate the oil corporations. This oil shutdown has led to severe losses for CNPC’s 
operations in South Sudan during 2012.  
The hostile relationship between Khartoum and Juba is another major factor of risk that 
might threaten the security of CNPC’s investments in South Sudan since the country’s 
independence. Because of the economic interdependence of the two countries, the hostile 
relationship and disagreement on an acceptable oil deal after independence has resulted in the 
shutdown of the South Sudanese oil production since late January 2012, and production is only 
expected to resume after a final peace agreement has been signed, which is to be negotiated 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
88 Refer to sections 4.2.5.4. and 4.2.6.2. 
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during September 2012 under the facilitation of the AUHIP. The shutdown has caused severe 
direct losses to CNPC, as Juba is not liable for compensating the oil companies in accordance 
with new contracts signed in January 2012. The shutdown has also indirectly affected CNPC, 
firstly because of the deteriorating effect that it had on relations between CNPC and Juba, as well 
as on Beijing-Juba relations. Secondly, the Sudanese and the South Sudanese economies have 
been devastated by the loss of oil revenue since the shutdown. This may pose the risk to CNPC of 
being targeted by the government to make up for the loss of oil revenue. The devastated economy 
in both countries has further major negative consequences for economic and human development 
in South Sudan that in turn may fuel grievances amongst the population. While protests have 
already started in Khartoum, there is a risk that it may spill over to South Sudan, a country with a 
violent political culture. This may also result in the renewal of violent conflict between Sudan 
and South Sudan, as evidenced by the interstate conflict in April 2012. The escalation of violence 
in both countries may affect the security of CNPC’s oil facilities and its ability to export oil 
through Sudan. As CNPC’s investments are dependent on South Sudan’s ability to export its oil, 
any renewed conflict may affect this ability. Therefore, the security of CNPC’s investment is 
dependent on the successful implementation of the peace agreement that is currently negotiated 
between Juba and Khartoum. The dependence of both economies on the revenue from the oil 
industry gives both parties an incentive to reach a deal, as both economies cannot afford further 
losses. 
 
4.5 Conclusion 
The purpose of this chapter was to answer the second sub-question of the study, which asks what 
the level of political risk is that CNPC faces in South Sudan since the country’s independence on 
9 July 2011. A political risk analysis was performed in accordance with Boshoff’s (2010) model 
and a score of 69,94 was calculated as an overall political risk level that CNPC faces in South 
Sudan. According to the scale, this indicates that CNPC has an investment indication of moderate 
to high risk and a political risk indication of high. This means that CNPC may face high political 
risk when operating in South Sudan, but the risk is still at an acceptable level for investment. A 
rating above 81 would be an indication that the investment is inadvisable. Despite the high risk, 
CNPC may still have opportunities for high investment returns in the country’s oil industry if the 
firm uses its competitive advantage and manage the political risk. 
In the next chapter, the results of the political risk analysis will be examined in order to 
answer the main research question and the study will be evaluated in accordance with the meeting 
of the research objectives.  
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Chapter Five: Conclusion and evaluation 
 
5.1 Introduction 
China has increased its FDI outflows to Africa significantly over the last decade and the African 
oil and gas industry in particular provides investment opportunities for Chinese NOCs. However, 
these opportunities are often in countries associated with high political risk, making the analysis 
of political risk increasingly relevant for the investment decision-making process of Chinese 
corporations as changes in political dynamics can affect the opportunities and profitability of 
investments. The nature of political risk has become complex as the world economies are 
increasingly integrated and interconnected and it has become important for firms to identify and 
incorporate all the dimensions of political risk into the analysis. As various scholars89 have 
argued that political risks are specific to certain industries, firms or projects, the objective of the 
study was to demonstrate the importance of firm-specific political risk analysis by way of a case 
study. The study aimed to identify the main indicators of political risk that Chinese firms may 
face in the oil and gas industry in African countries. A qualitative research approach was 
followed by way of an empirical case study of the political risk faced by one of China’s NOCs, 
CNPC in South Sudan.  
This last chapter brings the study to a conclusion by firstly providing a brief outline of the 
progress of the study up to this point. Thereafter, the study is evaluated in light of the main 
research question and the objectives as set out in Chapter One. This is followed by 
recommendations for future research in the field of political risk analysis. 
 
5.2 Progress of the study 
Chapter One served as a general introduction to the study. The research problem and research 
questions were presented, as well as the objectives, rationale and significance of the study. The 
objective was to gain an understanding of the political risks that Chinese firms may face in the 
African oil and gas industry and to demonstrate the importance of firm-specific political risk 
analysis in accordance with the general theories of political risk. The research design and 
research methods have been outlined, followed by an overview of the main literature that would 
be used during the course of the study. Thereafter the limitations and delimitations were set out, 
and finally, an outline of the further chapters was presented.  
Chapter Two firstly provided a theoretical grounding for the study by a discussion of 
political risk analysis in connection with decision-making and problem-solving theory. Secondly, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
89 Refer to scholars such as Boddewyn and Brewer (1994), Frynas and Mellahi (2003), Brink (2004), Alon and 
Herbert (2009) and Boshoff (2010). 
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the chapter served to conceptualise key terminology that would be used and applied during the 
course of the study. The concepts clarified included the terms FDI, risk, political risk, country 
risk, political instability, macro and micro political risk and political risk analysis. In the last 
section of the chapter the political risk model that would be used in the case study as a framework 
for the analysis of political risk faced by CNPC in South Sudan was presented.  
Chapter Three contextualised Chinese investments in the African oil and gas industry and 
its role in the Sudanese oil industry before South Sudan’s independence. Firstly, the influence of 
the Chinese foreign policy in relation to Chinese FDI was discussed, with special reference to the 
role of the state in the investment decisions of SOEs. It was found that the state’s control over the 
investment decisions of Chinese SOEs has weakened over the last decade because of bureaucratic 
fragmentation. Secondly, the influence of Chinese foreign policy on outflows of FDI to Africa 
was discussed, followed by a focus on Chinese investments in the African oil and gas industry. 
To narrow the context down to the current situation in South Sudan, the role of CNPC in the 
development of the Sudanese oil industry was discussed, followed by a brief discussion of the 
key issues of the Sudanese civil war that might impact the analysis of political risk faced by 
CNPC in South Sudan. The main issues of concern following the secession of South Sudan from 
Sudan on 9 July 2011 were then outlined. The two countries still had to agree on how to share the 
oil revenue and Sudan’s external debt. Also, no agreements have been reached on the 
demarcation of the common border and the status of citizens living across the border. The chapter 
concluded with the answering of the first sub-question of the study, which asked to identify the 
features of the relationship between China and Sudan before South Sudan’s secession. The 
features identified were broadly: Chinese oil firms engaged with Sudan as part of Beijing’s 
“going out” policy; Beijing’s policy of “non-interference”; China’s economic interest in Sudan’s 
oil; CNPC’s as largest oil investor; and the Chinese government and SOEs’ relations with 
Khartoum during the Sudanese civil war. 
The purpose of Chapter Four was to answer the second sub-question, which asked what 
the level of political risk is that CNPC faces in South Sudan since the country’s independence. 
An analysis of the political risk was presented by applying Boshoff’s (2010) political risk model 
for the oil and gas industry to the specific case. Each of the six political risk factors identified in 
the model were rated in accordance with the analysis and the rating of the specific risk indicators 
for each risk factor. The overall political risk level of 69,94 percent was calculated in accordance 
with the model’s mathematical formula, which indicated that CNPC has a high level of political 
risk exposure in South Sudan. However, the risk is not at a level where the firm would be advised 
to leave the country. CNPC may still have opportunities to gain from the high-risk situation 
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because of its competitive advantage in the country as an established investor in the South 
Sudanese oil industry.  
 
5.3 Evaluation of the study 
5.3.1 Answering the main research question 
The objective of the study was to demonstrate the general theories of political risk and the 
importance of firm-specific political risk analysis for Chinese firms operating in the oil and gas 
industry in Africa, as firms may be influenced in different ways by the political environment of 
countries in which they operate. If Chinese firms only focus on the analysis of macro political 
risk when operating in African countries with high-risk political environments and not take micro 
political risk factors that may mitigate the risk into account, important investment opportunities 
might be missed. The purpose of the study was not to develop a political risk model for Chinese 
oil firms, but to gain more empirical knowledge on the political risk they may face by way of a 
case study. As Yin (2009:14,15) points out, the findings from a case study cannot be generalised 
to populations or universes, but can be generalised to theoretical propositions with the goal of 
expanding or contributing to general theories. The research question of the study was: what are 
the main indicators of political risk that Chinese corporations may face in the oil and gas industry 
in African countries?  
In order to answer the main research question, the analysis of political risk faced by CNPC in 
South Sudan as set out in Chapter Four, has been examined and generalised to the theories of 
political risk as discussed in Chapter Two. The following main indicators90 of political risk that 
Chinese corporations may face in the oil and gas industry in African countries have been 
identified91 in this study, which includes indicators of macro as well as micro political risk.  
• Political instability. Political instability in African countries may expose Chinese oil 
firms to the risk of decisions made by new governments or new factions within the 
government, which might impact the firm’s ability to continue its operations or influence 
its profitability. This was demonstrated in the case study by the decision of the South 
Sudanese government to shut down the oil production of the country, following a dispute 
with Sudan over the fees charged for the use of Sudan’s oil infrastructure.  
• International and internal conflict. Violent conflict, whether international or internal, 
may expose Chinese firms to security risks if their operations are situated in the conflict 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
90 The term indicator is used in the same context as used in the Boshoff (2010) political risk model. In other studies 
these indicators may be referred to as risk factors. 
91 The list only includes the indicators of political risk that were identified in the study. Other factors and indicators 
may affect the political risk for Chinese NOCs operating in African countries that were not identified in the case 
study. 
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zones. Oil fields, the production facilities and the transport and export infrastructure may 
be damaged, and the security of oil firms’ personnel may be threatened by violent attacks 
during a conflict situation. In situations where the African country is dependent on 
infrastructure of neighbouring countries to export its oil, violent conflict in those countries 
may also influence the political risk exposure of Chinese firms. In South Sudan, violent 
conflict between Sudan and South Sudan has threatened the security of oil fields that have 
specifically been targeted by armed forces of both sides. CNPC’s oil production facilities 
are also situated in the Sudan-South Sudan border zones, where incidences of internal 
violence were widespread since 2011. Furthermore, ongoing internal violence in the 
Sudanese states of Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile may expose CNPC to political risk, 
as attacks on the oil pipelines to Port Sudan may influence South Sudan’s ability to export 
its oil. 
• Corruption and weak state institutions. Corruption and a system of patronage is a 
political risk variable that may affect Chinese oil firms as it sustains weak administrative 
systems in African countries. Corruption may be particularly high in countries where the 
economy is very dependent on oil revenue. This makes the firms extremely reliant and 
vulnerable to individuals in the government or state institutions of African countries. This 
might especially be a problem in countries with unstable governments where individuals 
are easily substituted. 
• Economic development. The African country’s economic development may indirectly 
affect the Chinese oil corporations’ investments. Poor economic development outside the 
oil industry and unequal distribution of the benefits of oil revenue may cause grievances 
amongst the population that in turn may trigger violent conflict or political instability. In 
the case study, this was evidenced by the effect that the marginalisation of southern Sudan 
in terms of economic development had on the outbreak of the Sudanese civil war. 
Grievances amongst South Sudanese government officials towards Khartoum due to the 
unequal distribution of oil revenue were also one of the main reasons for the decision to 
shut down the South Sudanese oil production at the beginning of 2012. 
• Social development. Poor human development levels in African countries may pose the 
risk of operational inefficiency to Chinese oil corporations, especially if the African 
country has strict local employment policies. Chinese oil firms may also be indirectly 
affected by poor social conditions, which may increase the risk of civil and labour unrest, 
political instability or internal violence.  
• Community opposition. Chinese oil corporations may be exposed to the risk of being 
targeted physically or by way of activism because of community opposition against the oil 
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firms. For example, Chinese oil companies in South Sudan are negatively associated with 
alleged forced removals during the development of the Sudanese oil fields. Furthermore, 
Chinese oil companies in South Sudan have been accused of following a top-down 
approach in social development projects in the oil producing regions, and of being 
reluctant to assist in aiding to resolve the humanitarian crisis in the country.  
• External dependency of the oil industry. The more dependent the African country is on 
its neighbouring or other countries for the export of its oil, the more vulnerable the 
Chinese oil firms may be to possible hostile relations with neighbours or conflict in 
neighbouring countries that can jeopardise the host country’s ability to export its oil. In 
the case study, this was demonstrated by the dispute over the oil transit fees that Sudan 
charged for the use of its oil pipelines to Port Sudan. The landlocked South Sudan is 
completely dependent on Sudan to export its oil and the dispute influenced its ability to 
export oil that in turn led to the decision by Juba to shut down the oil production.  
• Location of the oil operations. The political risk exposure of the Chinese oil firms may 
be influenced by the location of the oil fields. In the case of South Sudan, all the oil fields 
operated by GNPOC and Petrodar, as well as the oil pipelines that transport the oil to the 
export facilities, are located in regions where they may be exposed to violent conflict. 
However, the head offices of the oil consortiums are situated in Juba, where the security 
situation is more stable and the administration personnel and assets may be less exposed 
to political risk.  
• Contract specifications. The specifications of contracts that Chinese oil corporations 
have with the African countries may make the firms vulnerable to political decisions 
taken by governments. In the case of South Sudan, oil companies only have a right to 
operate the oil fields in terms of EPSAs, which grant certain rights to the South Sudanese 
government and may expose the firms to political risk. For example, in terms of the 
contract between CNPC and the South Sudanese government, CNPC does not have a right 
to be compensated by the government for the losses incurred by the government’s 
decision to shut down the oil production.  
• Relative importance of the Chinese NOC to the host country’s oil industry. The more 
dependent the country is on the Chinese firm to operate the oil industry, the less the firm 
may be exposed to the risk of expropriation. This is especially the case when the country 
does not have the ability to operate the industry. In the case of South Sudan, CNPC is the 
largest investor in the oil industry and the country is extremely dependent on the oil 
consortiums run by CNPC to operate the industry. As a new state, the South Sudan has 
weak state institutions and a weak NOC with little experience in the field of petroleum 
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policies. CNPC is important as most of the Western oil firms have left the country 
because of the Sudanese civil war and sanctions against Sudan since the late 1990s. 
• Competitive advantage of Chinese NOCs. Being a Chinese SOE may give a firm a 
special competitive advantage over other firms operating in the African oil and gas 
industry. Firstly, Chinese SOEs traditionally had a long-term perspective on the expansion 
of business opportunities rather than short-term profits. Managers of SOEs are now more 
profit-oriented, but may still have a longer term view on profits than firms from other 
countries and may still be influenced by political goals. Secondly, because of Beijing’s 
official policy of “non-interference”, Chinese SOEs may have opportunities to expand 
their business operations in countries where Western firms have withdrawn for political 
reasons. Generally Chinese SOEs do not have the same pressure from their home country 
as Western firms have to withdraw their investments from a country for political reasons 
such as terrorism or human rights violations. This was demonstrated in the case study by 
the fact that CNPC got a foothold in Sudan because of a lack of Western competition. US 
firms were prohibited by sanctions to invest in or trade with Sudan because of alleged 
terrorism. Thirdly, Chinese SOEs may have a special bargaining advantage of low-cost 
capital and labour, and low investment return and dividend payout requirements. This 
may give Chinese firms the advantage of being able to bid lower than their Western 
counterparts for oil operating contracts or construction projects in the oil industry. 
Fourthly, Chinese SOEs’ ability to make quick decisions and mobilise its activities in a 
short period may contribute to its competitive advantage. Indeed Frynas and Mellahi 
(2003) suggest that firms may exploit their competitive advantage and use it to reduce 
their political risk exposure. Chinese NOCs may therefore use these attributes of being a 
SOE to gain opportunities in the African oil and gas industry.  
• Government support to Chinese NOCs. Chinese NOCs may have the advantage of 
diplomatic and economic support from the Chinese government, mainly in the form of 
economic cooperation packages. Sethi and Luther (1986:66) argue that such a relationship 
may safeguard firms against some aspects of risks, for example if the home government 
can pressure the host government by withholding aid. The availability of these economic 
cooperation packages may secure Chinese oil firms’ access to exploration concessions in 
African countries. MOFCOM oversees Chinese FDI and aid, and can provide 
concessional loans to African countries for the development of infrastructure through 
China Exim Bank. These loans are attractive to African countries as they have relatively 
low interest rates and no political conditions such as good governance or the adherence to 
human rights regulations are attached to the loans. The availability of these loans may 
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benefit Chinese oil firms as the repayment of the loans may be linked to Chinese access to 
the African oil fields, either in the form of concessions or in the form of oil exports to 
China. 
• Technical abilities of Chinese NOCs. The technical abilities of Chinese oil firms may 
influence their political risk exposure positively or negatively. As demonstrated in the 
case study, CNPC had a technical advantage in the exploration of the Melut Basin in 
Sudan because of its experience in the Chinese upstream oil industry. This technical 
ability made Sudan, and later South Sudan, extremely dependent on CNPC and thereby 
reduced the firm’s risk exposure of being expropriated. However, in concessions that 
involve offshore exploration, CNPC may have a disadvantage because of a lack of 
technological experience. 
• Relative size of the Chinese NOC and the investment. The world industry positioning 
of the Chinese oil firm and the relative size of the investment for the firm may affect the 
firm’s political risk exposure. Large firms such as CNPC and Sinopec with wide 
investment exposure may be able to offset their losses of one project or investment by 
high profits gained in other projects or investments. In the case of South Sudan it was 
found that CNPC had the ability to carry the losses incurred during the shutdown of the 
South Sudanese oil production.  
• Economic dependency on the Chinese NOC. The relationship between the Chinese firm 
and the African country may have a significant influence on an oil firm’s political risk 
exposure, in particular its economic relationship. The more economically dependent the 
country is firstly on the oil industry, and secondly on the Chinese oil firm, the less 
political risk the firm may be exposed to. It was found in the case study that the relations 
between CNPC and South Sudan were strained because of CNPC’s association with 
Khartoum during the civil war. However, despite negative sentiments in the SPLM 
government towards Chinese oil firms that could lead to their contracts being ceased, the 
South Sudanese government acted pragmatically by renewing the contracts with CNPC 
because of economic interest. Due to South Sudan’s extreme dependency on the oil 
industry, and on CNPC as the largest investor with established oil production facilities in 
the country, the termination of their contracts would cripple the South Sudanese oil 
industry and with it the South Sudanese economy. Rather than acting on political 
sentiments, economic interest was decisive in Juba’s relations with CNPC. 
• China’s economic relations with the host country. The more the host country’s 
economy is dependent on China for trade, investments or finance for development 
projects such as infrastructure, the less political risk exposure the Chinese oil firm may 
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face. Also, the more important the host country is for China in economic terms, the more 
the firm may depend on support from the Chinese government, that may assist the firm to 
mitigate its political risk exposure. Sethi and Luther (1986:63) argue that a firm may use 
the relations between the home and host country as a bargaining power. In the case study 
the political and diplomatic relations between the governments of China and South Sudan 
were strained because of Beijing’s close relations with Khartoum and the Chinese 
government’s reluctance to get involved in the resolution to the oil dispute. However, the 
economic relations between the two countries were more important and played a larger 
role in the mitigation of CNPC’s political risk exposure in South Sudan. China is of major 
economic significance for South Sudan as the largest source of FDI, the largest export 
destination and a large potential source of finance for essential infrastructure 
development. South Sudan, on the other hand, is relevant for China in terms of oil 
imports, and therefore CNPC has the advantage of getting diplomatic support from 
Beijing in its negotiations with South Sudan.  
 
This study demonstrated the importance of firm-specific political risk analysis, as many of the 
factors and indicators of political risk that CNPC are exposed to in South Sudan are specific to 
the oil industry, and other factors and indicators may influence the way CNPC is affected by 
macro political risk. For example, the shutdown of the South Sudanese oil industry directly 
affected oil corporations, but only indirectly influenced other industries because of the effect on 
the country’s economy. Furthermore, indicators such as being a Chinese state-owned firm might 
impact the political risk exposure of that specific firm. The selection of the case study of CNPC’s 
operations in the South Sudanese oil industry proved to be a good example to illustrate the 
importance of firm-specific political risk analysis and to emphasise the need for firm-specific 
political risk analysis as a decision-making tool for international businesses operating in foreign 
countries.  
 
5.3.2 Review of the study 
Two aspects should be mentioned in the review of the study. Firstly, the majority of the articles 
and studies presented in the literature overview in Chapter One were found to be useful in serving 
as a foundation for this research. Most of the sources were secondary and this proved to be 
sufficient for the purposes of the second and third chapters. Some difficulties were found with the 
availability of information of Chapter Four because of the short period since South Sudan’s 
independence. Some of the statistical data, such as economic data on the balance of payments and 
current account, was not available for South Sudan from the sources consulted and the data had to 
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be derived from other information. Other reports still used combined data for Sudan and South 
Sudan. Furthermore, most data on the oil negotiations were cryptic and it was difficult to identify 
the influence of all the role-players from the reports. A few recent secondary sources were 
helpful in this regard, but care had to be taken not to rely too much on one source, as it could 
limit objectivity in the analysis. As the oil and border negotiations between Sudan and South 
Sudan were ongoing during the course of the study, it was difficult to make a final conclusion to 
the assessment of political risk. It should be taken into account that only information up to 31 
August 2012 was used and developments afterwards might have an influence on the final risk 
evaluation, but not necessarily on the answering of the research questions posed by the study.  
Secondly, some aspects of Boshoff’s (2010) political risk model used as a framework for 
the analysis should be mentioned in the evaluation of the study. The model proved to be a good 
basis for firm- and industry-specific political risk analysis for the oil and gas industry as it made 
provision for both macro and micro political risk factors and indicators in one model. However, 
some aspects should be noted about the application of the model in the study. Firstly, the model 
makes provision for the discretion of the analyst in the weighting of political risk factors to 
calculate an overall political risk rating, but not for the weighting of the indicators that are used to 
calculate the average risk rating for each risk factor. This proved to be a disadvantage of the 
model, as it was found by the analysis of the context of the case that some indicators contributed 
more than others to the specific risk factor, but because no discretion was given to the analyst to 
adjust the weight of the indicator, the higher contribution was not reflected in the quantitative risk 
rating of the factor. For example, the shutdown of the oil industry had an extreme impact on the 
political risk that CNPC might face, but the indicator for political instability was watered down in 
the political factor risk rating because of lower values attached to less significant issues. The 
second aspect about the model that should be noted is that some of the indicators overlap when a 
specific factor is analysed. For example, for the societal factor, indicators such as homogeneity, 
ethnic conflict and internal violence overlap. Also, the indicators of balance of payments and 
current account overlap in the analysis of the economic factor. By combining these indicators, a 
more effective analysis could be made.  
These two limitations of Boshoff’s (2010) model can be overcome by giving the analyst 
more flexibility in the weighting of the indicators. The identification of these aspects emphasises 
the importance of the political risk analysis within a certain context and of using qualitative 
methods in conjunction with quantitative political risk analysis methods, as suggested by Frei and 
Ruloff (1988:6).  
The next section suggests further areas for research that were identified during the course 
of the study. 
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5.4 Recommendations for future research 
The study was limited to an empirical case study on political risk faced by CNPC in South Sudan 
since the country’s independence. More empirical studies can be performed to give better insight 
in the phenomenon of political risk, specifically with regards to micro political risk. The research 
on the indicators of political risk that Chinese firms may face in the African oil and gas industry 
can be extended to other Chinese oil firms and to other African countries, such as Nigeria, 
Angola or DRC. Since Chinese firms are expanding their investments in other sectors such as 
construction, telecommunications and retail in African countries, comparative research in other 
sectors may also provide valuable insight into the nature of political risk faced by Chinese firms 
in Africa. 
More research is also warranted in the area of industry specific political risk models. The 
scope of this study was limited to the application of a model, and the aim was not to develop a 
new model. However, as difficulties were found with some of the aspects in the application of the 
model, it is suggested that with more theoretical and empirical research, the models that are 
currently available can be streamlined to be able to give a better measurement of a firm’s political 
risk exposure.  
Finally, this research study did not include a discussion of risk mitigation and risk 
management. For Chinese corporations that operate in African countries where they may face 
high political risk, political risk analyses should be supplemented by risk mitigation and risk 
management plans. Security and profitability objectives are becoming more relevant for Chinese 
SOEs as they operate in these high-risk regions. If the political risk can be managed and 
mitigated, the opportunities that may exist for high returns on their investments may be exploited. 
 
5.5 Conclusion 
The nature of political risk is complex and multidimensional in an integrated world economy 
where MNCs of developing countries are increasingly investing in operations situated in foreign 
countries. This is evident from the expansion of the presence of Chinese NOCs in the African 
continent, where the political environment of the oil producing countries often expose the firms 
to high political risk. Oil has played a central role in the politics of Sudan since the discovery of 
oil reserves during the late 1970s, and has been a significant factor in the events leading to the 
secession of South Sudan in July 2011. As a major investor, CNPC, one of the large Chinese 
NOCs, was significant in the development of the Sudanese oil industry, and found itself in a 
difficult position when the largest part of the oil reserves were transferred to South Sudan after 
the country’s independence. These developments changed the political landscape in which CNPC 
has to operate and may expose the firm to possible political risks. This study analysed the 
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political risk exposure of CNPC in South Sudan, and found that the firm may face a high level of 
political risk. However, the political risk exposure was mitigated by certain indicators of political 
risk such as the economic dependency of South Sudan on China and CNPC. By examining the 
results of the case study, possible indicators of political risk that Chinese oil firms may be 
exposed to in African countries were identified. The study demonstrated the complex nature of 
political risk and the close connection between business and politics. This highlighted the 
importance of political risk analysis for international business firms as a decision-making tool to 
justify its investment decisions Even in high-risk political environments, the African oil industry 
may provide Chinese NOCs with opportunities of gains if these risks are managed. 
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Appendix A 	  
Chronology of the conflict and oil development in Sudan, 1850-2011 
 
 
Table Four: Chronology of the conflict and oil development in Sudan, 1850-2011. 
Source: Adapted from BBC News (2012b), ECOS, (2010), Kobrin (2004), Harneit-Sievers (2010) and 
Large (2008). 
  
•  Sudan under British-Egyptian rule 1899 - 1955 
•  Outbreak of first Sudanese civil war 1955 
•   Sudan gains independence 1956 
•  Jaafer Nimeiri comes to power after coup d'etat 1968 
•  Addis Ababa Peace Agreement grants southern 
Sudan autonomy 1972 
•  Oil discovered in the Muglad Basin 1978 
•  Chevron starts oil development in Muglad Basin 1982 
•  Powers of southern Sudan eliminated 
•  Sharia (Islamic) Law introduced 
•  Outbreak of second Sudanese civil war 
1983 
•  Chevron suspends oil operations in Sudan  1984 
•  NIF comes to power after coup d'etat led by 
Omar al Bashir 1989 
•  US sanctions against Sudan 
•  GNPOC starts oil production in Muglad Basin 1997 
•  Sudan begins to export oil 1999 
•  CNPC discovers major oil field in Melut Basin 2003 
•  CPA signed by the NCP and SPLM/A 2005 
•  Southern Sudanese vote in favour of secession 9 January 2011 
•  South Sudan gains independence 9 July 2011 
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Appendix B 
Maps 
 
 
Map One: Sudan and South Sudan oil blocks. 
Source: ECOS (2010).  
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Map Two: Sudan and South Sudan: Heglig oilfields. 
Source: BBC News (2012c). 
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Map Three: States of South Sudan.  
Source: ICG (2011b). 
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